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Introduction 
The dawn of the democratic political era in South Africa with the dismantling of the 
Apartheid racial ideology in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s marked a liberal watershed 
in the country’s political history, a history characterised by oppression and ‘raciallized’ 
exclusion of the indigenous ‘non-white’ populations.  Ascendancy to power of the first 
non-racial, democratically elected government in 1994 has signalled a major turning 
point in political focus in the country. In the initial years of democracy, the new 
government has embarked on ambitious programs aimed at the promotion of socio-
economic integration of the previously disadvantaged populations, and attempts to 
redress the numerous inequalities resulting from racial segregation and oppression dating 
back to the colonial era. The legacy of race-based politics in South Africa has produced 
countless such inequalities between the privileged predominantly ‘white’ population, and 
marginalized communities defined as ‘black’ or ‘non-white’ under the Apartheid 
discourse. This legacy has involved the systematic identification and classification of the 
entire population into specific categories on the basis of socially constructed notions of 
‘race’, and allowed for the forced exclusion of the majority ‘non-white’ population by the 
supposedly superior ‘whites’. 
Exclusion has possessed many differing mechanisms and diverse forms throughout the 
history of race-based politics in South Africa. The zenith of this program was reached 
with the National Party government’s Apartheid ideology, which was to emerge as the 
ideal model of race-based socio-political exclusion; serving to formalise racism in 
legalistic terms and allow for the systematic reordering and reproduction of society to 
reflect this bias. The forms of social exclusion of racially marginalised populations are 
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numerous, with marginalized populations in South Africa suffering economic, political 
and social burdens at the hands of the exclusively ‘white’ government. Despite the 
transformation to democracy and over a decade of reform and development initiatives, 
this legacy of race-based politics and exclusions continues to pose a significant challenge 
to the new government’s attempts to promote integration, and the effects of over a 
century of racial bias are still keenly felt.  
This study is located generally in the intellectual fields of urban development and 
comparative environmentalism relating to a number important aspects of exclusion and 
race-based political theory; but more specifically in the literature concerning spatial/ 
geographic exclusions, environmental exclusions and in particular the arguments 
presented by Goldberg (1993) in Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning1, 
and the discourse of Environmental Justice. The paper has two principal aims. First the 
study aims to serve as an examination in the South African context of the means whereby 
racially marginalised populations are excluded from space and attempts to promote urban 
development, healthy environments (and their benefits), community and policy-making 
concerning the places where they live, resulting in the deepening of inequalities between 
these marginalized populations and the affluent groups in society. By proceeding from an 
examination of development initiatives undertaken in terms of the dominant development 
discourse in South Africa – the study aims to link the continued existence of racially-
constituted spatial forms to root causes in this specific development strategy, which 
allows for the covert operation of racial spatialisation to proceed unfettered.  
                                                 
1
 Oxford, Blackwell publishers, 1993 
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The second aim of the paper is an examination of the nature of development projects 
undertaken in the post- apartheid era; ostensibly with the aim of promoting integration 
and the formation of sustainable human settlements for the marginalized in South 
Africa’s urban context. Through a critical analysis of these projects and policies, the 
study aims to show how contemporary development has yielded inherently unsustainable 
outcomes – resulting in the exacerbation of the spatial, environmental and socio 
economic exclusion of the marginalized. 
The case study presented as part of the examination examines two wards in the 
Johannesburg Municipality and the specific manifestations of these issues in these areas, 
placing the theoretical issues within the context of urban development on the fringes of 
Johannesburg’s sprawling suburbs and the numerous informal settlements located therein. 
Brief Outline to the Paper 
The first chapter in the discussion serves to introduce the notion of social exclusions in 
terms of space and the environment, providing an important link between the concerns of 
social justice and those relating to urban spatial geography in the South African setting 
and social and environmental exclusions. The legacy of Apartheid’s urban settlement 
patterns and racial marginalisation is examined to the extent to which it impacts on 
contemporary urban spatial configurations, particularly the creation of periphractic spaces 
such as informal settlements and townships; identifying a number of practical problems 
concerning the concentration of large numbers of the marginalised in these spatially 
dislocated and environmentally desolate and untenable regions. Through an examination 
of the mechanisms which act to normalise and reproduce racial configuration of human 
settlements, in particular through a close examination of Goldberg’s (1993) argument; the 
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chapter introduces a number of important mechanisms which feature in the context of 
South Africa’s post-Apartheid human settlement formations. Included in this discussion 
is an examination of the existence and operation of a number of socially constructed 
pathologies concerning inhabitants of the margins – which act to normalise or legitimise 
their ongoing confinement in the urban margins. 
Part two of the chapter extends these theoretical notions to an examination of the 
environmental spaces occupied by the marginalized in the context of South Africa. 
Beginning with a historical assessment of black environmentalism since the colonial 
period until the inception of the environmental justice movement in the 1990’s, the 
chapter examines the effects of degradation and dangers faced by residents of South 
Africa’s blighted margins. 
Chapter two extends the discussion through an examination of the spatial and 
environmental exclusion of the marginalised in terms of development discourse in the 
post-Apartheid era. The chapter begins with a discussion of the three mainstream 
approaches to development at the global level; neo-liberalism, sustainable development 
and environmental justice. The chapter introduces the discourse of Environmental Justice 
and its acceptance, both internationally and locally, as an important body of theory in the 
promotion of awareness concerning those environmental issues facing marginalised 
populations throughout the world. Numerous successes, criticisms and dilemmas 
concerning the environmental justice discourse are examined, specifically those relating 
to its genesis as a reaction to environmental racism in the United States of America, and 
the racially based marginalisation of poor communities of colour with respects their 
environments.  This marginalisation assumes numerous different types: including 
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marginalisation in terms of quality of environments, policy-making and management.  
The second portion of the chapter attempts to place development initiatives undertaken 
since 1994 in context of these discourses, and in particular the dominant accepted 
discourse of neo-liberalism. By alluding to a number of shortcomings in the areas of 
human settlement formation and the provision of housing and basic services to the 
marginalised – the chapter identifies a number of dominant features of the discourse of 
neo-liberalism which assist in the formation of un-sustainable development practices – 
further affecting the marginalisation of vulnerable groups in South African society. 
The final chapter forms the body of the case study. Beginning with a general introduction 
to the case study through an examination of the demographics and main concerns of the 
areas which form the main body of the case study, the chapter introduces two wards 
within the Johannesburg Municipality which form the main area of study, namely Wards 
95, 96. The area forms an incredibly interesting area of study, as it is located in the North 
of Johannesburg in relatively newly settled high-concentration residential spaces, 
characteristic of the rapid suburban sprawl occurring in most of Johannesburg. The 
surrounding areas are also examined to show high degrees of disparity between 
inhabitants in relation to affluence, class and employment; with the region serving as host 
to one newly formalised predominantly ‘black’ residential settlement, two informal 
settlements – as well as some of the highest-cost residential spaces in Johannesburg. 
Problems facing each of these wards are highlighted in turn, with important challenges 
facing the populations within being elaborated upon. The chapter includes discussion of a 
number of pertinent issues relating to the Integrated Development Plan in the region, 
including the discussion of disputes relating to social exclusion; in the ongoing attempt to 
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relocate the informal settlement of Zevenfontein, and sections of the informal settlement 
at Diepsloot in the area by the ‘white’ residents; and the formalisation of road closures in 
the area creating isolated high-security (predominantly ‘white’) residential communities, 
in response to the encroachment of ‘black’ settlements on these spaces. 
Finally, the second part of the chapter forms the main body of the case study, that of 
residents’ reaction to exclusion within the periphractic spaces in the study region. 
Reactions can be roughly divided into different categories: that of reaction to their 
general environment, reaction to exclusion from space, and finally to exclusion from 
integration from the ‘white’ residential areas through the proposed relocation, and the 
security enclosures of the ‘white’ residential areas. A final portion of this chapter deals 
with the wishes of the population with regards their integration into the broader 
community.  
Methodology 
The study is the culmination of a process involving a wide variety of primary sources as 
well as the secondary theoretical sources mentioned. Primary sources included the 
analysis of local community newspapers, a national newspaper, Integrated Development 
Plan for the region, Spatial Development Plans for the region, census data and 
approximately twenty to thirty household visits in the informal settlement of Diepsloot 
and Zevenfontein. During the course of these visits a number of informal discussions 
with families and friends, as well as private interviews were undertaken. Further, in each 
ward, the ward councillor was interviewed as to development issues facing the region, 
environmental issues and reaction to exclusion brought to their attention by the public. 
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Social workers in the area of the informal settlements were also contacted and 
interviewed concerning a number of pertinent social issues brought to their attention. 
The case study serves to dispel a number of myths concerning the spatial and 
environmental awareness amongst diverse populations in South Africa. The prevalence of 
crime in contemporary South African society features as an important variable in the 
determination of spaces and their quality across both groups. Crime has two varying 
interpretations as both something that is ‘outside and inflicted upon’, among inhabitants 
of the affluent areas who continue to see the spatial configuration of society as one which 
demands rigidity, a sense of place or structural order; to a sense of ‘in and among us’ 
amongst inhabitants of the periphractic spaces, with varied prospective solutions being 
proffered most often dealing with the provision of basic needs, such as electricity and 
increased integration. Both landscapes reflect these orientations in the case study, with 
affluent areas exhibiting a concerted (and often very expensive) attempt to keep those 
who don’t belong out, or at least to deny their proximity in large concentrations. The 
operation of various social pathologies which equate the prevalence of crime with ‘black’ 
or marginalised populations, is a particular concern of this discussion, as it dictates the 
construction of urban spatial formation in profound way. 
The final experience of exclusion as examined by the document deals with the aspirations 
of the marginalised and their reaction to their blighted margins. Perceived exclusion was 
found to feature highly in the mindset of the South African marginalised with special 
emphasis on a continuation of Apartheid issues relating to places of inhabitancy. The 
abilities of affluent populations to insulate their communities through private interests in 
security mechanisms, and their support of local metropolitan programs for the provision 
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of security such as road closures discussed in detail in the case study; generates a sense of 
exclusion for marginalised populations. The erection of fences, ‘Berlin walls’, or cages as 
described in numerous retorts from those inhabiting the margins reflects a distinct racial 
bias to the construction of social space, one which most often represents a perversion of 
democratic rights to private property and the right to self-protection. 
With regards environmentalism, contemporary wisdom concerning environmental 
awareness often assumes environmentalism to be the domain of white, predominantly 
middle-class members of society – the paper both in its theoretical content and in the 
findings of the case study reveal a strikingly different reality. Whilst media reports 
concerning the environment in the affluent areas focuses predominantly on issues such as 
species conservation and anti-development articles arguing for the preservation of the 
commons, the situation in informal settlements reveals a markedly different focus. For 
the most part, the populations of informal settlements were found to exhibit a remarkable 
awareness of the negative aspects of their unhealthy environmental existence, despite the 
paucity of efforts to improve them. In particular though, the disparities between 
environmental concerns across the racial groups can be said to be illustrative of what has 
grown to be termed the ‘green versus brown’ debate in environmental theory. Issues 
affecting those inhabitants of informal settlements tend to be restricted to the provision of 
basic needs, such as water, sanitation and waste collection; the availability of 
employment; the prevention of social ills, including crime, promiscuity and substance 
abuse; and the promotion of pride and permanence. These issues are often referred to as 
brown considerations. Green issues by contrast involve issues of conservation of species, 
both plant and animal; preservation of natural habitat; and in some cases sustainability of 
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natural resources necessary in capital intensive industrial production. Analysis of 
community participation, charitable donations and leisure option in the affluent areas in 
the study confirmed conventional wisdom dealing with awareness amongst the affluent, 
with concern primarily being addressed in terms of the aesthetic enjoyment of natural 
spaces and species, in contrast to the bitter struggle for basic needs which is characteristic 
of inhabitants of the two informal settlements. 
This paper hopes to present the experiences of exclusion in space, environments and 
broader society from the standpoint of those inhabiting the margins, from the point of 
reference of informal settlement residents. Reactions to their conceptions of place in 
society, their environments, and as communities in search of wider integration into this 
newly democratic South Africa present a challenge to the contemporary urban and sub-




The Legacy of Spatial Exclusion in South Africa 
 
Despite the process of transformation and democratization, South Africa’s cities for the 
most part continue to display many of the hallmarks of their racialised history. Not with 
standing the legislative and policy enactments of the newly democratically elected 
African National Congress –lead government, newly urbanized ‘blacks’ flocking to urban 
centres in search of employment continue to face numerous challenges as a result of the 
perpetuation of boundaries which have survived the liberalisation of the racialised 
colonial- and Apartheid-cities.2 After over 10 years of democracy, the government 
remains confronted with the increasingly desperate challenge of re-ordering South 
Africa’s Apartheid cities, which combine “planning problems of both First World and 
Third World urbanism and the huge headaches of an Apartheid inheritance.”3 
The outcomes of this challenge will have profound and lasting effects on social justice in 
South Africa’s post-Apartheid cities, and the future spatial form which these cities are to 
adopt. 
Following the arguments of Iris Marion Young (1990), cities often exhibit clearly 
determinable scars of the inequalities of distribution evident in broader society, yet 
despite this visible evidence, “The social structures, processes and relationships that 
produce and reproduce these distributions, however, are not so visible….”4 
                                                 
2
 Lemon, A (eds); Homes Apart: South Africa’s Segregated Cities; David Philip, Cape Town, 1991, p. ix 
3
 Ibid, p. ix 
4
 Young, M (1990) :241, cited Smith, D, Urban Fragmentation, Inequality and Social Justice: Ethical 
Perspectives, in Harrison et al (eds), Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and urban development in a 
democratising society, chp 2, Cape Town, UCT Press (2003_ 
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South Africa’s urban centres are vivid examples of this argument. The spatial separation 
of racially-defined populations, advocated and enforced during Apartheid remains 
stamped into the contemporary urban structure despite liberalism of the legal 
superstructure which enforced it, with the result that; 
democratic space is still subject to contestation because, although people 
have the political freedom to move around, they are confined to the spaces 
of old, spaces that defined people on the basis of colour.5 
Despite valiant attempts under democracy to extend service provision to the victims of 
oppression and exclusion under Apartheid – the ordering of South Africa’s cities 
continues to pose a daunting experience of marginalisation and exclusion to these 
populations, suggesting that for the most part, “The Apartheid legacy has been carried in 
to the new era largely intact.”6 
Following Young’s argument then, what is necessary to reform and eradicate these 
symptoms of decades of inequality, and indeed to explain why attempts to do exactly this 
over the past 10 years of democracy have failed; is the identification of the underlying 
processes and relationships which support, reform and reproduce marginalisation and 
social exclusion in the urban makeup. 
Of crucial value in this attempt, is an understanding of the mechanisms whereby spaces 
are constituted, how they are maintained and the processes and social relations they 
dictate to inhabitants. 
                                                 
5
 Mayekiso, M; South Africa’s Enduring Urban Crisis: the local State and the Urban Social Movements 
with Particular Reference to Johannesburg, in Harrison et al (eds), Confronting Fragmentation: Housing 
and Urban Development in a democratising society, chp 4, Cape Town, UCT Press, 2003, p 58 
6
 Smith, op cit, p. 30 
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Polluting the Body Politic and Creation of Urban Peripheries 
Goldberg (1993) argues that space is rationally structured in most instances to 
institutionalise categories of difference and relations of power underlying society.7 The 
spatialisation of racial categories in geographies serves to normalize these categories of 
difference, while social space is allowed to appear as natural when based on rationalized 
forms. Goldberg argues that the construction of racialised space in South Africa under 
Apartheid is the limit of an extension of the practice of racialised spatial configuration 
throughout the history of Western involvement in Africa, both in the colonial context and 
post-colonial context.8 
Spatial ordering of society is determined and refined by power relations; and nowhere is 
this as obvious as in the structure of urban centres, where the relations and ordering of 
power relations are reflected in the differences within the urban make-up. 
The history of colonial expansion is one of population subordination, spatial expansion 
and mediation. Colonial conquest was often rationalized in terms of; 
spatial vacancy: the lands’ emptiness or emptying of human inhabitance. 
The drive to racialize populations rendered transparent the people so 
racialised; it left them unseen, merely part of the natural environment, to 
be cleared from the landscape – urban or rural – like debris.9 
The division of space according to ‘difference’ allows for both the physical and social 
control of inhabitants – both those desired inhabitants and the undesirable. This ordering 
of society creates an implication of a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’; ‘sameness’ and 
‘other’; ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Those on the outside, the ‘other’, are constructed as 
                                                 
7
 Goldberg, D,T; Racist Culture: Philosophy and the politics of Meaning; Oxford ;Blackwell, 1993 p.183 
8
 Ibid, p. 185 
9
 Ibid, p. 186 
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different, strange and eventually as deviant from those standards which ‘we’ on the inside 
represent. This estrangement is reproduced in the forms developed in the territories its 
application has assisted to procure. 
Spatial differences have profound implications for the social identification of 
populations, which in turn are reflected in the subsequent reordering of social space. The 
process of colonial conquest involved the bloody purification of the ‘other’; 
Whether the bodies of the racialised other were to be killed or colonized, 
slaughtered or saved, expunged or exploited, they had to be prevented at 
all cost from polluting the body politic or sullying civil(ized) society.10 
The creation of the ‘other’ as impure, polluting, diseased allows (or necessitates) their 
definition as undesirable and structures subsequent spatial containment accordingly. In 
this way, racialised discourse with its inherent conceptualisation of ‘Truth’, its 
ascendancy of values whereby all aspects and members of society can clearly be 
categorized as ‘good’ and ‘bad’; has existed as a powerful weapon for the social 
organization of space, including exclusion from space or its segregation. 
Spatial Formations and the Changing Nature of Peripheries 
The West’s program aimed at the racialisation of urban geography has its genesis in the 
colonial experience. Throughout the passage of colonialism the subjugated racial ‘other’ 
was constructed as different in terms of capacity, morality and even biology. The passage 
of urbanization to urban centres necessitated the creation of means whereby the other was 
forced into a spatial distance from the Western Colonizer or its agents. It was here where 
                                                 
10
 Ibid, p. 187 
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segregation was largely developed as a process of administration of a conquered ‘deviant’ 
population.  
While the spatial reordering of Western cities was not required at this juncture, with the 
end of World War II immigration to the metropoles in the wake of rapid dismantling of 
the colonial order necessitated the domestication of foreign exclusionary/ segregation 
practices.11 The domestication of “exclusion and exclusivity”12 is most obvious in the 
programs of slum administration adopted by Western powers in this period. White-flight 
to the suburbs as a result of fear of contamination by the racialised inner urbanized slum 
locations, and the subsequent rationalization of these locations into high-density 
racialised structures further cemented the racialised ‘other’ in the periphery of power and 
spatial concerns.  
It is important in this regard to note the relative locational variable of periphractic space, 
a term which does not necessarily denote the displacement of the marginalized to the 
extremities of urbanized spaces. Rather, the periphery denotes the actual or imagined 
circumscription of populations in terms of locality or their access to the apparatus of 
power, enjoyment of rights, procurement of goods and enjoyment/ benefit from 
services.13 In this way the periphery denotes far more than a mere location, but rather it is 
the actualisation of a constructed and reproduced dislocated racial marginalization. 
A second important feature of periphractic space is the fact that it appears as both fluid, 
and internally differentiated. In the metropoles of the western powers, this has been 
illustrated in changing patterns of urban marginalization, inverted in the 1960’s and 
1970’s. The new patterns were again consistent with racially determined class lines as 
                                                 
11
 Ibid, p. 188 
12
 Ibid p. 188 
13
 Ibid p. 188 
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significant ‘white-flight’ by previously urbanized middle-class workers left the swelling 
urban centres which were rapidly becoming increasingly dislocated between poverty-
stricken whites and even worse-off racialised inhabitants.14 The suburbs too reflected the 
class and racial division of the society as a whole. Suburban space was differentiated and 
graded in desirability – roughly determined to their remoteness and permeance to the 
detrimental effects of the urban racialised spaces housing the ‘other’. The further the 
white suburban space was situated from the depravity and contamination of the racialised 
space; and the greater is potential to restrict the traversing of its boundaries by the people 
or values of the ‘other’ – the greater the desirability of occupancy. Suburban spaces 
further encouraged occupancy by predominantly ‘white’ middle classes by situating 
themselves in proximate locations to places of leisure and commercial consumption – 
shopping malls and parks, herby structuring environmental aesthetics as separated centres 
of ‘white’ middle class enjoyment – and away from the industrial sectors which 
employed racialised cheap and unskilled labour, producing the pollution associated with 
the other as well as that associated with industry. The inner city became the periphractic 
space of the ‘other’ – the dark, bleak and crumbling sector of depravity. 
Definitions of periphractic space were again to change in the 1970’s with the resultant 
urban renewal or gentrification of the inner urban localities. This process was triggered 
by increasing opportunities for skilled employment in the urban centres and a growing 
discontent amongst middle-class professionals with tedious commutes from the suburban 
areas.15 The flow of capital into the renewal of urban centres displaced the racially 
marginalized further by driving up rentals and prices of proximate luxuries of spaces in 
                                                 
14
 Ibid p. 188 
15
 Ibid p. 189 
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the urban sector. Increasingly concentrated into expanding slums in remote/ undesirable 
high density zones in the urban sector, or displaced to the outer city limits; the inner 
subjected were once again turned out. The complexities of existence in the midst of a 
rapidly expanding capitalist profit maximization project in the urban centres left the 
displaced racial groups with little recourse to defy their estrangement from community 
structures and concentration in high-impact; racially defined class-determined spaces. 
Whilst the mechanisms of the marginalization of racially defined groups act in various 
ways, their marginalization in the manner depicted above (economically) is perhaps the 
most encompassing form – with lack of opportunity for employment in specific industries 
yielding middle to high incomes; access to mortgages and housing loans; low levels of 
personal savings and income spent on education of its members; low levels of 
consumption – all being defining characteristics of the racially excluded ‘Other’.16 
According to Goldberg the implications of these factors on class position is important in 
highlighting the fact that for marginalization to occur, not all members of a racially 
defined population need suffer commensurate levels of dislocation in the physical 
sense.17 Skilled, professional members of the marginalised racial group may be allowed 
to live amongst ‘whites’ – and in fact these members are further alienated through 
cultural and identity based factors. 
These changing boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’ have found reflection in the 
various forms of urban modelling over the decades.18 Aestheticism of the pre-war years 
was replaced in the post-war years with rationalization models which aimed at the 
greatest efficiency in the delivery of services and social organization. The 1960’s saw the 
                                                 
16
 Ibid p. 189 
17
 Ibid p. 189 
18
 Ibid. p 189 
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renewal of interest in the urban centres with higher regard for effectiveness in urban 
development and efficiency in utilization of urban space. Finally, the culmination of the 
process in the 1980’s to one based on purely economic rationale, where planning is 
undertaken on the basis of expertise in pursuit of profit maximization from urban 
development, signals the triumph of the capitalist productive forces over contemporary 
urban spatial forms. 
The process of slum clearances from the inception of the slum as a solution to the 
problem of the racialised poor further serves to highlight the dislocative nature of urban 
planning throughout the decades.19 The project of slum clearance was initiated in the 
colonial period by the Western governments as a bulwark against the transmission of 
infectious disease from the colonized subjects to the colonizers. The racialised ‘Other’ 
were seen as polluting or infectious, and with the arrival of plague means were developed 
for the urgent further segregation of the population and their dislocation in the guise of 
public (‘white’) concerns.  
In the South African context, the outbreak of plague in Cape Town and Johannesburg 
was to result in the forced relocation of slums to the periphery where they were settled on 
undesirable lands without basic infrastructure.20 These new settlements were to develop 
into permanent segregated townships or localities in the periphractic space. In this way 
the impure ‘other’ was relegated to a smaller portion of the urban landscape but in far 
greater concentrations, while those not being desirable for their value as labour were 
relegated to the city limits. These spaces are identified by the ‘white’ population as 
                                                 
19
 Ibid p. 190 
20
 Lemon, op cit, p. 4 
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polluting, dirty and barely habitable; living space suitable only to the marginalized other 
forming “the metaphorical stigma of a black blotch on the cityscape….”21 
Constructing the Apartheid City 
The processes of city formation, urban influx control, segregation, and spatial and social 
exclusions have developed concurrently through all the predominant phases of urban 
development in South Africa; as the predominantly ‘white’ settlers sought a solution to 
the quandary of requiring indigenous labour power, while demonstrating an 
unwillingness to integrate with those they perceived as both ‘racially’ and culturally 
inferior.22 
Davies has argued urban policy in South African cities in the pre-democratic era is 
characterized by three distinct phases: the settler-colonial period, from 1652 until after 
the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910; the second phase, with the passing of 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 marking the onset of formalized, structured and 
premeditated urban segregation and control; and the third period, marked by the passage 
of the Apartheid regime’s Group Areas Act of 1950, continuing for the most part despite 
varied attempts at reform until the transition to democracy – beginning in the early 
1990s.23 
Each of these phases reveal a number of strong similarities which run continuously, and 
indeed in some cases have persisted in to the post-1994 urban policy; as policy-makers, 
government, civil society groups and citizens attempt to reform and integrate the 
discontinuous nature of the Apartheid city. It is important not to divorce the Apartheid 
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city from its roots in British Colonial practice and segregation. Indeed, it has been argued 
that for the most part, South African cities until the passage of the Group Areas Act can 
comfortably be viewed in context of other African- and colonial cities with which they 
share numerous similarities.24 In both South African- and other colonial cities – 
mechanisms of coercion and control, and the distribution of access to political power, 
land, employment and resources – were employed to ensure the dominance of those in 
political power. In this manner, control of the means of production, socio-economic 
mobility, and ownership of wealth, land and space was effectively placed firmly in the 
hands of the dominant social group in society (the colonial authority) – a process 
followed invariably by conscious administrative, political and social engineering; 
designed to protect these socio-economic gains from the threat of the ‘other’.25 
Controlling Populations and the beginnings of Exclusion 
While African urbanization in South African cities was considerably lower than ‘white’ 
urbanization in the early 1900s, the growing necessity of unskilled African migrant 
labour to support South Africa’s rapid industrial development, especially the mining 
centres of Johannesburg and Kimberly, lead to a significant boost in urbanization; with 
urban Africans numbering approximately 587,200 in 1921, as opposed to 847,400 urban 
‘whites’ – amounting to approximately 55% of the ‘white’ population.26 Initially, little 
formal or legislative state influx control or segregation existed for African workers in 
urban centres; and while various municipalities throughout South Africa’s cities devised 
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a variety of mechanisms of population control – in none did these form a comprehensive 
policy or system of influx control or segregation.27 
Whereas the compound system acted as the dominant model of housing and control of 
mine workers in Johannesburg and Kimberly, these measures were by no means 
pervasive – and throughout South African cities large numbers of Africans were housed 
in municipal run townships; on vacant land (some privately owned and leased to 
residents); or as tenants on ‘white’ properties both within the cities, and on the urban-
fringes within proximity of employment opportunities.28 
Segregation during this period was commonly achieved through private-choice 
mechanisms at the level of community or municipality. Typically these measures were 
fundamentally difficult to enforce, characterised increasingly by attempts at the level of 
community- or municipality interaction, as opposed to national or provincial policy-
making. A significant catalyst to the growth of municipal segregation was the ‘white’ fear 
of the spread of contagious diseases, commonly associated with the perception of the 
‘other’ as pathogens and dirty.29 Outbreaks of epidemics of influenza and similar diseases 
were often precursors to new attempts at relocation of Africans away from urbanized 
‘whites’ – often relegating these populations to the peri-urban margins away from service 
delivery, sustainable environments and employment opportunities. 
Segregation in the Cities 1923-1950 
Dramatic upsurges in urban migration between 1923-50 as a result of the burgeoning 
urban economies and declining rural opportunities for Africans, resulted in the first state-
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lead interventions at urban influx control and segregation.30 The outcome of the Stallard 
(Transvaal Local Government) Commission of 1922, which championed tighter influx 
controls and attempts to minimize state accountability for the housing- and service needs 
of urban Africans, soon became accepted policy – the arguments of which were to form 
the basis of all future segregation attempts until the period of democratic transition; 
arguing that,  
the native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are 
essentially the White man’s creation, when he is willing to enter and 
minister to the needs of the White man, and should depart therefrom when 
he ceases so to minister.31 
The ensuing Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 entrenched these beliefs, laying the 
legislative foundation for local authorities to designate segregated localities to house 
African migrants, and establishing responsibilities for municipalities to account for 
migrant labour influx – establishing the basis for a systematic state-supported and 
legislated system of segregation and influx control, to be expanded and strengthened 
dramatically in future policies.32  
Subsequent amendments to the 1923 act in 1937 served to centralize the operation of 
control and segregation in the centralized office of Native Affairs, compelling municipal 
implementation of the 1923 Act and its amendments – and further allowing for the 
‘rustication’ or return of migrant labourers unable to secure employment, while curbing 
the entrance of African women to urban centres.33 Following the extension of controls to 
women, the targets of the policies were again expanded in the 1940’s to Indians, as 
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increased movement into formally ‘white’ populated residential and commercial areas in 
the period 1930-1940, threatened ‘white’ economic interests and the securing of areas of 
‘white’-only ownership of property.34 Despite burgeoning industrialization in the 1940s 
as war shortages necessitated the expansion and diversification of the South African 
industrial and manufacturing workforce; contradictory state attempts to enforce tighter 
influx controls lead to the hugely unpopular 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act – which aside from restrictions as to types of employment and demarcation, in 
section 10 of the Act allowed for qualification for permanent urban residency for 
Africans only if they had “resided there continuously since birth, had lawfully resided 
there for 15 years, or had worked there for the same employer for 10 years.”35 
Wartime production towards meeting import shortages crippled already dismal state-
housing provision for urban Africans, as resources were directed towards the satisfaction 
of shortages. The resultant mushrooming of informal settlements on the fringes of South 
African cities bred a new tide of discontent amongst an increasingly militant and 
radicalised ‘black’ leadership.  
Yet, despite increasing liberal condemnation of the migrant labour system and influx 
control, such as that embodied in the 1948 Fagan Commission – the limited ability of 
liberals and ‘black’ leaders to realise their demands in decision-making and the exclusion 
of populations from community- and municipal-fora and political activity; resulted in 
these grievances being trumped by the fears of ‘whites’ at the continued African urban 
population explosion.36 Manipulation of these fears by the National Party in their 1948 
‘swaart gevaar’ election campaign, contributed in no small part to their victory – resulting 
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in the extension of segregation policies to the ideology of Apartheid – which sought to 
deepen and entrench the expression of ‘white’ dominance of the urban centres of South 
Africa.  
Whereas South African cities pre-Apartheid were segregated to some extent, the result 
was by no means the ‘total segregation’ envisioned by Apartheid idealists due to the 
practice of African tenancy and the lacklustre enforcement of existing legislation by 
certain municipalities.37 Yet under Apartheid the extensive movement, relocation and 
forced occupation of specific racially constitutive zones aimed at the deeper and more 
exclusive dominance of South African society than had hitherto been witnessed.38  
 
Johannesburg since its proclamation in 1886 has rapidly grown to become the economic 
centre of South Africa; yet accompanying this growth has been the entrenchment of 
injustices relating to the ‘race’-based segregation of residential and urban spaces, 
divergences in economic opportunities for inhabitants, restrictions on movement for 
‘racially’ defined undesirables, and the political marginalization of those excluded from 
local and municipal division making – which despite the transition to democracy in the 
1990s still scar both urban landscapes, and the social and economic lives of the city’s 
population. Since its founding, Johannesburg has been the site of residential segregation 
and the forced relocation of marginalized populations; the earliest of which removed 
populations from the urban centre to the African residential settlement at Klipspruit in 
1904, located on the periphery of the city.39  
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Despite prevailing acceptance of segregation, the reality of the earliest years of 
Johannesburg was that many urban Africans remained in urban centres despite the 
formation of separate residential space; either in compounds on the gold mines, or 
through tenancy as ‘illegal’ occupants in designated ‘white’ urban areas, or further in 
residence in the freehold locations of Alexandra or Sophiatown where the majority were 
able to rent backyard rooms – hereby minimizing transport expenses. With the passage of 
the Natives Urban Areas Act in 1923, a fresh wave of forced removals proceeded to 
affect the segregation ideals envisioned in the legislation – resulting in the formation of 
formally exclusive residential space for Johannesburg’s urban African population being 
restricted to the freehold areas, and the newly formed Western Native Township, later 
known as Soweto.40  
Critical housing shortages in these areas compelled numerous urban Africans to seek 
shelter outside defined areas, resulting in a massive proliferation of slums and informal 
settlements during this period; as well as an increase in tenancy and backyard living in 
‘white’ areas. Increased urbanisation amongst both ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ in the 
depression and war years compounded already failing housing stocks, with the result that 
of the estimated 400,000 strong ‘white’ population in 1931 in Johannesburg – 8,000 were 
unemployed and 1,200 households resided in slum areas.41 Increased racial mixing in 
these areas catalysed the 1934 Slums Act, used to affect the second great wave of 
relocations of urbanised Africans in 1937 to segregated townships about the city. 
Despite these measures, the years of the Second World War were to see an intensification 
of informal settlement formation and illegal squatting in urban areas, including those 
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areas designated ‘white’ by municipalities. These challenges to established ‘white’ areas 
resulted in higher priority being given to the housing of Africans after the war, allowing 
for some marginal redress of the extensive housing backlog for Africans after 1946 – yet 
still affecting the removal of Africans from ‘white’ areas to newly developed locations 
set aside for their exclusive occupation.  
Fragmenting the cities: The Group Areas Act 
The Group Areas Acts passed in 1950 and 1966 formed the core of the Apartheid regimes 
racialised segregation ideal, resulting in the dramatic and far-reaching reconstruction and 
redefinition of urban space in South Africa; the effects of which were felt in the 
education system, service provision, in representation in municipal and local authorities, 
and in employment.42  
Group Areas served to effectively translate into spatial realities the central tenet of the 
Apartheid ideology; that differences based on socially constructed notions of ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’ result in integration between different groups being fundamentally dangerous, 
and a threat to the established ‘white’ dominance of South African society. What was 
envisioned in order to promote harmonious ‘race relations’ and the continuation of 
‘white’ dominance, was the minimization of contact between the ‘racially’ and 
‘ethnically’ defined groups through a process of race-zoning – limiting inter-group 
contact and preventing the formation of a collective revolutionary consciousness.43 The 
practical operation of Group Areas legislation resulted in the extension of ‘racially’ 
categorised land apportionment throughout South Africa, having significant impact on 
the country’s urban settlement patterns. Accordingly the 1950 Act tightly controlled the 
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development and transfer of property – particularly that occurring between the clearly 
defined ‘racial groups’ – in order to affect the ‘racial’ compartmentalization of South 
African society.44 The policy thus acted to proclaim areas of ownership or occupation by 
different ‘racial’ groups; while in urban planning departments areas were set-aside as 
buffer zones or sites for the future expansion for specific ‘racial’ groups.45 Group Areas 
legislation had an enormous impact on ownership and occupation of private property – 
providing the legislative means for state regulation, zoning and expropriation for Group 
Areas development programs.46  
The overwhelming majority of victims of this process were those deemed ‘non-white’ by 
the Apartheid regime. Forced removals affected under the auspices of Group Areas 
Development are estimated by authors to number over one million Africans between 
1950 and 1990,47 as well as the over 125,000 families officially recorded – the 
overwhelming majority of which were categorised as ‘coloured’ or ‘Indian’.48 The 
enforcement of ‘race’ zoning required an enormous state expenditure; resulting in the 
creation of large settlements on the periphery to achieve the goal of Apartheid planning. 
The process of Apartheid forced removals caused tremendous damage, not all of which is 
measurable in economic terms of property loss and livelihoods destroyed – but also in 
terms of psychological damage to the excluded, and the significant destruction of self-
help and social capital networks as communities were scattered. Additionally, excluded 
populations suffered the humiliation of a vast number of wide-ranging social pathologies 
as cause of their expulsion to the peripheries of society. Exclusions coupled with 
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dispossessions – did little to assuage ‘racial antipathy’ as the thinkers of Apartheid 
claimed – but merely exacerbated it.49 At the level of planning, Apartheid cities aimed at 
an exclusively ‘white’ CBD with ‘white’ residential space in close proximity, separated 
by ‘racial’ buffer zones on all sides and by zones set aside for future expansion. 
Conversely other ‘racial’ groups including ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘blacks’ were 
relegated to the peripheries in townships, or hostels within industrial zones – separated as 
far as possible from ‘white’ areas by buffer zones and through the provision of separate 
amenities and recreational zones.50 
Despite state rhetoric of the period claiming the creation of exclusively ‘white’ zones, the 
tenure of Africans, coloureds and Indians on ‘white’-owned land continued – yet 
invariably those housed were engaged in menial work within these ‘white’ areas in 
exchange for housing within proximity of urban employment and commercial 
opportunities, and constituted only a very small fraction of the excluded populations. 
The application of Apartheid Group Areas legislation to Johannesburg extended existing 
measures at the segregation of the urban populations – with formalised, legal measures to 
support the process. Forced removals in 1950 resulted in the moving of 58,000 Africans 
to the peripheral locations of Meadowlands and Diepkloof, despite resistance from the 
local authority; and after the forcible enactment of the Natives Resettlement Act in 1951, 
government was able to by-pass the resistance of the Johannesburg City Council to 
resettle African residents from Sophiatown and the Malay Location – constructing low 
income white housing in its place.51 
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Within the townships themselves, the Apartheid machinery set about to re-define urban 
Africans in terms of a supposed ‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribal group’, linking Africans to their 
defined rural areas – attempting to segregate townships by imposing a constructed 
‘ethnic’ difference to those residing in them. To enforce the ‘temporary status’ of African 
workers in townships in Johannesburg, Apartheid legislation decreed urban Africans 
unable to hold title deeds to township properties – in essence reducing all inhabitants to 
state tenants who, once employment in the urban centres was unavailable – would return 
to locations assigned to them by ‘tribal’ differentiations in the rural areas.52  Attempts to 
eradicate the settlement of the ‘other’ in ‘white’ designated suburbs met with relative 
success, supported by legislation in 1954 to combat ‘locations in the sky’ – setting a limit 
on the numbers of Africans allowed residence outside of their defined areas, and 
accompanied by increased relocations from African labour compounds within the urban 
centres to Soweto.53 
The regulation of urbanisation through the tight influx measures adopted under 
Apartheid, policed vigorously by authorities; lead to some easing of the African housing 
shortages in townships until the late 1960s, when a shift to housing allocation in the 
Bantustans diverted attention away from housing Africans in the urban centres in an 
attempt to quell new urbanites. Despite these measures, African urbanisation proceeded 
in growing numbers as the relative poverty of rural locations and the hardships of life in 
the Bantustans resulted in enormous numbers of Africans risking deportation, 
imprisonment, and the harsh living conditions of urban informal settlements and 
backyard sub-letting in formal townships. 
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Urban Africans Under Apartheid 
Urban centres under Apartheid were a planned and constructed attempt at the permanent 
segregation of the South African population, allowing for the future development of those 
‘race’ groups viewed as vital to the Apartheid ideology; whereas the urban centres were 
orientated towards the containment and exclusion of ‘non-whites’ regarded purely as a 
‘necessary evil’ by virtue of their necessity as a labour force, but beyond this as 
undesirable and not belonging to the urban ideal.54 The delimitation and exclusion of 
urban Africans necessitated the extension of state control over African influx control, 
labour regulation, housing, service provision and all aspects of social life. From 1954, 
official state policy extended the exclusion process, advocating the identification and 
separation of Africans in the urban centres according to their supposed ethnicity – 
mimicking the situation in the Bantustans of the state’s Separate development policy.55 In 
large urban centres such as Johannesburg, this resulted in massive upheaval in townships 
as ‘ethnic’ zones were proclaimed for the occupation of Urban Africans, further adding to 
the housing backlog already present and further alienating and excluding Africans from 
one another.  
Influx controls for urban centres, although present to some degree prior to Apartheid 
were radically extended after 1950 with the passage of the 1951 Illegal Squatting Act, 
governing and restricting the settlement of Africans on the peri-urban fringes of the city, 
in the hopes of locating employment; and further by the Native Laws Amendment act in 
1952.56 The amendment not only extended the requirements for permanent occupation in 
the cities by virtue of employment status and an extension of section 10 rights to all urban 
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Africans; but also introduced stricter measures for the expulsion of unemployed urban 
Africans, held to have no purpose in the cities; and measures for re-directing surplus 
labour to other urban centres through the establishment of labour bureau in the 
Bantustans.57 Tighter influx controls had the effect of compartmentalizing the urban 
African labour force in South African into two groups: the larger fluctuating unskilled 
migrant labour force denied permanent residence within the urban centres; and a smaller 
group of permanent residents determined according to section 10 of the Native Laws 
Amendment Act, who by virtue of their relative permanence in employment developed 
into a semi-skilled labour force housed in ‘ethnically’ and ‘racially’ zoned townships on 
the urban fringes – far removed from designated ‘white’ areas, yet within proximity of 
employment.58 State policy involved the regulation of migratory flows to and from the 
Bantustans, which as industry and manufacturing became more sophisticated and 
developed, lead to a decreased reliance on migratory labour. Thus, by the 1970s fewer 
Group Areas for Africans were proclaimed in urban centres, as official policy shifted to 
retain Africans in their Bantustans – resulting in “the damming up of rural-urban 
migration behind artificial boundaries which has continued ever since in both townships 
and informal settlements.”59 
By the 1970s labour demands for urban centres had dictated a complex influx control 
system characterized by a clear division between what was described by the Riekert 
Commission (1979) as urban ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’,60 those skilled labourers 
possessing section 10 rights to permanent residency and those who did not – the 
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‘insiders’ having employment preference and the ability to relocate to areas where labour 
was required – hereby reducing the flow of ‘outsiders’ wherever possible in order to limit 
the overall number of urban Africans.  
Yet, the proclamation of new residential spaces still served de facto to segregate the 
population based on ‘race’, and according to Mabin, took advantage;  
of informal settlements on the metropolitan peripheries and further a field 
to fragment the African urban population in ways which facilitated indirect 
political control.61  
Two further bills were introduced post-1985 to deal with the burgeoning informal 
settlement populations in major urban centres. The Slums Bill and Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act of 1988, allowed for state demarcation of land for occupation by informal 
settlements and measures whereby government could affect the eviction and relocation of 
illegal land occupants.62  
Reforming Group Areas 
Until the late 1970s, Group Areas legislation proved fairly successful in segregating the 
urban population of Johannesburg according to the doctrine of Apartheid. Despite official 
reforms only being introduced after the Riekert Commission proposals in 1979; in reality, 
urban Africans had begun to permeate ‘white’ designated residential and inner urban 
centres from 1970 onwards.63 In residential suburbs, ‘black’ corporate businessmen, 
foreigners and government dignitaries steadily began to relocate to formally ‘whites only’ 
suburbs in small numbers. Yet these small numbers of ‘black’ residents in ‘white’ 
suburbs were tiny compared to the rapid growth of Africans into Johannesburg’s inner 
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city residential spaces; resulting in formerly habitable areas developing into 
“overcrowded, crime ridden black ghettos.”64  
Despite the illegality of settlement and the hardships and dangers of inner-city 
occupation; shortages of housing in the townships and the dangers of life in informal 
settlements surrounding the city – compounded by increased capital expenditures on 
transport to employment in industrial and commercial centres in the city, resulted in 
many more Africans flocking to the inner city.65 The progressive relaxation of influx 
controls and designated ‘racial’ areas in the 1980s promoted further incursion into 
formerly ‘white’ suburbs, resulting in a number of responses from ‘white’ residents. 
Increased expenditures on security by ‘white’ property owners and the growth of the 
private security industry have had dramatic impact on the aesthetic environments of 
affluent neighbourhoods.  
Concerns over security prompted by ‘black’ infiltration into ‘white’ neighbourhoods has 
resulted in a documented flight of large numbers of working class ‘whites’ to the urban 
peripheries, often near to affluent suburbs to small properties or townhouses where 
security interests can be shared amongst fellow local residents.66 
In the formerly bleak and uniform housing projects in the city’s townships of Alexandra 
and Soweto – the right to home ownership has allowed for a number of visible changes to 
the appearance of African owned dwellings – as well as the development in the late 
1980s of middle class areas in these locations. Yet, despite these positive developments, 
relaxed influx controls compounded the problem of backyard living and shack 
settlements. Shortages of formal housing and employment opportunities in the late 1980s 
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lead to an estimated 2.5 million people occupying informal housing in Johannesburg, 
50,000 of these in shack settlements.67 Further, in the 1990s as influx controls were 
repealed, the growth of informal settlements in the periphery of the city intensified 
dramatically, prompting land invasions and illegal occupation of land as thousands 
migrated to the economic hub of Johannesburg to escape life in the repealed Bantustans. 
Apartheid’s Urban Areas 
In Goldberg’s view the Group Areas Act under Apartheid in many ways is the idealistic, 
legalistic product of a history of racialised marginalization and exclusion in the West. His 
central claim is not that Western governments have formalized Apartheid in their own 
right, but merely that the practices of marginalization of a racially defined Other hold 
within them the seed for the Apartheid ideology underlying the Group Areas Act; and 
further that despite the transition to Democracy undertaken in South Africa, urban spatial 
arrangements will continue to mimic the Western racialised locational model.68 
Goldberg identifies five noteworthy structural features of the Group Areas Act to be 
particularly enlightening to the practice of dislocation and reproduction of the racially 
marginalized.69 The core of the Group Areas Act was the division of the population into 
specified racial groups and the delineation of a residential or specific area for each 
defined racial group. The concept of ‘race’ is here conceptualised as ‘white’ or ‘non-
white’, but most often as ‘black’. The informal extension of the concept of ‘blackness’ to 
include racial groups other than whites, suggests that often racial identification is a 
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fabrication.70 Racial classification impacts as much here on class, as class is likely to be 
delimited by racial classification. Those groups who are racially marginalized are faced 
with various aspects of social exclusion, including their removal (directly or indirectly) to 
periphractic spatial zones. 
Two further noteworthy characteristics of the Group Areas Act concern the means 
whereby racial groups are controlled in the spaces they occupy, and the measures 
undertaken to delimit these spaces in such a way as to clearly identify these spaces with 
the racial group concerned. Consider in this regard the planning mechanism of Apartheid 
which aimed at the erection of strong boundaries between racially stratified spatial 
arrangements, defined passages and terms of access to and usage of shared space, and in 
some cases differentiated leisure spaces again with defined routes and mechanisms for 
access and mandates for usage. The ordering of these boundaries was specifically 
orientated to minimize contact between the excluded racial margins and the broader 
sectors of accepted society, and as such undertook both physical demarcations and 
imaginary – however, for both the excluded and the accepted these boundaries were 
always visible, each group being consciously aware of the existence of spatial locations 
specifically created for the excluded ‘Other’. Under Apartheid numerous examples of this 
existed as townships were both fenced off and access-controlled as well as being 
internally divided according to ‘ethnic’ division and the degree of permanence of the 
migratory inhabitants; while ‘white’ residential spaces in the defined areas were often 
protected by high fences and walls, patrolled by private security companies and 
supported by the local police forces. Access and passage by the racialised ‘other’ was 
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strictly controlled at the height of Apartheid by the Pass laws, which ensured that not 
even the most casual encroachments on ‘white’ delineated space were tolerated. 
Racialised exclusions have not disappeared with the end of Apartheid or South Africa’s 
transition to democracy; instead the relationship of space has merely been reordered and 
complicated. With the repeal of restrictions on previously subjugated populations taking 
up residence in urban centres, mass movements of these racial groups into the city-centre 
have occurred; seeking escape from the stigma of living in township spaces and relief 
from crumbling environments they were forced to occupy. Accompanying this ‘black’ 
inner-city migration is the resurgence of the flight to the suburban areas of the ‘white’ 
population, this time encompassing not only the middle classes but a greater proportion 
of less economically powerful ‘whites’ as well, to less racially threatened areas outside of 
the urban centres. In this way the ordering of a specific racialised spatial arrangement is 
reconstructed and reproduced although without the formalistic legal exclusionary 
mechanisms provided by the Apartheid legislative bodies. Instead exclusions on racial 
grounds are determined by private preference, “…the inadvertent outcome of private 
choice and informal market mechanisms.”71 The post-apartheid form of municipal 
administration divides residential space into localized units, each administered by 
representatives of the communities concerned with wide-ranging discretionary powers 
over land usage, protection of resources and local policies within their communities and 
residential localities. In many of these residential spaces the economic supremacy of the 
‘white’ populations make for an unequal power representation in local community 
forums and planning offices – reproducing an element of ‘white’ control over a defined 
spatial ordering of the population reflecting the racialised marginalization of the 
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Apartheid years. Through these mechanisms affluent communities are able to either 
prevent or to administratively and legally forestall the settlement of both informal 
residential spaces by the racially marginalized, and by controlling the standards of new 
development in their areas to limit new formal settlements by driving up real estate prices 
and setting standards for town planning, inclusive of formalized leisure spaces and laws 
to prevent overcrowding. These measures serve to restrict access to these residential 
spaces by the racially excluded representing the lower echelons of the population with 
regards affluence. 
These processes underlying the privatisation of the definition of racialised urban spatial 
arrangements is a cornerstone of exclusionary relations.72 Exclusions are exercised 
according to private preferences relating to liberally accepted notions of freedom of 
association or the operation of the free-market where political realities make more 
legalistic attempts to segregate or exclude racial ‘Others’ impossible.73 
Further notable aspects of the Group Areas Act concerned the placement and structuring 
of industrial and commercial areas within this racialised spatial arrangement. The 
exaggerated control of capital by the ‘white’ classes has influenced the historical flows of 
employment into and out of the urban centres. The flight of middle class ‘white’ workers 
into the city as a result of gentrification as well as the subsequent flight into the suburban 
areas following the removal of formalized Apartheid has produced corresponding flights 
of capital. The movement of capital into and out of urban centres has proved to be 
essentially exclusionary in nature, as the workforce in these capital intensive areas 
becomes steadily ‘whiter’ – excluding the racially marginalized to periphractic spaces of 
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confinement. This displacement from centres of employment has proved disastrous for 
the marginalized groups as difficulties of employment are exacerbated by high additional 
costs relating to travel and rentals in premium locations as close as possible to desired 
employment, within the periphractic space. The additional economic burden imposed on 
the already economically marginalized cements their racially determined class position. 
The close connection between racialised class and private space is reflected in the 
degradation of the environment in periphractic spaces. This in turn is reproduced in the 
realm of public space in terms of the disparities in public versus private health care 
facilities, educational facilities and the availability of consumer centres such as shopping 
malls between the ‘white’ and ‘black’ areas. The repeal of Apartheid legislation has done 
little for the moment to dramatically alter these realities, with previously excluded groups 
still suffering increasing concentrations in periphractic spaces due to new urbanizations 
in the wake of relaxed migration laws; as well as suffering extended journeys to centres 
of leisure, employment and consumerism due to the flow of private development capital 
into the ‘white’ residential spaces. 
Peripheries and Pathologies 
Evidence of urbanisation and influx control under Apartheid shows the structure of 
residential spaces in the post-Apartheid era bears striking similarities to those under the 
Group Areas Acts during Apartheid; and indeed with the underlying processing operating 
in racialised exclusions through the Western nations.74 The resultant spatialized racial 
exclusion serves to compartmentalize, monitor and manage the composition of urban and 
suburban spaces according to engendered racial and class stereotypes; and effectively to 
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dislocate the excluded both physically and in their subjective experience of the urbanized 
environment. 
The factors examined thus far show spatial control and the dislocation of racialised 
populations to be mutually reinforcing. As much as perceived of socially constructed 
racial bias results in a segregation of groups into racially conceptualised margins, so their 
concentration into specific locations renders as criminal or deviant the activities which 
take place in these localities. As a result of a number of incumbent social pathologies, the 
concentration of deviant behaviour in periphractic locations according to Goldberg,  
magnifies the image of racialised criminality, and it confines the 
overwhelming proportion of crimes involving the racially marginalized 
into racially marginal space.75 
In this way, spatial limitations and boundaries act to monitor and control the members of 
the marginalized, while also affecting the changing of the ‘white’ residential landscape to 
reflect the construction of these social pathologies. ‘White’ or affluent areas respond to 
the pathological assumption of ‘non-whites’ as being involved in all manner of criminal 
activity by transforming their dwellings into secure fortresses against the deviant others 
infiltration, with high walls and sophisticated security measures, 
Commercial companies now offer 24 hour ‘armed response’ service to 
protect domestic premises against theft and unlawful entry. In the affluent 
white northern suburbs the logos of these security firms as well as the 
boards of ‘neighbourhood watch’ societies are prominently displayed on 
the high perimeter walls that characterize many of the wealthiest 
districts.76 
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Added to the pathology of the breakdown of law and order are other pathologies 
representing a wide variety of social disorders including pollution, disease and 
promiscuity. In this way the spatial location of the marginalized is seen as the 
embodiment of these social pathologies.  
Informal settlements and RDP housing in the post-apartheid era are typical of 
mechanisms to concentrate the racially marginalized in high numbers into clearly defined 
and limited city spaces, allowing for little interaction with other marginalized groups in 
spaces constructed to represent,  
a generic image without an identity: the place of crime; of social disorder, 
dirt and disease; of teenage pregnancy, prostitution, pimps, drug 
dependency; the workless and shiftless… centralized in this faceless space, 
peripheral at the social centre.77 
This type of housing does little to encourage that pride or the sense of community or 
acceptance from its inhabitants which is typically associated with home ownership 
elsewhere. Rather the lack of pride contributes to the degradation of the local space, 
while strong resistance is faced from the more privileged property holders in the areas.78 
In the South African model, this often lead to the wholesale removal of the marginalized 
from the high premium bureaucratically important inner city zones to other locations, 
allowing projects to be destroyed or their inhabitants to be recycled with new migrant 
workers. This results in the residential confinements of the marginalized becoming 
internally disordered; allowing for decreased chances for the formation of resistance or 
any notion of permanence, and in so doing facilitating the discipline and management of 
the inhabitants. 
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Similarities in the housing administration and spatial configurations of the Western 
nations and certain structural aspects of Apartheid’s Group Areas Acts, suggests there 
exists,  
a common (trans-spatial) history of racist expression [which] prescribes 
the range of acceptable city planning for the racially marginalized and 
circumscribes the effects of such plans.79 
This process is driven to a large extent by historical and contemporary recourse to a 
number of socially constructed pathologies dislocating the other from those accepted 
within broader society. The ‘other’ is inherently linked with a wide range of negative 
social traits in this way, and the accepted are set in opposition to guard against the spread 
of this social decay. 
The policies and processes outlined above have historically contributed to the spatial 
dislocation of marginalized groups and their differential inclusion into the body politic 
and access to its services, resources and opportunities. The process of spatial 
concentration which gives rise to a pathological distinction between the included and 
excluded, the pure and the deviant, is the reflection of an internalised racist discourse 
which it necessarily supports and reproduces in turn. Exclusion whether expressly 
constituted in a formalistic manner as in the Group Areas Act under Apartheid, or in the 
spatial configurations which have emerged in the post-Apartheid era and are reflected in 
the spatial configurations of Western urban centres; is an inherently political expression 
of racial differentiation, oppression and social injustice. The atomisation of populations 
and their distancing from other racial groups according to the constructed 
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conceptualisation of otherness and sameness is the structural realization of an underlying 
racially constituted order. 
The repeal of Apartheid legislation and the transition to democratic governance in South 
Africa has seen new reproductions of spatial configurations steeped in the racialised 
discourse of the past. Although not having recourse to the previous legal arsenal of 
discriminatory laws, ‘white’ capital has been able to reproduce the long-standing power 
relations which have under girded racially constructed identities and exclusions 
throughout history. The marginalized remain tied to their incumbent social pathologies, 
and development initiatives are conceived of as means whereby these populations can be 
integrated into the world of the dominant ‘white’ population.80 These development 
initiatives are in turn forestalled by recourse to liberal laws in the name of anti-racism or 
discrimination. The operation throughout history of these same legal values and abstract 
rules to limit agency and particularities in favour of universalistic commitments, denies 
marginalized populations the recourse to their own history as a means to mobilize 
resistance to this continued social exclusion. 
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Apartheid’s Spaces: Environments of exclusion 
 
In South Africa, marginalised populations continue to suffer the brunt of environmental 
and spatial exclusion as a result of environmental injustices. The National Party 
government’s Apartheid policy served to racially categorise and systematically exclude 
communities on the basis of ‘race’ (ascribing the term ‘non-white’ in the Apartheid 
discourse to those not of colonial or Afrikaner descent) from the rest of society. Policies 
aimed at the protectionism of the ‘white’ populations relegated ‘non-whites’ to only the 
must menial of jobs offering low wages and exempting them from qualifying for even the 
most rudimentary benefits of citizenship. The Apartheid policy’s systematic and legalistic 
segregationist policy, including legislation such as the Group Areas and Separate 
development acts, impacted directly on where non-white communities could live – 
forcing them into tiny demarcated areas where overcrowding and poverty contributed to 
further damaging the environments in these localities.  
South Africa’s experience of environmental ideology until the 1990’s was largely 
characterized by concerns for species preservation and natural park conservationism; and 
was largely the domain of the affluent ‘white’ middle classes.81 Environmental ‘victories’ 
won by these activists were often opposed to the wishes and needs of the majority poor 
population. Further, the experience of economic exclusions resulting from dispossession 
of marginalized communities, were joined by their physical exclusion from these spaces, 
their political exclusion from membership in the environmental movements, and their 
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social exclusion from the benefits of the areas with which these environmental 
movements were concerned – resulting in a typically hostile perception of environmental 
groups among the marginalized, as being concerned with “…elitist concerns peripheral to 
their struggle for survival.”82  
The specific nature and history of ‘race based’ marginalisation in South Africa has had 
lasting structural and psychological effects on access to environments and membership in 
environmental movements; benefits relating to the enjoyment of the aesthetic quality of 
environments, quality and safety of residential spaces, access to environmental resources, 
and a wide variety of other considerations.  
The Evolution of Environmentalism in South 
Africa 
Contemporary environmentalism in South African remains like the entirety of socio-
political and economic life in the democratic period, heavily scarred by the legacy of the 
racialised oppressive system of Apartheid – resulting in environmental discourse and 
activity in this setting emerging as a highly politicised and racially constituted concept. 
Despite emerging global environmental awareness, Apartheid era education and 
environmental discourse continues to view environmentalism in terms of conservationist 
and preservationist terms – preferring to construct environmental spaces as sites of leisure 
or recreation, whether local parks or zoos, or in the form of National Game Reserves 
where conservationist were engaged in preserving indigenous species such as the African 
Wild Dog, or guarding the White Rhino, one of Africa’s “big five” against the onslaught 
of poaching. 
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As late as the early 1990’s, whilst a few children in affluent ‘white’ schools were 
conscious of such global concerns as the erosion of the ozone layer as a result of 
pollution, and the dangers of impending global warming – few if any were conscious of 
ground-water pollution in poor (most often ‘black’ or ‘coloured’) communities as a result 
of mine dumping, the siting of refuse landfills or hazardous chemical disposals near to 
these communities, or as a result of inadequate service provision – particularly sanitation 
and refuse removal services. 
This ‘blind spot’ in environmental consciousness in the pre-democratic era is not wholly 
surprising when viewed in context of the racialised legislative and social ideology of 
Apartheid’s spatial and environmental exclusion – a program involving the physical and 
psychological exclusion of the majority of the country’s racially constituted population 
from environmental space and discourse. While the focus on conservationism and climate 
effects as examples of environmental consciousness of the period, exist in of themselves 
as immeasurably important crises in environmentalism globally; the almost total absence 
of concerns of justice for local marginalised populations in the dominant discourse of the 
period is emblematic of the historical oppression and exclusion of the marginalised with 
regards space and environmental discourse – a history with roots as far back as 
colonialism and the growth of urbanisation in South Africa. 
Pre Apartheid Conservation in South Africa 
The history of South African environmentalism under colonialism is largely dominated 
by the actions of various ‘white’ affluent preservationist groups with little concern for 
meeting the basic needs of the majority of South Africa’s marginalized. Whereas laws did 
not extend at this stage to precluding membership in environmental organizations to 
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marginalized populations based on ‘race’ specifically, the existence of de facto 
segregation and exclusions typically isolated these communities in terms of class. The 
class base of these environmental movements thus made membership extremely difficult 
for those populations viewed as undesirable and classified as ‘non-whites’. As a result, 
the environmental movement was seen by these marginalized populations to exist as a 
means whereby the environment could be maintained for the enjoyment of the privileged 
‘white’ classes, a belief with more than a little justification if seen in light of the 
initiatives of these movements.83 The establishment of numerous national parks and 
wildlife protection areas which occurred in this period signalled the first in what was to 
be many, forcible removals and physical exclusions with relation to space of indigenous 
populations from their traditional lands, and outlawed the practice of hunting in these 
areas – destroying local livelihoods and scattering locally established communities.  
During the period of colonialism then, the environmental movement reflected the 
dominant belief of their cultural superiority in the minds of the ‘white’ European 
colonizers. This fostered a conversationalist ideology which regarded ‘blacks’ as 
uncaring towards the environment and as such inherently destructive. Driven by a 
Darwinian belief that the European colonizers had certain knowledge, privileges, power 
and rights of possession due to their inherently more ‘civilized’ society, colonizers were 
quick to place notions of environmental conservation over the interests of those of the 
‘uncivilized’ marginalized population;84 
The fact that this perception was rooted more in racial bias and greed than 
in reality did not prevent the acceptance of a concept of the ideal protected 
natural area as one which was uninhabited, which catered to mobile, 
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affluent visitors, and from which the indigenous were excluded, except to 
serve in menial roles.85 
The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 marked the beginning of formalized 
legislative racism in South Africa. Apart from the various laws promoting the economic 
and political superiority of those classified as ‘whites’, other laws and private-practices 
also facilitated the spatial exclusion of ‘black’ populations through removals and 
dispossession. These communities were subsequently spatially, economically and 
politically marginalized in the new Union; resulting in numerous devastating blows to the 
physical and psychological connection between the local ‘black’ populations and their 
traditional environments.86 During this period ‘black’ representation in environmental 
movements was minimal, and their exclusion from ‘natural’ areas and certain 
environmental leisure spaces was common. 
Environmental rhetoric used by the government often depicted these marginalized 
populations as inherently anti-conservationist, uneducated and destructive; an image that 
was to be rapidly recycled to justify their exclusion from environments of agriculture; 
residence, both in rural and urban settings; leisure and industry. 
The Apartheid Era  
The formalization of racial segregation and political exclusion by the National Party after 
achieving political victory in 1948, was to cement the systematic separation of the 
racially constituted marginalized ‘non-white’ populations from the dominant ‘white’ 
population in a wide variety of ways. A legal arsenal of prohibitions and directives 
managed the totality of the marginalized’s access to spaces constituted as exclusively 
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‘white’ areas, their ability to construct their own sustainable environments through 
economic marginalisation and frequent relocations, and prohibited their membership in 
environmental organizations. 
The processes of marginalisation deserve some closer attention, having numerous 
mechanisms.87 The formation of the ‘homelands’ policy lay at the centre of the Apartheid 
state’s ideology concerning the forcible exclusion of marginalized populations to the 
rural areas. Relocations were often violent, while the areas where the marginalized were 
eventually settled were small and barely tenable for the sustenance of the populations. 
Here the populations were divided along socially constructed ‘ethnic’ lines into separate 
territories, further dislocating them from one another despite their sharing of a common 
fate in marginalisation. Environmentally these areas were barely suitable for survival and 
in the majority of instances, remain so to this day. Lack of developed infrastructure and 
service delivery, the concentration of poverty and its incumbent social ills, and the sheer 
number of inhabitants – lead to a rapid degeneration of these locations; creating an 
environment of violence, pollution, disease and insurmountable hardships. In this way, 
“…Africans were treated as foreign migrants in the place of their birth,”88 relocated to the 
rural peripheries of the country to be housed in unsustainable locations. 
Movement from these and other areas where Africans were settled, both in the urban or 
rural settings, was made incredibly difficult by legislation such as the Group Areas Act, 
the Pass Laws and the Separate Amenities Act, proscribing certain amenities for ‘white’ 
use only.89 The urban settings into which the Group Areas Act confined the racially 
marginalized exhibited similar hostile settings to those in the rural areas; lacking places 
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of leisure or the enjoyment of nature. Due to their political marginalisation, inhabitants 
here could organise little resistance to the siting of toxic industries or other locally 
unwanted land uses in their proximity.90 
This cumulative effect of Apartheid legislation and policies has resulted in the alienation 
of marginalized inhabitants from their local environments, having profound effects on 
attitudes towards environmental issues among Africans today; effectively excluding the 
majority of the population from mainstream environmental thought and participation.  
Apartheid legislation further extended the marginalisation of excluded populations 
through the imposition of numerous laws regulating their economic development. By 
restricting the types of jobs ‘blacks’ could enter into, and prescribing an unequal share of 
the benefits of employment; Apartheid acted to entrench these marginalized populations 
in debilitating poverty, compounding their dismal existence in dangerous local 
environments and removing all chance for socio-economic upliftment. Faced with the 
task of eking out a living under these circumstances, few among the marginalized could 
avail themselves of the meagre opportunities for enjoyment of the environment, or the 
engagement in resistance to their plight. 
Linking Notions of Exclusion and Environmental Justice 
Hallowes and Butler91 argue that Environmental Justice is a rights based discourse which 
assists with the framing of environmental issues in the broader socio-political context.92 
Accordingly, environmental justice assists in placing environmental concerns within 
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broader contexts of socio-economic power relations, development and issues concerning 
social justice – particularly the notion of social exclusions or inclusions. The inherent 
value of the ability of environmental justice to ‘bring-home’ issues relating to the 
environment in the contemporary South African context cannot be overstated. Notable in 
this regard is the environmental justice understanding of the concept of development as 
being inherently concerned not only with issues relating to sustainable use of 
environmental resources, but also with the power relations which underlie interests and 
notions concerning where development is to take place.  
If we were to identify the presence of environmental injustices with regards development 
then, one could argue that injustices occur most often where power relations or 
underlying interests associated with development act to either unfairly exclude 
populations from the benefits of developments, or unfairly bear the brunt of 
developments externalities.93 Accordingly the aim of environmental justice in this 
instance must be to provide an accurate analysis of the underlying power relations 
defining development, and affect a restructuring of these relations to include in their 
considerations the socially marginalized. Apart from the externalisation of negative 
environmental losses through development already covered in this discussion, the 
principal means whereby environmental injustices are created affecting the poor or 
marginalized is that of social and spatial exclusions. 
Exclusion may relate not only to unequal representation of populations in socio-economic 
terms or even their spatial dislocation with regards living and working environments, but 
also to their unequal membership or visibility in social institutions. These features are 
inherently reinforcing, and exclusion in this sense denotes the means whereby the 
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marginalized are limited or implicitly denied access, control and management of 
resources made available by development projects.94 
South Africa’s history of segregation and the legacy of Apartheid has had profound 
implications for the administration of environmental and developmental concern, 
reflecting the radicalised discourse underlying marginalization of the racially identified 
non-white populations. Racial marginalization has not appeared as the totality of 
marginalization of the population, as profound differences exist in terms of gender and 
class as well.95 
Environment, Poverty and Marginalization 
The process of marginalization of the majority in South Africa under Apartheid has 
involved a process of alienation of populations from their environments; both physically 
as in the form of spatial social exclusions, economically through programs producing 
trends of unequal access to the modern economy, and psychologically by disempowering 
individuals within decision-making and ownership processes concerning the spaces they 
inhabit. Development at both the international and national level has followed the lines of 
these internal divisions, with costs visited on the marginalized disproportionately to the 
benefits gained from development projects. The wide array of attacks from development 
on the rights of varied populations results in huge difficulties for resistance, while the 
tendency for negative impacts to be externalised on the economically marginalized 
groups renders whatever unlikely opposition should form, relatively powerless when 
faced with the economic might of those driving development for their own unequal gains. 
The separation in the dominant discourse of notions of development and the environment 
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excludes the fact that environmental degradation caused by unequal development or 
resultant social exclusions can compound into further environmental degradation which 
may increase the yoke of poverty on the marginalized.96 Dominant neo-liberal tenets 
concerning development regard poverty as the failure to enter the market economy, and 
prescribe programs to facilitate this entry despite evidence that the poor entering the 
market on an unequal footing will prove beneficial only for the exceptional few. 
Thus, it is evident that the history of development and the distribution of resultant 
negative effects have profound impact on the marginalization of populations in relation to 
society and the environment. 
Danger In The Margins 
The spaces housing the marginalized majority ‘black’ population throughout South 
Africa’s history of Apartheid have suffered the full brunt of a massive concentration of 
people into a very small area. Environmental problems suffered here include chronic soil 
erosion, scarcity of resources other than land such as fresh water supplies and suitable 
fuels; absence of proper sanitation and transport infrastructure and in some places the 
absence of electricity to drive local production.97 
The areas are beset with the social ills associated with exclusion and extreme poverty, 
whilst reliance on fossil fuels and paraffin for heating results in a highly dangerous 
environment, especially for the young. 
Attempts following the collapse of Apartheid by conservationists to assist these areas to 
integrate in a sustainable manner through wise-use of local resources have 
understandably met with suspicion and distrust of government attempts to manage 
                                                 
96
 Ibid, p. 60 
97
 Ibid, p. 70 
 55 
production. This suspicion is often based on the history of similar programs under 
Apartheid to limit production in these areas to cement the cycle of poverty amongst the 
inhabitants.98 
In both formal and informal settlements the level of environmental degradation has 
precipitated a debilitating health problem.99 Apartheid’s Group Areas Act and homelands 
policies have typically located ‘black’ settlements in environmentally unfavourable areas. 
Apart from unequal exposure to locally unwanted land usages, such as waste treatment 
plants, landfills, incinerators and toxic industries; these settlements have often been 
subjected to water pollution from industries situated miles away due to their reliance on 
natural water sources.100 
The absence of access to clean water is a major concern in these areas as many still use 
polluted water supplies, suffering from a wide variety of water borne diseases. Reliance 
on fuels like coal and paraffin have contributed to air pollution and associated health 
problems. Endemic poverty and restricted access to health care have resulted in 
catastrophic levels of the population suffering from treatable diseases. Coupled with 
increasing rates of transfer of incurable diseases such as HIV/AIDS – this situation 
results in large economic losses being suffered by the spatially marginalized; due to the 
cost of treatment and care, as well as days lost from employment due to illness. The 
relative economic hardships to the already poor populations here places further strain on 
life, and by extension the natural environments. 
Attempts by privatised service providers to supply basic services such as water and 
electricity in recent years have done little to relieve this strain. While large numbers of 
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connections to these services have been made, their management has proved in some 
instances to be disastrous. Faced with water metering and the metering of electricity, 
many poor have incurred additional economic strain in paying for these services. Further, 
meter tampering in order to take advantage of these basic necessities for survival is 
constructed as criminal by local authorities. Despite the criminalisation of populations 
desperate for the basic amenities of survival, the supply of these services has been related 
to a number of hidden costs to the marginalized. Among these are included the 
conversion of appliances in the households to electricity.101 Additionally, the monitoring 
of water and electricity usage in these settlements where metered connections are 
installed most often is the responsibility of females in the home, further increasing the 
already disproportionate burden these women faced in marginalized spaces. The 
provision of health care to the sick due to worsening environmental conditions is also 
most often undertaken by females, decreasing their opportunities for holding employment 
and earning wages to increase their dismal economic prospects. 
Apart from the hazards associated with health risks, the poor planning of informal 
settlements as a consequence of racially orientated spatial arrangements gives rise to an 
increased exposure to natural disasters and other crises. Settlements often form close to 
rivers due to their need for water. This arrangement can prove costly in times of heavy 
rains and flooding, when the collapse of flimsy structures from flooding or erosion during 
rains presents a significant problem.102 Stress caused by economic hardships and 
compounded by environmental degradation and un-sustainability is further implicated in 
increasing violence in these areas. Cramped living conditions and lack of leisure activity 
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is compounded by competition over scarce resources. Insecurities and the absence of a 
sense of belonging and permanence engendered by a history of social exclusion 
contribute to these stresses. Outbreaks of violence are common in these areas both 
domestic and otherwise. Again these negatives are most often borne disproportionately 
by women and children.103  
The tendency of the government and local administrations to site dirty industries and the 
most harmful of potential environmental hazards according to a racial bias is 
unmistakable. Increasing poverty in these areas has reinforced environmental 
degradation, which in turn has impacted again on the ability of the communities in 
question to develop means whereby they might escape their situation. Although the 
Apartheid system has collapsed, these distributions persist to a large degree. Those 
populations classified as ‘non-white’ under Apartheid continue to live in much the same 
areas in which they were concentrated under Apartheid as they lack the necessary capital 
to relocate. ‘Whites’ in South Africa on the other hand often live in the most desirable 
environments, often fenced off to disallow access to outsiders to their pillaged 
environmental benefits. Whilst similar acts of racism such as those under Apartheid are 
no longer tolerated through new legislation, “…anecdotal evidence suggests that it still 
pervades environmental decision making at the local government level.”104 
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Chapter II 
Unsustainable Development in South Africa 
In attempting to explain the continuation (and in many cases exacerbation) of drastic 
inequalities between the affluent (predominantly ‘white’) populations and a rapidly 
growing poor in South Africa despite the country’s adoption of a liberal governmental 
framework; many academics, authors and activists have turned to an examination of the 
particular development discourse adopted by the ANC-led government towards the end 
of the 1990s. In particular, many of these authors argue the reconfiguration of the 
dominant development and economic project in South Africa from one sensitive to power 
imbalances underlying society and supportive of redistribution of wealth to the victims of 
Apartheid (as embodied by the RDP program); to a neo-liberal market orientated 
approach which favours the ‘commodification of everything’105 in order to extend the 
rational laws of market-management and their supposed benefits to all society106 - lies at 
the very core of the continuation of spatial marginalisation forms and the exacerbation of 
dramatic inequalities between the rich and poor in economic, social and environmental 
terms. 
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Bond (2003) has argued the eradication of the legislative basis for racism under 
Apartheid has in this way been replaced with “an equally oppressive structured process 
that can be termed class apartheid”107 resulting in an ever broadening inequality between 
the rich and poor. 
Contestation over development in the post-1994 period in South Africa has typically 
followed similar cleavages evident at the global level – tending to relate to conflicts 
between three dominant distinctive ideologies: namely neo-liberalism; the doctrine of 
sustainable development; and finally that on Environmental Justice. 
This chapter in its initial part aims to introduce these three distinct development 
discourses in turn, positing the emergence of the final discourse of Environmental Justice 
as the organisational response to the dominant global trend of development under the 
neo-liberal model, and further as a result of an incomplete attentiveness of the current 
dominant paradigm of the sustainable development discourse to the needs of poor 
populations in the developing world. 
The latter portion of the chapter serves to examine the particular trajectory of post-1994 
development in South Africa, with the aim of illustrating the competing claims by 
advocates of Environmental Justice and sustainability in the context of development in 
South Africa. For the most part, the examination focuses on the issues of human 
settlements formation in terms of the South African development response to spatial 
marginalisation, and the maintenance of environmental spaces for the poor – including 
the provision of core infrastructural services. 
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This examination will serve to introduce a number of key themes to be examined in the 
case study to follow – particularly the effects of un-sustainable development projects 
and their effects on the marginalised. 
Neo-liberal Development and Nature in Crisis 
 
The standard model of neo-liberal development relies extensively on the historical pattern 
of development which occurred in Western Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, a pattern 
emulated worldwide towards the middle of the 20th century, primarily through the 
policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as other 
International Non-governmental Organisations and donors. The ideology represents 
progress as a linear movement from poverty to wealth, highlighting the process of capital 
accumulation as the ultimate aim of development strategies. Mechanisms to achieve 
capital accumulation were again modelled on those used in the West; the expansion of the 
capitalist economic model, the growth of free trade and the opening of markets to outside 
investors and products, and the stimulation of a high consumer culture to cultivate 
growing demands for new products and innovation. Viewing the history of development 
in this way, contemporary development projects undertaken in context of neo-liberalism 
place capital growth as the unquestioned arbiter of success – while cultural practices, 
traditional economic practices and the subsistence of livelihoods, which fail to generate 
profit are considered backward or inefficient. 108 Ultimately, the standard neo-liberal 
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model represents an attempt to compel all states and communities “to converge into a 
homogenous monolithic order modelled on the particular evolution of the West.”109 
The tying or paring of world aid and programs of foreign direct investment to the meeting 
of the structural adjustment criteria closely modelled on the neo-liberal approach, has 
effectively subjected countries in the developing world to the market economy and the 
pitfalls of free-trade at the global level, involving “the imposition of the will of the 
economic powers of the North on the rest of the world.”110 
The standard view of environmental management is derived from the many challenges 
posed to the environment by the advance of capitalism. Environmental management 
under the standard neo-liberal model is characterised largely by after-the-event solutions, 
a tendency influenced by the central tenet of neo-liberalism, that; 
No general environmental concerns should stand in the way of “progress” 
(more precisely, capital accumulation) and that any “after the event” 
environmental difficulties can be effectively cleared up if need be.111 
The standard model therefore clearly reflects a supposed dominance of human scientific 
understanding over Nature, a factor which denies both the irreversibility of environmental 
damage, or the existence of a pervasive burgeoning environmental crisis. Environmental 
issues according to this model are regarded as “the results of ‘errors and mistakes’ […] 
that should be dealt with on a case-by-case (and most often place-by-place) basis.”112 
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Accordingly then, this discourse favours the economic interests of established firms and 
places the burden for environmental management of ‘market failures’113 on the state.  
Whilst relegating the management of environmental issues to the state domain, these 
market based discourses uphold the neo-liberal defence of private property, preventing 
the encroachment of the state on established rights relating to use and alienation of 
private property. 
By subjugating the environment to the market in this way, attempts at environmental 
management undertaken under the neo-liberal model are faced with two important 
limitations: firstly, that intervention must occur on a case-by-case basis, only once clear 
evidence of degradation has occurred; and secondly, due to the existence of a neoclassical 
market belief in a zero-sum trade-off between environmental protection and economic 
growth, the pursuit of capital is the ultimate goal – a goal which rejects subjugation to 
other concerns.114 
Determining the tradeoffs involved in environmental degradation versus economic 
production, results in the placing of environmental management in expert technocratic 
discourses of finance, economics and science; facilitating its submersion in the state 
regulatory apparatus, often under the influence of corporate and state driven research. 
These processes often exclude the wishes of broader society or local communities from 
influencing the management of environmental problems which may affect their 
environmental interests and local livelihoods.  
Environmental management under the neo-liberal model of development is for the most 
part, perfectly in connivance with the interests of capital, and environmental protection 
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involves more a process of conserving and appropriating environmental resources for use 
in economic production, than attempts to mediate concerns for broader social justice or 
scarcity; 
The view that capital accumulation is fundamental to human development 
is never challenged. The right of humanity to engage in extensive 
environmental modification is tacitly regarded as sacrosanct.115 
In the name of high productivity and capital growth, the standard model has operated to 
promote high resource intensive production processes. Often the net effect of these 
processes are the ‘hidden externalities’ of resource deterioration and ecological 
destruction; whilst promoting a transfer of the benefits from production (resources and 
wealth) from the poor nations and the poor, to the wealthy both in underdeveloped 
countries and those in the Northern industrialized states. Yet for many opposed to neo-
liberal development, the operation of the neo-liberal development model entrenches 
poverty in the Third world or underdeveloped nations, while simultaneously supporting 
the high consumerism and wealth-operated culture of affluent nations; 
The impoverishment of the peripheries and the erosion of the resources 
and rights of marginal communities actually pay for the material basis of 
the prosperity of the enclaves.116 
It is this conceptualisation of development at the global level that lies at the heart of the 
now often used narrative of the Summers memo, widely used to criticise growth-centred 
development and introduce claims for justice and sustainability in environmental 
management. This 1991 World Bank internal memo from the desk of Lawrence 
Summers, Harvard economist and chief economist of the World Bank was leaked and 
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published in The Economist, February 8, 1992. Herein Summers seems to argue for the 
World Bank to encourage more migration of dirty industries to less developed countries. 
He based this statement on 3 reasons: 
1. That since the population of the Third world and Less Developed 
Countries (LDC’s) have a much lower wage-earning potential than the 
populations in the First world, the economic costs of deaths and 
illnesses from pollution are lowest in developing countries. Summers 
argues the logic behind the dumping of toxic waste in the lowest-wage 
country is “impeccable”.117 
2. Summers argues that in relation to the First world countries, Africa is 
vastly under-polluted. Thus he argues it makes economic sense to 
introduce pollution.118  
3. Since the poor are more concerned about poverty, they will not worry 
too much about environmental conditions. In Summers’s words “…the 
concern over an agent that causes a one in a million change in the odds 
of prostate cancer is obviously going to be much higher in a country 
where people survive to get prostate cancer than in a country where 
under-five mortality is 200 per thousand.”119 
The leaking of the memo caused a media scandal world-wide. While environmental 
groups declared Summers public enemy number one, and the World Bank made open 
moves to distance official World Bank policy from the content of the memo; some within 
development studies have commented that Summers logic is indeed impeccable viewing 
his logic as an accurate description of the material realities in the modern global 
economy. Poverty stricken areas and LDC’s can indeed be paid to accept toxic waste and 
they often are - often involved in bidding wars with one another to act as such dumping 
grounds. In often-desperate attempts to mobilise employment and other social benefits for 
their communities, many leaders of poor communities have sought to entice potentially 
dangerous industries to site themselves in or near their communities. This phenomenon is 
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not exclusive to the Third world and admittedly it is not exclusive to communities 
defined as ‘black’; but occurs in areas of poverty throughout the globe. ‘Black’ or 
‘coloured’ workers in South Africa and in poor communities globally are more 
vulnerable to these pressures than their ‘white’ often more affluent and educated 
counterparts as they suffer higher proportionate burdens of unemployment, and most 
often lack the necessary skills or capital required to secure more favourable employment, 
or to relocate to other communities. 
The reality of the modern world economy is that capital possesses numerous advantages 
over labour with regards space. If capital senses its interests are threatened it often is able 
to relocate to areas of reduced labour and legislative resistance. Capital further has the 
ability to recoup losses by other means, either by relocating (and often taking 
employment with them), or by externalising costs to consumers or other communities 
such as those in the third world.120 
Aside from illustrating the inequalities present within the world capitalist economy, 
essentially the text of the memo further reveals a number of assumptions and outcomes 
implicit in the underlying discourse of neo-liberalism. Firstly the memo would seem to 
suggest that the lives of those living in the third world are worth less, than those of first 
world countries due to the nature of their earning potential. Secondly, according to 
Summers the level of pollution in the third world is inefficiently low – meaning that the 
number of sinks and resources going unused in these zones contributes to a wasteful 
system – and that waste of this nature cannot be tolerated in the context of profit 
maximization. And finally, the memo suggests healthy environments to be luxury objects, 
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affordable only by those in the highest income-earning bracket,121 presumably 
communities in the affluent centres in the first world. 
While undeniably, few liberal governments in the first world can justify principles that 
evaluate groups of citizens differently, in practice “such differences in valuation […] are 
at the very core of the capitalist economy and state.”122 Under the capitalist world market, 
hazards are regarded as most efficiently distributed if distribution results in the poor 
being most affected. Pollutants are thus regarded as necessitating management and 
distribution in accordance with the free market – an approach extended to issues such as 
climate change, erosion of bio-diversity and other environmental crises. These arguments 
are based on laws of economics which under-appreciate human issues, ecological sanctity 
and irreversibility in their calculations. 
The unfortunate reality then, is that it is indeed sound market economic logic to situate 
undesirable waste disposal units in poorer communities where land prices are not going 
to be as adversely affected as if they were situated in richer areas, and if justice was allied 
to pure market whims this would be the only acceptable outcome. As Harvey argues, 
unfortunately “…the market mechanism “naturally” works that way.”123 
The placement of dumping grounds in the USA and around the world for toxic wastes in 
those areas with a geographical concentration of people of low-income and colour 
supports this claim; and the practice of Summers’s logic has sparked a mass outcry 
world-wide, giving significant impetus to the movement against what has been defined as 
‘environmental racism’. 
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Further, Summers’s argument has been used as fuel by many scholars embroiled in 
North-South and Dependency theorist development arguments for a reformation of global 
trends in development and as evidence of the First worlds support of a system of 
environmental ‘apartheid’ – and as fuel for arguments in favour of sustainable 
development. 
Shiva is a notable advocate of the theory of global developmental ‘apartheid’ and the 
resultant growth in global environmental apartheid. Her argument briefly, revolves 
around the fact that the Northern countries appropriate resources and wealth of LDC’s 
through the activities of the world market, then systematically dump their pollution and 
waste on the poor. Whilst Shiva argues that the current environmental and development 
crisis in the Third World would suggest that the world economy should adjust to the 
ecological limits and needs of human-centred survival; instead through adjustment 
programs advocated by donors, international monetary institutions and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) the Northern states are forcing the third world into an increasing 
‘open dependence’. The effects of the global policy of the “holy trinity”124; multinational 
corporations from the North, their supporters in governments and the wasteful lifestyles 
of the rich in the North, serve to effect the further under-development of the Third world 
– by externalising their environmental costs to these countries through export. 
Under the phenomenon of globalisation, even toxic waste is treated as a commodity and 
its disposal is subject to the requirements of profit maximisation. The US generates 275 
million tonnes of toxic waste every year and is the leading producer in the world;125 with 
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the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries126 
producing 98% of the 400 million metric tonnes generated worldwide. Further, the costs 
of burying one tonne of waste in the North is vastly more expensive than the costs of 
shipping it to the South. In Germany, it is USD2500 cheaper to ship a single tonne of 
waste to the LDC’s than to process it in Germany.127 Thus, Northern states justify 
dumping as a type of economic efficiency. 
Third World countries are often powerless to resist this trend. Northern states pay huge 
amounts of money for dumping in Third World countries like those in Africa. Thus the 
North-South orientation of the world economy allows for the practice of environmental 
racism to be perpetuated at a global level. 
Development under the standard liberal model has allowed the North to be largely 
powered by the removal of scarce resources in the South. While benefits are concentrated 
in the North, the costs of this mode of development are visited on the South, including 
environmental hazards associated with production and the effects of poverty. 
The failure of the neo-liberal model has left a polarized world, “the world might have 
developed – but in two opposite directions.”128 The bifurcation of the industrialized North 
and underdeveloped South is further mirrored within nations, as the gap between 
economically powerful elites and socially marginalized poor populations continues to 
grow. Thus the notion of North and South have become,  
less and less geographical categories but rather socio-economic ones, 
                                                 
126
 Member countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States of America. 
127
 Shiva, (1999) op cit, p. 58 
128
 Sachs, W; “Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature on the Political Anatomy of an 
Oxymoron, in Fischer and Hajer (eds), Living with Nature; Oxford: Oxford University press, (1999) p. 25 
 69 
referring to the line which divides the strong world-market sectors from 
the competitively weak, economically superfluous sectors in society.129 
It becomes obvious in light of the current crises, that neo-liberal development is indeed 
neither universal or equitable, nor can it be expected to be durable at its present pace.130 
The major challenge which has confronted those seeking to challenge the standard model 
of development is that of the crises of justice versus the crisis of nature.131 Under the 
standard notion of growth-led development, these views are naturally opposed to each 
other; any attempt to do justice to marginalized populations threatens the crisis of nature, 
while any cessation of development to ease the burden on nature threatened to condemn 
the rights of the poor to achieve the standard of living in the Northern industrialized 
states.132 
Ecological Modernization and Sustainable Development 
The ascendancy of the neo-liberal standard model and the crisis of eco-social injustice 
were soon to give rise to the Environmental Modernization model of environmental 
management and social development. At the centre of this discourse lies the notion that 
capitalist production is inherently damaging to the environment, and that environmental 
management requires a proactive response by society to manage these issues in the form 
of pre-emptive regulations and control.133 In place of the post-fact market-driven case-by-
case management practices of the market model, what is proffered is the formation of a 
systematic body of policies and regulations aimed at the promotion of sustainable 
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economic development, which takes cognisance of the fact that many of the detrimental 
effects of capital accumulation on the environment are irreversible. This represents an 
acceptance of a basic ethic concerning the need for conservation of the environment for 
the enjoyment of future generations, a notion lacking from the standard model. The 
notion of sustainability is equally important. The standard models rejection of any 
attempt to limit the use of resources required in production has raised questions in the last 
decade of the dangers presented by the fact that these resources are not infinite. Further, 
the appropriation and use of land in production which damages the quality of the 
environment and local livelihoods is also seen as contrary to sustainability, exemplified 
in practices such as deforestation or water pollution. 
Thus the environmental modernization model serves to internalise notions of risk facing 
the environment; as well as internalising the fact that effects of human use of the 
environment as a productive resource, and as a site for the externalisation of costs arising 
from production is likely to have long-term, and some times even permanent, effects on 
the quality of environments. It thus summarily rejects those aspects of the standard model 
which allow for post-fact interventions. 
Issues in the discourse of environmental modernization have become adopted in many 
subsequent theories concerning the management of the environment, as well as the 
environmental agendas of many non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), government 
and environmental pressure groups. 
Much of the success of this discourse resides in its ability to appeal to some extent to 
capital for support. By arguing that capital accumulation serves to impair the ability of 
environments to sustain long term efficient production, environmental modernization is 
 71 
able to some degree to convince capital of the benefits of resource conservation and the 
preservation of resources and environmental ‘sinks’, and to consider long-term effects of 
their policies.134  
Critically, notions of environmental justice have also resulted in certain concessions 
being made in environmental theory to notions of environmental equity, and the 
integration of the environmentalism of the poor and marginalized into the discourse in the 
search for long-term sustainable environmental management. This attempt to integrate 
notions of development and environmental justice was instrumental in the formation of 
the World Commission on Environment and Development’s Brundtland Report in 
1987.135 This document where “…economic development (improvement in human 
capacities and conditions) is seen as quite distinctive from economic growth…”136, has 
served to introduce a wide variety of ‘brown’ issues commonly held to refer to 
environmental issues of pertinence to the poor or marginalised, into development 
discourse. This recognition of a number of inherent rights on behalf of all people to the 
enjoyment of safe environments has allowed environmental management to take 
cognisance of the wishes and demands of broader democratic society.137 
The Contested Notion of Sustainable Development 
The Brundtland report introduced the notion of Sustainable Development, a term which 
has become widely appropriated by environmentalists, development organisations, 
government officials, corporations and donors – all who share disparate competing 
interests in continuing economic development, while simultaneously mediating the 
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effects of development on the environment, and in the case of environmental justice 
activists - effects on marginalised local communities in both the developed and 
developing world.138 Whilst historically environmental protectionists have had a tenuous 
relationship with those striving for economic development, the doctrine of Sustainable 
Development is proffered in many arenas as an all-encompassing framework for 
cooperation in meeting the needs of continued development and environmental 
protection, while paying heed to social justice demands of local populations. 
Despite this rather triumphalist claim, sustainable development has evolved to offer very 
little in respect of a manageable common ground between competing interests, primarily 
due to the highly contested nature of the definition of the concept; and the competing 
paradigms which have emerged within the discourse. The Brundtland Report defines 
Sustainable Development as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”139 Yet, beyond 
this definition, Sustainable Development continues to suffer difficulties arising from a 
lack of clarity or cohesion between various interested parties, difficulties which have 
given rise to a number of competition claims and interpretations. Indeed, Vaillancourt 
argues sustainable development exists as less of a theory for development, than as “a 
vague and complex theoretical category, which also serves partly as an ideology, and 
partly as a loosely operational concept, for various groups of actors.”140 
The absence of definitive meaning and application lends the concept to varying 
interpretations and perspectives. Sustainable Development has gained significant favour 
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in an era of rejection of the notion of limitless growth (as advocated by neoclassical 
economics) and heightened environmental awareness; particularly in terms of the effects 
of development programs and capitalist economics on nature. Yet aside from this 
rejection, aspects of neoclassical economic thought are clearly discernible in some of the 
perspectives on Sustainable Development; particularly amongst those donors, 
corporations and international organisations using elements of the Sustainable 
Development discourse in promoting development programs in the less developed 
countries (LDC’s).  
Environmental modernization discourse has been successful in its attempt to encourage 
awareness and action concerning a number of important environmental issues in the 
promotion of development, despite embodying minimal challenges to the ascendancy of 
the capitalist market economy. Whilst it does impinge on property rights to some extent, 
and can act to curb unlimited capital accumulation; the ability of the movement to 
promote efficient and moderate usage of environmental resources in the interest of long 
term development has enabled the discourse to appear as acceptable to many within the 
capitalist market economy.141 Harvey however warns against its inherent ease of 
corruption by capitalist interests for their own gain, fearing a situation, 
In which big industry, big government and establishment, and high-tech 
big science can get to dominate the world even more that they currently do 
in the name or ‘sustainability’, environmental modernization and 
appropriate global management of the supposedly fragile health of planet 
earth.142 
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The Crisis of Justice in Development. 
Since its emergence in the 1989 World Commission for Environment and Development’s 
Brundtland Report, the discourse of sustainable development has attempted to marry the 
notions of ‘environment’ or nature, with that of ‘development’ or justice.  
The definition of Sustainable Development as given in the Brundtland report internalises 
questions over whose ‘needs’ are to be met and how these needs are defined. These 
questions are largely unanswered in the text of the Brundtland report, and as such the 
definition serves to avoid the crisis of justice.143 It is therefore left up to those seeking to 
allude to the discourse of Sustainable Development in their attempts at environmental 
action to clarify their understanding of the term – which often reflects directly their 
position with respect to justice and development. However, what is apparent is that 
sustainable development rejects the notion of any ecologically imposed limitations to 
further development, assuming them away in the interests of becoming more agreeable to 
vested capitalist interests. Instead, what is proposed is continued economic development 
proceeding from increased ecological attentiveness, internalising in Sustainable 
Development a notion of the domination of Nature by human technology and scientific 
understanding. Nature is held to possess certain natural capacities or productive 
boundaries; and while these boundaries are to be respected they are also to be overcome 
through science, innovation and technology.144 
 Sustainable development discourse further recognizes the existence of a network of 
social and political groupings other than the typically neo-liberal recognition of states and 
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various supra-national economic actors.145 Included in this recognition are a number of 
interests varying from national civil societies and reform groups, to international 
organizations. While recognizing their existence however, the discourse often falls short 
of recognizing the complex interplay of power relations that make up interaction between 
these groupings and local communities. These shortcomings hold potentially damaging 
consequences for attempts at promoting environmental justice concerns, particular those 
relating to the protection of local livelihoods. The discourse typically overestimates the 
ability of local communities to express their concerns and desires with regards 
development programs undertaken in their local area – while simultaneously neglecting 
the ability of capital to exclude poor communities from the benefits of development 
activities, while dispossessing them of livelihoods. 
For Shiva, the contradictory claims in the Sustainable Development debate in general 
emerge from the conflict between two paradigms emerging in the contestation over 
beneficiaries of development; one ‘ecologically-based, people-centred and earth-centred’, 
and the other based on economic development and increased global trade.146 This clash 
between the ecological and commercial paradigms has resulted in the Sustainable 
Development discourse evolving as a highly contested discourse. According to Shiva, the 
commercial paradigm has represented,  
an attempt to reduce the WSSD to WTO, and in the process destroy the 
sustainability of peoples livelihoods, the ecosystems that support 
livelihoods and our very survival.147 
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The destruction of local livelihoods illustrates the changing interpretations of the terms 
poverty and development between the ecological and commercial paradigms. Often the 
projects advocated by those in the commercial development paradigm are responsible for 
destroying local livelihoods in the name of growth, deepening the effects of poverty 
amongst local populations “by robbing them of homes, communities, livelihoods and 
cultural security”148 In order to allow the industrial modern economies to retain the 
advantage in light of new scarcities, notions of sustainability cannot be allowed to inhibit 
further growth – and rather these strategies are to be reined in to compliment the search 
for greater economic output.149 
The commercial paradigm then utilizes growing environmental concern as an engine for 
further economic development and capital output, advocating innovation in technology 
both in terms of products to be marketed to environmentally conscious consumers, or as a 
means to promote more efficient usage of the environment as a natural resource in 
production. In this way, Sustainable Development is constructed as complementary to a 
capitalist mode of production, as increased efficiency and innovation stimulates 
maximization of profit. In light of new scarcities, both of raw materials for production 
and more importantly of environmental sinks for the disposal of waste, emphasis shifted 
from attempts to secure bilateral agreements for the procurement of resources – to 
securing multinational arrangement to secure access to environmental sinks.150 Such 
agreements aim to reduce the extent of emissions from the South in order that sinks will 
be available for use by the North in order to continue economic development in the 
future. 
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Viewed in this light, the term sustainable development seeks to preserve development in 
spite of natural limits, through careful management of access to nature.151 The exact 
character of this ‘development’ remains unclear. 
A final distinguishing characteristic of this perspective is the apportioning of blame for 
environmental hazards on states in the underdeveloped South; and in so doing, marking 
these countries as requiring change to circumvent further ecological disaster while 
positing the globalised ‘north’ as the technological model to be adopted in the furtherance 
of development ideals.152 
Environmental hazards and poverty are explained as responsible for the continued 
underdeveloped nature of countries, as opposed to actions of the capitalist industrial 
world market economy. In this way the burden for change is passed to the poor, with the 
solution offered by increasing the openness of local markets to more efficient technology, 
and through greater investment of the affluent to extract or utilize resources in more 
efficient ways.153 
The influence of the standard model of development is clearly determinable in the contest 
perspective.154 Just as the underdeveloped South was to be revived by following the 
development of the North, allowing for greater openness to exploitation of the South by 
the North; the environmentally unsound practices of the South are constructed as 
requiring the efficient management and expertise of the North. The result can only be the 
same, continued exploitation of countries in the South for resources and sinks required to 
fuel the ‘sustainable’ economic expansion of the North. 
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The Ecological Paradigm: Towards Eco-social Justice 
The ecology paradigm arises in response to the nature of development projects 
undertaken in accordance with the standard neo-liberal development discourse.155 In 
contrast to the commercial paradigm, the ecological paradigm rejects the crass equation 
of development with capital, arguing the issue of development,  
is not merely a trade-off of costs and benefits because the cost of 
destruction of the conditions of life and well-being is not merely a matter 
of money, it is a matter of life itself.156  
In mounting their challenge to the standard notion of development, those among the 
ecological paradigm argue for alternatives to equating development with commodity or 
capital production, 
since it treats sustainable and unsustainable production alike […] while 
largely ignoring processes of recycling and energy conversion which do 
not lead to the production of goods or marketable services.157 
Alternatives to these measures include the meeting of basic human needs and the 
maintenance of natural ecosystems integral to local livelihoods in underdeveloped 
nations, 
Sustenance and basic needs satisfaction is the organising principle for 
natural resource use in the survival economy, in contrast to profits and 
capital accumulation being the organising principles for the exploitation of 
resources for the market.158 
For those in the ecological paradigm the contradiction inherent within Sustainable 
Development discourse is not merely the environment versus development, but rather the 
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actions of ‘resource-destructive’ economies operating to value natural resources based on 
their role in economic production, versus that of ‘resource-conserving’ economics 
operating to preserve local livelihoods and the natural resources integral to their 
operation, and indeed the promotion of life itself.159 Whilst there are many in the 
commercial development paradigm that would argue their goals are the same, that 
promoting a process of technological management is necessary to sustain natural 
environments, a necessity for sustainable economic growth – overwhelmingly evidence 
of development outcomes does not stand in their favour. Rather the continued operation 
of the standard model through the commercial paradigm serves to destroy local 
livelihoods through short-sighted resource accumulation programmes while drawing local 
populations into capital intensive wage labour – giving little thought to cultural traditions, 
basic needs or local community upliftment. In the process, negative externalities are 
created; in the loss of productivity of resources, local livelihoods and pollution – leading 
many to assert that if allowed to continue in this way, Sustainable Development holds not 
the upliftment of populations at heart but their continued and future impoverishment. 
Sustainable Development thus becomes unsustainable if allowed to proceed purely 
according to the commercial paradigm.160 
In light of the evidence of competing paradigms and perspectives presented, it becomes 
obvious then that the discourse of Sustainable Development is not a coherent notion, but 
rather represents a wide variety of interests, paradigms and perspectives on both the 
environment and development. 
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Interests of capital find expression in the commercial paradigm, continuing attempts to 
develop the North at the expense of those nations in the South – yet with renewed 
justification on the basis of technological efficiency and increased scientific 
understanding of the management of Nature. 
Contestation over the discourse of Sustainable Development would seem to indicate a 
sense of “business as usual” for all interested parties; with the only significantly novel 
idea coming in the form of a growing realisation by all concerned parties of the urgency 
of achieving their aims in light of mounting scarcities, and a burgeoning and increasingly 
visible global environmental crisis; accompanied by some attempt to give lip service to 
‘basic needs’ provision for those marginalized. 
Future challenges to a redefinition of development in terms of sustainable development 
remain the same as those which have informed the debate for the past few decades. Will 
environments benefit the poor, or increase the profits of the rich? Will the terms of 
development redress inequalities between North and South or exacerbate them? Will the 
North be allowed to continue to pilfer the resources of the South? And ultimately, will 
people begin to respect the natural limits to growth on Earth, or will development 
continue to spiral out of control to the detriment and destruction of the planet? 
The question of justice for local populations marginalized by the global flows of capital 
remains largely unresolved due to the trade-power and fluidity of capital in development, 
and crucially Sustainable Development only internalises these debates, while further 
being ‘captured’ by corporations and First world countries and affluent centres of 
economic power – interested in preserving their own form of unlimited expansion based 
on the exploitation of those countries in the underdeveloped worlds. The result in South 
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Africa has been as Hallowes argues, the maintenance of old power relations, as in 
questions as to maintaining corporate power in the face of local needs,  
In virtually all the highest-profile examples since 1994, expediency 
prevailed, corporations got their way because of power, and the needs of 
the environment and society were denigrated.161 
Environmental Justice 
The failures of development according to the neo-liberal model generally (and the 
sustainable development model more recently) to advance the cause of justice for local 
populations in development programs in favour of the interests of capital, have prompted 
the gradual emergence of the final discourse to be examined, that of Environmental 
Justice.  
The campaign for Environmental Justice has developed in recent decades to present a 
powerful force challenging the established domination of environmental theories by 
affluent communities, corporate powers and their role in pollution, governments and their 
role in supporting unequal distributions of the harmful effects of industrial production 
and finally the lack of representation of marginalized populations in the decision making 
apparatus of environmental procedure, distribution and production.  
Environmental justice is concerned with answering the questions: Why are certain 
‘communities of colour’ and ‘the poors’ bearing an unequal distribution of pollution and 
environmental hazards? What are the mechanisms supporting this distributive inequality? 
How can these trends be eradicated? And finally, what organisational structure will be 
able to effect such a reformation of environmental injustices? 
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In brief, Hallowes argues the concept attempts to resolve injustices perpetrated in 
development projects at both the local and global level, in that it, 
Sites ecological problems and possibilities within a socio-political context 
first and foremost, and poses firm moral and distributional questions about 
that context.162 
Environmental Justice has since its inception, emerged internationally as a powerful 
environmental discourse challenging the established forms of power which act to 
marginalize populations from the benefits of healthy environments. The discourse 
focuses on a broad range of issues pertaining to power relations underlying society, 
‘race’, poverty, social justice, and the unequal distribution of environmental hazards at 
both the global and local level.  
Environmental Racism and the Movement for Environmental Justice 
Local and global incidences of ‘environmental racism’ have been the main reasons for 
the development of the ideal of environmental justice, an ideal formed in the United 
States (US) in the civil rights movement of the late 1960’s and 1970’s; which achieved a 
wide degree of support both in the USA and internationally since its inception. 
Environmental racism has been described by Benjamin Chavis as: 
Racial discrimination in environmental policy making and the enforcement 
of regulations and laws… the deliberate targeting of people of colour 
communities for toxic and hazardous waste facilities, the official 
sanctioning of the life threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in our 
communities, and the history of excluding people of colour from the 
leadership of the environmental movement.163 
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Historically the environmental movement in the US has been a typically affluent middle 
class ‘white’-dominated movement. Even the most progressive of these organisations, the 
Sierra Club, in its infancy denied membership to Jews and ‘blacks’ through sponsorship 
policies. National parks and beaches were further closed off to people of colour until the 
civil rights movements in the 1960’s, representing them as ‘uncaring’, ‘naïve’ and even 
as contributing to the pollution of their own communities.164 
The 1970’s were to see a growing frequency of struggles in the United States against 
environmental racism as part of the debate surrounding environmental injustices. 
These struggles mobilised local poor communities of African-Americans, Hispanics and 
Native American Indians and a range of progressive groups – most notably churches and 
civil rights organisations – that sought to oppose and change the racially discriminatory 
distribution of hazardous waste and high-pollution industries in the US.  
This grassroots development was not allied with the mainstream environmental 
consciousness movement; which was purported to concentrate mainly on the concerns of 
‘white’, middle class Americans, and throughout history had largely failed to pay 
adequate attention to the disproportionate burden of pollution on minority communities.  
This burden has been attributed to “…the often racist, activities of major corporations 
who target them for high technology industries, incinerators and waste.”165  
A critical turning point in the movement against environmental racism in the United 
States was the protest in 1982 in Warren County, North Carolina against the development 
of a PCB (polychlorinated-biphenyl) landfill in a black community. Various minority 
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groups and civil rights leaders joined church and political representatives in uniting the 
local community in a civil disobedience campaign against the proposed development. 
Shortly after the Warren County action, a federal government study revealed evidence of 
racial discrimination in the location of toxic waste landfills in one region of the US. This 
study was followed up by analysis by the United Church of Christ (UCC), a relatively 
small yet very influential African American church, which published its findings in 1987 
demonstrating that race was the crucial determining factor in the distribution of chemical 
hazard exposure throughout the US.166 
The findings of the UCC report were generally taken to heart by the population, and have 
formed the backbone of activism against environmental racism since their publication.167 
The growth in local based community movements against environmental racism was 
rapid, and by the 1990’s literally thousands of groups had achieved a broad spectrum of 
successes throughout the US.  
In 1991 approximately 650 activists from 300 of such groupings met in Washington D.C. 
at the First National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit. This meeting 
marked the first concrete step towards the movements refocusing of its character along 
global political and ethical ideals. The summit culminated in the adoption of 17 key 
principles for effecting the promotion of “environmental justice” – extending the ambit of 
the environmental racism movement to broader notions such as justice, class, gender and 
protection of non-human species. In Cutters view, the meeting signifies the 
environmental racism movements growth from a movement focussed mainly on racial 
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issues, to “…include other (regardless of race or ethnicity) who are deprived of their 
environmental rights, such as women, children and the poor.”168  
The genesis of the environmental justice movement with the summit and the subsequent 
broadening of political purpose of the Environmental Racism movement, further served 
to extend the social and institutional bases of the movement; enabling activists and 
academics to influence important environmental justice concerns being institutionalised 
within government, academic institutions, corporations, business and academic research.  
Environmental Justice advocates have provoked numerous changes in government 
agencies and their policy formations world-wide.  
A further area of success for the Environmental Justice movement has been the challenge 
to historically ‘white’ dominated environmental groups. In the sphere of corporate power 
and polluting business enterprises, environmental justice theorists have noted that 
contaminations in poorer communities are so prevalent due to the fact that as Bullard 
argues, these communities present the path of least resistance for the pollution industry. 
Here the Environmental Justice movement has answered the mainstream environmental 
organisations’ call of ‘not in my back-yard’ (NIMBY) which typically has meant “not in 
a white persons backyard”, with their own policy of Not In Any Man’s Backyard 
(NIAMBY). Further, the influence of the movement has made prosecutions and fines 
against offenders more frequent, and has proved instrumental in denying the building of 
many new dump sites and landfills in areas of poverty and social marginalisation.  
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Environmentalism in South Africa Post -Apartheid 
According to Cock and Fig, environmentalism in South Africa has historically reflected 
the many social cleavages inherent within the historically divisive society, to the extent 
that it has never “constituted a social movement in the sense of a co-ordinate formal 
alliance that is mass based and has a shared vision and set of objectives.”169 Prior to 
democratisation, environmentalism in South Africa was dominated by an authoritarian 
conservation perspective,170 a reflection of the broader systematic exclusion of 
marginalized groups from the benefits of the environment. The overwhelming legacy of 
this perspective has resulted in “the gradual but relentless alienation of blacks from the 
environmental sphere, and the growth of hostility to conservation issues as defined by the 
mainstream.”171 
Throughout the term of colonialism and Apartheid, ‘blacks’ and other marginalized 
communities were excluded from environmental organizations by a barrage of legal and 
social mechanisms designed to implement their political, physical, socio-economic and 
psychological marginalisation. The success of this program is reflected in the continued 
existence of these constructed margins to this day, as well as the ongoing hostility on 
behalf of the previously excluded to the broader issues of environmental management. 
The Rise of Environmental Justice in South Africa  
Collaborative attempts in the 1990s to address these issues of exclusion and 
environmental degradation found representation and expression in an adaptation of the 
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international movement for Environmental Justice. McDonald defines environmental 
justice as being the process of,  
incorporating environmental issues into the broader intellectual and 
institutional framework of human rights and democratic accountability.172  
The movement which developed from Environmental Racism protests in the United 
States, regards the environment as all spaces which people inhabit - whether in the 
workplace, or at home, as well as recognised conservation spaces. In this manner the 
theory attempts to link formally ‘green’ concerns of conservation or species protection, 
with ‘brown’ or urban issues relating to living and workplaces, and finally ‘red’ issues of 
social justice.173 
It is this linking of environmental degradation to social issues which Castells regards as 
evidence of a dramatic extension of the scope and diversification of environmentalism – a 
‘coming-of-age’ as a truly universal concept extending across the various class, income, 
spatial and ideological cleavages of the advanced industrial society.174 
Importantly, environmental justice accepts the notion argued by Mittelman that the 
environment is a “social construction that is contested”175, and as such “views 
environmental issues as deeply political in the sense that they are embedded in access to 
power and resources in society.”176 
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The spread of environmental justice concerns in South Africa has been instrumental in 
the promotion of a wide-range of environmental discussion and development among 
previously marginalized populations in South Africa since the period of democratic 
transition. The relaxation of discriminatory legislation and policies which took place in 
the early 1990’s was to form the catalyst for this growing environmental awareness 
throughout the entire population.177 
Despite this watershed in South African history with the dismantling of Apartheid 
discriminatory structures and legislation, the effects of over a century of marginalisation 
are far from repealed; power relations, affluence, employment and even the environment 
are still largely skewed in favour of the ‘white’ populations as they were defined under 
Apartheid. The acceptance of democratic politics however was of paramount importance 
to the inclusion of environmental issues in the agendas of many political groups and civil 
society organisations.178 The degree of local support for environmental justice 
endeavours to date, and the success of a number of endeavours to mobilise popular 
support for environmental initiatives at the grassroots level in South Africa, has shown 
the need for environmental groups to take into account a number of ‘brown’ 
environmental issues, such as the provision of healthy, clean and appealing environments 
for all, and the provision of basic needs such as clean water, sanitation, food and health 
care – if they hope to win broad-based political support; and that efforts undertaken 
should extend to an understanding of the underlying power relations which act to 
entrench poverty in marginalized poor communities.179 
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The Structure of Environmental Justice in South Africa 
The political euphoria of the early 1990s due to the un-banning of political opposition to 
the white institutions of Apartheid created enormous collaborative opportunities for a 
dramatic resurgence in democratic civil society in policy making. This collaborative spirit 
produced a number of “rainbow alliances”180 involving formally estranged groups, 
resulting in a wide-variety of important legislative breakthroughs in terms of 
environmental policy and social justice, not least of which was the inclusion in the 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa181, of the right to a healthy environment for 
all South Africans regardless of race or gender. Despite these collaborative tendencies, 
environmentalism remains split between contemporary mainstream ‘green’ 
environmentalism, and a rapidly growing discourse of environmental justice.182 
Despite the fact that environmental justice has attracted a wide degree of organisational 
support in South Africa since its inception in the early 1990s, Cock argues that there is no 
single environmental ideology operating in South Africa – but rather that 
environmentalism remains divided into two streams: those accepting the principles of 
Sustainable development, “marked by technicist, pragmatic and reformist attempts to 
bring environmental externalities into the marketplace through ecological 
modernisation”; and those advocating environmental justice.183 The result is that often, 
environmental struggles are undertaken by a variety of different groups, some not 
typically falling into contemporary definitions of environmentalists – such as trade 
unions. Not only do these groups mobilise different sections of the population, but 
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different claimants tend to mobilize around a wide variety of iconic struggles particular to 
their relative constituencies,184 often resulting in undertakings being ad hoc instead of 
part of a concerted and ongoing program. 
Added to these capacity constraints, a marked decline in government willingness to 
engage in participatory democracy with civil society has been noted with the steadily 
growing acceptance amongst the African National Congress (ANC) leadership of neo-
liberal economic policies, a commitment enshrined in the 1997 Growth Employment and 
Redistribution programme (GEAR).185 Conjoined with the negotiated transition’s failure 
to effectively challenge certain key elements of Apartheid’s privilege and power 
structure, most notably the unequal distribution of private property and wealth;186 the 
gradual withdrawal of civil society from the political sphere or cooptation into 
government departments have resulted in the declining significance of hard-won 
legislative enactments – particularly in the lack of implementation of these policies.187   
Whilst the South African Constitution is committed to the goal of the provision of 
environments for all that are not harmful, as well as the ongoing de-racialization of 
society, Ruiters argues the failure to address the underlying power relations surviving the 
Apartheid society limits the extent of change and redistribution by framing contestation 
within the guidelines set by the contemporary neo-liberal approach to economics; 
respecting rights to private property despite the fact that this respect internalises dramatic 
inequalities between the have’s and have-nots. This apparent necessity to pander to the 
‘graces’ of the dominant capitalist class has resulted in a situation where, “at best the 
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‘realistic’ solution acceptable […] is affirmative action, reconciliation and the widening 
of a co-opted black middle class.”188 
An inability to redress the deeper issues of economic power relations underlying society, 
has further cemented the inherited class relations of the Apartheid era. Despite de jure 
inclusion and Affirmative action programs, employment and incomes continue to 
unjustly favour the ‘white’ minority populations. Paucity of employment and the failure 
of employment generation strategies, have served to entrench ‘black’ populations in the 
same environmentally unsound localities they occupied under Apartheid, with all the 
incumbent dangers of poverty and environmental degradation. Thus, in a final analysis, 
While the racial legal superstructure in post-apartheid South Africa has 
changed, the spatio-economic order that naturalized racial division has 
not.189 
A number of encouraging trends in South Africa seem to suggest the steady growth of an 
“embryonic environmental justice movement […] made up of highly interconnected 
networks clustered around a few key nodes or hubs.”190 Examples of these trends stem 
from the cooperation of diverse civil society organisations mobilising around a number of 
issues pertinent to environmental justice advocates, such as those forming the South 
African Water Caucus (SAWC) which has successfully engendered cooperation between 
trade unions such as the Congress of South African Trade unions (COSATU), the South 
African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and members of local communities against 
water privatisation;191 and again in actions of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
(SECC) which collaborated with members of COSATU and SAMWU against electricity 
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privatisation and cost recovery in Soweto, Johannesburg.192 Increased cooperation has 
been bolstered in part by the adoption of new legislative basis for rights-based claims to 
service provision and environmental quality in South Africa, which in the context of the 
environmentally degraded legacy of Apartheid has provided a powerful basis for 
mobilisation for environmental justice concerns.193 
Through its abundance of member organisations and network structure, the emerging 
Environmental Justice movement serves to connect and represent an impressively diverse 
segment of the country’s population. Additionally the recognition of environmental 
issues as socially constructed, conjoined with a commitment to issues in both rural and 
urban contexts, and a broad definition of ‘environment’ to include the workplace – has 
allowed the environmental justice movement to appeal to a broad social base. This 
broadness is further complimented in the extent to which these networks act to connect 
local grassroots activists to the global movement for environmental and social justice – a 
fact evident in the cooperation in 1990 of local organisations including Earthlife Africa 
and local labour union, the Chemical workers Union, with Greenpeace International in 
activism against Thor Chemicals in KwaZulu-Natal, found guilty of importing toxic 
mercury and poisoning local water supplies.194 Global connectedness allows local 
activists a significant advantage in terms of both resources such as funding and 
information transfer; as well as providing for confidence among local organisations 
through the linking to a global moral argument for social justice and cosmopolitan 
democracy. 
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Strategies and Challenges Facing Environmental Justice in South 
Africa 
The South African model while sharing a number of similarities with the US model has 
gradually evolved to a number of unique responses to the particular socio-political and 
environmental context of South Africa. 
Cock argues the South Africa adaptation of the concept represents a number of 
differences to the US model, with organisations and activists focussing on “total change 
driven by majority rather than minority interests, […] includes class issues, whereas in 
the US it is class-blind, focussing exclusively on environmental racism.”195 
Environmental justice in the South African context has focussed primarily on attaining 
juridical definitions of justice necessary to effect a redistribution of environmental 
hazards, improved environmental regulations and a redress of the Apartheid era’s legacy 
of dispossession of the ‘non-white’ community.196  
The embryonic Environmental Justice movement has engaged in a variety of activities 
encompassing a response to a plethora of issues, bridging notions of social equity with 
those environmental issues affecting marginalized populations while encouraging the 
linking of local injustices to root causes in broader government policy.197  
The strategy of mobilisation around rights is the key strategic model adopted by the 
moment.198 This strategy emerges from the introduction of a number of key legislative 
entitlements offered in numerous pieces of legislation and policies adopted since 1990, 
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including the Constitution – which are used both as sites of focus for social mobilisation, 
and as sources of legislative legitimacy. 199  
The constitutional provision of rights to a healthy environment has enabled activitists to 
focus on the basic needs inherent in the promotion of life and healthy environment. By 
linking basic needs to sustainable environments, environmental justice advocates are able 
to frame basic needs as rights; a strategy aimed to mobilise support amongst excluded 
populations in mass protest against the denial of these rights, while simultaneously using 
litigation and legal challenges to claim these rights for affected populations.200 
Mechanisms like the Constitution and new legislation, including but not limited to the 
National Management Act,201 aim to establish minimal environmental regulations for 
businesses and local administrations. Implicit in these policies is the right for all people 
to be treated fairly regardless of income, class, religion or race. Further implications of 
the focus on judicial justice have been the introduction of mechanisms whereby local 
communities may enter into litigation, “…allowing for private prosecutions as well as 
protection from liability for court costs if the action is in the public interest.”202 
However, reliance on litigation and the strategy of framing basic needs as inherent rights 
has come in for a fair amount of criticism. 
Increased judicial mechanisms whilst providing disadvantaged communities with some 
legal recourse, have done little to assist impoverished communities in achieving a more 
equitable distribution of environmental hazards or improve access to service delivery. 
Ironically this increased legislative regulation requires a large degree of both expertise 
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and wealth which often is not available to the communities in question. Legal 
proceedings are costly, and while poor communities do have rights to legal 
representation, corporate interests and polluting industries are often able to stall 
proceedings in legal red-tape, as well as hire specialist legal representation to arm 
themselves against claims of environmental racism. Furthermore, legal proceedings are 
often lengthy processes, often involving independent expensive research studies on the 
part of those accused of environmental injustices to discredit the claims. 
Ultimately legal procedural options may just as easily limit the options available to 
communities as they can only follow policies for which legal precedent or legislation 
already exists.  
The legalistic basis of environmental justice also has the effect of ensuring that the 
discourse remains entrenched in the broader legalistic and economic programs of the 
country. While South African economic policies and courts value the protection of 
existing property rights (those inherited from the Apartheid regime), as well as touting 
the principles of free markets, enterprise and deregulation of restraints on the economy 
including environmental regulations; environmental justice remains constrained by these 
policies in its attempts to decasualise society and introduce greater environmental 
equity.203 
Narrowly defined legalistic interpretations of environmental rights fall short of offering 
promising solutions to the ongoing crisis, due to an increasing reliance on litigation as a 
means to combat discrimination. Marginalized populations are subdued by the power of 
capital in these proceedings, due to the costly nature of research, legal representation and 
losses incurred in absenteeism from employment during what is often a long and 
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protracted legal process.204 The poor suffer from the burden of proving environmental 
wrongs, while those under accusation typically possess the wealth and legal expertise to 
both recover costs from these processes, as well as conduct extensive research by highly 
specialised professionals to muddle the facts of inquiry. Visible effects of environmental 
degradation are often further not immediately determinable. Micro-pollutants in 
groundwater for example, defy visibility and often the effects of their existence may only 
become apparent in sicknesses of populations over a course of years. Further, pollution is 
often not localised in space, with upstream dumping often travelling to communities in 
distant locations – dislocating pollution in terms of both space and time. 
These factors; the ascendancy of respect for property rights, the burden both 
economically and a burden of proof on poor populations to prove causality, and the 
specific dislocated nature of environmental hazards spatially and temporally – reveal the 
litigation process as limited in its capacity to provide adequate solutions to environmental 
and social injustices. 
Therefore, the ideal strategy in Cock’s analysis is that of the combination of legal 
measures such as litigation to claim rights or court actions to halt the abuse of rights, 
combined with grassroots collective action.205 
The Challenge of Distributive vs Procedural Justice 
The increasing tendency of environmental activists in South Africa to link environmental 
issues to issues relating to social justice, has proven complimentary to the development of 
this embryonic consciousness by identifying spaces for engagement- and populations for 
mobilisation at all levels of society. 
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Perhaps the principal challenges facing the movements result from capacity constraints 
and the difficulty of stimulating what Cock has termed “deep mobilisation”,206 the dual 
strategy of mass collective action supported by litigation; challenges which necessitate 
the building of strong, durable coalitions to challenge more than just the distributive 
nature of environmental justice – but incorporating critically “an understanding of how 
social difference and environmental problems are produced and distributed.”207 
The re-focussing of struggles against these procedural aspects of environmental injustices 
as Ruiters suggests, and avoiding an over-reliance on legislative entitlement, is essential 
if the embryonic movement is to continue to grow to maturity as a fully fledged 
environmental movement challenging the underlying power relations of our socially-
divisive, unjust, and environmentally unsustainable neoliberal society. 
 
What is needed to overcome these limitations is an extension of environmental justice to 
concerns of procedural and productive justice.208 This point is argued over and over again 
by progressive environmental theorists, however its value cannot be over emphasised. 
The various limitations placed on environmental justice through organisational 
inefficiencies, lack of funding and popular support issues require urgent attention. The 
movement therefore needs to apply itself with other deeper concerns of justice to appeal 
to broader constituencies. Only then it is argued will true procedural and production 
justice be possible, as only with popular support and funding can the movement hope to 
challenge the entrenched inequalities within the decision making process predating the 
distributive process of environmental hazards.  
                                                 
206
 Ibid, p.30 
207
 Ruiters, (2001), op cit, p. 102 
208
 Ruiters, (2002), op cit, pp. 123 & 117 
 98 
Critical to this program is a broadening of both definitions of inequality, understanding of 
how these are produced, and an increase in the democratic process to challenge 
distributive, procedural, judicial and productive conceptions of justice. Finally, Ruiters 
argues that justice needs to project itself as a process rather than as an end-point as is 
common in the current sustainable development thesis of basic needs fulfilment.209 
Merely focussing on basic needs has a disheartening affect on communities leading to 
increasingly dependence, and a situation where the marginalised expect little more than 
the barest minimum. For environmental justice to be appealing and empowering to these 
communities it needs to be conceptualised as a process whereby communities are 
empowered to rise above the preoccupation with third world political rhetoric of basic 
needs. Convincing communities that organisations will continue to fight for their rights 
long after basic needs are met will likely go a long way to garnering support for the 
fledgling movement in South Africa. 
 
The Challenges to the Environmental Justice 
Movement: 
 
The ability of the movement for Environmental Justice to effect such far reaching 
changes in legislation, distributive equity and public awareness of environment hazards in 
their immediate communities – and indeed their successes in mobilisation local 
communities in protest against powerful corporate polluters; has necessarily captured the 
attention of both corporate producers and academics alike. 
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As a results the movement and its practices have been the target of a plethora of 
criticisms, both from a corporate perspective which attempts mainly to derail the 
movements legitimacy – as well as from academics critical of the movements potential to 
sustain and direct social mobilisation effectively beyond short-lived distributive 
outcomes, to achieve a broader realisation of justice. 
Broadly speaking, these criticisms can be divided into methodological challenges, 
criticisms as to the usage of ‘race’ or racism as a means of mobilisation by the 
movement, and finally criticisms arising due to the movement’s over-indulgence in 
affecting distributive outcomes rather than involving itself in procedural or productive 
processes of environmental hazards. 
The Challenge of Race 
The newfound prestige and community-based awareness of the principal claims of the 
Environmental Justice movement has produced a dangerous threat to the established 
exercisers of power. Accordingly, policy makers responsible to affluent political 
hegemony and capital accumulation have prompted a number of academics to challenge 
the idea and existence of ‘environmental racism’. In this discussion, “…a Weberian 
conception of class is typically used, with income, property value, and educational 
attainment serving as the key variables.”210 
Bullard argues that there is little doubt as to whether racism influences the likelihood of 
an increased exposure to detrimental environments, as well as the accessibility of 
communities to health care facilities, or even a clean water supply.211 
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Whether by conscious decision, or unconsciously in their roles as primary owners and 
administrators of the means of production, government administration and policy 
making; ‘white’ populations at all class levels the world over have a distinct advantage in 
choosing and gaining access to the most highly valued, clean, healthy environments - the 
net result of which has been to relegate poorer ‘communities of colour’ to spaces where 
they are exposed to harmful local environments. This tendency has been observed 
throughout history in the times of colonialism; during the conquest of the America’s 
where the native populations were forced to cluster in Native Reservations; during the 
decades of slavery in the USA and continuing until the civil rights movement of the 
1960’s, where vast numbers of African-Americans were confined to urban ghettoes; and 
in the South African era of Apartheid and Separate Development, where entire 
populations of ‘non-whites’212 were forcibly resettled on ‘homelands’ and denied access 
to certain institutions and areas delineated as ‘whites-only’ spheres of society. 
Bullard has argued that the tendency of ‘communities of colour’ in the US to be more 
likely to be exposed to the harmful effects of pollution or other aspects of environmental 
degradation than the ‘white’ affluent population cannot be explained purely on the basis 
of income. Models of urban development and the demographic makeup of communities 
are largely influenced by the forces and relationships of production within them, which in 
turn are influenced by ownership and the regulations brought to bear on them by 
government, or subsidies offered them by local government administrations seeking to 
attract investment.213 Further, Bullard has argued that in the USA, “…vestiges of race 
based decision making still influence housing, education, employment, and criminal 
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justice.”214 The lack of representation of minorities within the decision making apparatus 
in question has resulted in a biased process, influencing decisions such as: new industry 
sitings, siting of local unwanted land usages (LULU’s), degree of enforcement of 
environmental regulations, sewerage treatment, availability of water and power resources, 
and even the location and access to systems of transport. Lack of representation is a 
symptom of a historically ‘race-based’ society, and without an active role in the 
institutional decision making apparatus, poverty-stricken disempowered communities 
will continue to suffer the burdens of pollution and environmental injustices to which 
they are presently exposed. 
In the US, both class and perceptions of ‘race’ interact to produce certain vulnerabilities 
for environmental injustices and other health inequalities. Bullard notes however, that 
“people of colour […] face elevated toxic exposure levels even when social class 
variables (income, education, and occupational status) are held constant.”215 Bullard 
further argues that race is a central determining factor independent of class concerns in 
predicting the distribution of a wide number of environmental inequalities, including but 
not limited to air pollution, location of waste disposal mechanisms and other LULU’s, 
and incidence of lead poisoning of children and entire communities.216 Bullard squarely 
places the blame for this uneven distribution of harms and benefits on the history of 
‘white-lead’ racism in the USA, but also argues that its perpetuation has been worsened 
by the inability of marginalised communities to empower themselves and their 
communities to influence the decision-making which produces these very inequalities.  
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Indeed Pulido does seem to agree that the evidence would suggest a strong correlation 
between both ‘race’ and class, while ‘race’ emerges as the strongest correlation.217 
Proving a correlation between ‘race’ and pollution adds impetus to the arguments of 
those wishing to divert attention towards recognition of the problem of racism and its 
impact on society. Those wishing to deny this correlation often find a favourable 
correlation for class, manipulating this outcome to deny that there exists an underlying 
racism to distribution within society and the problems facing communities of colour are 
the same problems facing poverty stricken communities of any racial classification.218 
The second major challenge to the Environmental Racism thesis, argues a correlation 
between LULU’s and communities of colour are erroneous as land use policies existed 
before these communities settled there – thus denying the existence of a racist 
predisposition to land usage. Whilst Bullard would argue this is irrelevant since 
discrimination is the end-result, Pulido disagrees. She argues that conceptualisations of 
‘race’ as a conscious act such as this problematic implies serves to deny the existence of 
other covert forms of racism.219  Pulido regards the monolithic understanding of racism 
which this promotes as preventing,  
a nuanced understanding of how racism interacts with various economic 
forces, including, relations of production and regimes of accumulation, to 
create highly oppressive circumstances.220 
The conceptualisation of racism as an overt, deliberate act has a number of basic 
shortcomings. Firstly it presents racism as a complete act, a corporeal whole which we 
can view, separate, criticise and contain separately. Such projections then would imply 
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that the separation of causes and effects of racism can be neatly compartmentalised and 
dealt with.221 The reality however is that just as society is fragmented, and decision-
making processes and institutions exhibit a fragmentation, specialisation and diversity 
unparalleled historically, the various incidences of racism in society do and should 
permeate these many fragmentations. Consequently racism avoids detection by 
underlying every aspect of social institutions. 
Secondly, presenting a conceptualisation of racism as an overt action against 
communities obscures discrimination which occurs as part of an overarching ideology of 
racism.222 Restricting racism to overt acts disadvantages communities victimised by 
underlying racial attitudes. Pulido argues that covert racism exists and functions as 
“…ideology works to create meaning itself, racism infuses society, including culture, 
politics and economic structure, and helps, in turn to shape these forces.”223 Defined in 
this way, the project of alienating racism from society becomes much larger than merely 
tackling overt incidences of racist action, but involves institutional change to reverse the 
ideological tainting of decision-making and policy formulation. 
Finally, Pulido argues that the above conceptualisation of racism serves to create the 
image of a single or fixed racism, where in fact it cannot be defined in this manner. The 
diversity of racial attitudes and the mechanisms by which racism is propagated allows 
racism to become elusive, indefinite, and fragmented.  
Increasingly however while proving incidences of Environmental Racism have 
undoubtedly in many instances improved the lives of communities unfairly exposed to 
environmental hazards; the question remains as to what extent concentrating on 
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distributive outcomes in the production of environmental hazards for social justice at both 
the local and global level. 
At the local level, concentrating on distributive processes often only occurs in many 
instances once pollution or hazards already exist. However, even in instances where 
communities are able to sustain protest in order to block the siting of hazards – the 
dangers of potentially forcing another community, whether ‘white’, affluent or not – 
contains within it the very real potential to fragment communities into opposing camps 
based on some perceived socially constructed notion of difference. The operation of 
NIMBY-like discussion and protests thus contain within them the very real potential of 
inciting increased local group identity particularist associations; an outcome which in 
many instances results in increased fragmentation and social antipathy. 
Local protests against environmental racism further have the disadvantage of being 
inherently localised in both time and space. While few would argue against the fact that 
Environmental racism protests are able to achieve mass mobilisation of local 
communities in order to effect their environmental desires, whether to block distribution 
or hold corporations accountable for pollution – the degree to which social protest is 
sustainable once the desired outcome has been achieved is questionable, failing a 
broadening of aims or goals from notions of purely distributive equity outcomes narrowly 
defined towards the achievement of ‘deeper’ aims such as those advocated in the 
broadened principles of the Environmental Justice movement. Failing this, environmental 
racism protests may never in most cases progress beyond transient social mobilisations 
which are localised in time and space, towards a more inclusive and enduring form of 
social movement. 
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In light of this, it is necessary for the Environmental Justice movement to progress 
beyond their increasing fetishism of ‘race’ in their policies and categorisations. For if the 
main task of the movement in the future is the unification of diverse and competing 
groups within working society as we have argued, the ongoing distributive racial 
preoccupation which saw the foundations of the grassroots campaigns for distributive 
justice is unlikely to win much new support amongst white workers.224 Thus the 
distributive fuelled policy program needs to give way to concerns of poverty, inequalities 
in income between the upper and lower classes, inequalities in representation of the 
working class in decision making bodies within society, and last but certainly not least 
the movement must move to appeal to working women from all racial groups and 
cultures – in order to address social inequalities within a non-racial framework. 
 
A closer look at the historical fortunes of narrow race-based particularistic politics would 
seem to support our findings. ‘Race’ based political movements have historically been 
unable to mobilise popular support outside of their narrowly defined constituencies and 
as such have been largely unable to challenge the ‘white’ domination of global and 
national societies. Whilst it is true that the civil rights movements in the 1960’s and the 
spread of environmental justice concerns in the decades to follow did much to advance 
the rights of African Americans in terms of legislative provisions, the reality is that the 
popular support necessary for an empowerment of African Americans in the institutional 
decision making structures of society at large was never fully realised. So too in South 
Africa we find a similar problem existing since the collapse of the Apartheid system. 
While in these instances the ‘black’ majority government has indeed managed to win 
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control of the state and local government apparatus, the continued existence of ‘white’ 
dominated economic systems and a widening gap between the rich (predominantly 
‘white’) upper class, and the poor (predominantly ‘black’) underclass still bear testament 
to inherent domination of the various protectionist mechanisms of society which lie 
outside of government control.225 Further, attempts by the government to adopt land 
reform policies, or to entrench Black Economic Empowerment concerns within the 
institutional framework of societies has often been met with charges of counter-racism. 
The dangers of claims of counter-racism cannot simply be ignored if we are to build 
coalitions in support of governments acting to empower the majority of our population to 
influence the unequal distribution of power in our society. These claims are quick to 
progress towards similar processes of ‘white’ middle and working class protectionist 
measures being undertaken by those believe themselves to be victims of these policies, 
and may ferment growing covert racist ideology which preying on fears and anxieties of 
workers, may illicit racial and class conflict within our newly democratic (yet still fragile) 
society. Perhaps a more valuable program for the advancement of environmental justice 
is one which attempts to enter into coalitions with these opposition bodies within a 
broader policy framework of the Environmental Justice movement. In order for such 
coalitions to succeed though, it is perhaps necessary to ‘tone-down’ the movements 
overly distributive discourse, by reforming discourse along less socially charged 
formulations such as equitable representation in decision-making bodies along racial, 
class and gender divisions. By including inequalities in income-distribution and gender, 
notions which unlike racism do not carry as heavy a stigma nor the same narrow focus 
can assist in mobilising popular support for the movement for environmental justice. The 
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1991 Summit was a crucial turning point in expanding the policy focus of the 
environmental justice movement in the US, a process bolstered in the South African 
context in the formation of the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) in 
1992. The underlying motive for the formation of the EJNF was a recognition that 
“ongoing cross-sectoral cooperation was required to redefine and transform the dominant 
middle-class, alienating and conservative understanding of the environment.”226 
Subsequent recognition in the Charter of the EJNF of the need to instigate social 
transformation through a challenge of the dominant power relations in society, which 
result in the poor suffering the brunt of environmental hazards; signalled the adoption of 
a broad policy focus for environmental justice in South Africa – committing the 
organisation to look to other categories of injustice affecting the country’s poor. 
The Challenge of Distributive versus Procedural Justice 
Perhaps the most salient of criticisms levelled at the Environmental Justice movement has 
resulted from the fact that often the operation of environmental justice and environmental 
equity has served to thwart local autonomy and to challenge the very core of democratic 
practice. This dilemma surfaces where “…the principles of justice underlying claims of 
environmental equity encounter the pragmatic demands of local communities or conflict 
with local community sentiment.”227 The net result then is the creation of a situation 
where principles of distribution underlying environmental equity are placed in opposition 
to local working class autonomy and self-determination.228 
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The problems underlying this dilemma have been attributed by Lake to the historical 
preoccupation of the Environmental Justice movement with distributive justice.229 The 
successes won by environmental justice advocates in areas throughout the US and 
globally, have served to place this process as the central preoccupation of the many 
environmental justice organisations working throughout the world today. The emphasis 
on reaching distributive equity has served to alienate higher ideals of procedural justice, 
and often has served to relegate them to mere legislative enactments or policies which 
facilitate the action of groups seeking to promote distributive equity. This preoccupation 
with proving distributive injustices in the literature, and well as the successes in the 
eradication of distributive injustices in communities throughout the US and the rest of the 
globe, has resulted in procedural equity and justice being sidelined. 
Procedural justice seeks to influence decision-making in the processes of siting of 
environmental hazards, yet Lake argues that even this is insufficient,230 as it regards the 
procedures relating to the initial production of these environmental problems as being out 
of reach. Instead of regarding production as a fore-gone conclusion, theorists such as 
Young and Ruiters231 have argued that what is desperately needed is a broader focus in 
influencing decision-making and policy formulation. The broader focus in discussion 
advocates rather that environmental justice should not just be content to focus on 
empowerment in decision making for the distribution of environmental problems; but 
rather should empower their communities to influence decision making which decides 
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what is produced for distribution in the first place, how these problems should be 
addressed, and finally the means of distribution itself.232  
Once procedural justice is conceptualised in these terms, it is possible finally to reconcile 
the current dilemma of environmental justice concerns existing in opposition to local 
autonomy and self-determination. The attainment of true procedural equality helps to 
involve local populations more completely in decision-making which will ultimately 
determine what hazards they will produce in their own communities, and how these will 
be dealt with. Self determination is thus satisfied in the democratic sense as communities 
are able to choose from a set of options that which they are most comfortable with, and 
exercise autonomy in rejecting the arbitrary exercise of external forces seeking to declare 
the production of waste as a foregone conclusion. 
Overcoming Obstacles to Promoting Environmental Justice 
However, Goldman has argued that a crucial obstacle facing coalition building, and by 
extension the progress of the Environmental Justice movement - is the phenomenon of 
‘the disappearing middle’.233 The world economy at large is no longer best illustrated as 
the pyramid structure typical of the capitalist industrialisation in the 19th century, with 
few on the top controlling the means of production and the vast majority at the bottom in 
poverty. Instead, this has been replaced by the “hourglass of inequality”,234as technocratic 
employment opportunities have catapulted a growing number of middle class workers to 
the upper echelons of society. The common factor in Goldman’s analysis in this our 
modern economy, is “…a dwindling supply of the kinds of secure, well-paid, full-time 
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jobs that have defined middle class existence.”235 The result of this process is an increase 
in fall of middle class workers to the lower classes, where they produce an increase in 
competition for employment, resulting in increasing unemployment amongst 
marginalised workers who lack comparative levels of education, or who are merely 
discriminated against by the ‘racial’ leanings of the administrative institutions of 
production.  
The need for environmental justice movements to fashion an organisational structure 
which can transcend historical preoccupations with racial prejudice and which can appeal 
to the working class majority regardless or ‘race’ divisions - is particularly salient, and 
the future of environmental justice will increasingly be reliant on the extent to which is 
can market itself to appeal to the middle class, broadening its appeal in order to attract 
greater following without alienating those members it already has or becoming embroiled 
in many of the limiting policy debates which characterise many of the mainstream 
environmental organisations.  Ultimately the movement faces the task of becoming a 
mainstream organisation, without succumbing to the pit-falls which have characterised 
these organisations along the way. 
Despite the increasing popular following of the Environmental Justice movement and the 
adoption of many of its principles in policy making processes in government, local 
institutions and indeed in many mainstream civil society organisations; Goldman has 
observed that,  
people of colour in the United States are now even more likely than whites 
to live in communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities than 
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they were a decade ago. 236  
It would seem therefore that although public awareness has been focussed on the dangers 
of the environmental degradation likely to be caused by polluting industries or the siting 
of waste disposal sites in their communities, the situation of the poverty stricken 
communities marginalised from the procedural processes of production has by and large 
worsened due to the fact that these communities remain the path of least resistance to 
corporations looking to dispose of toxic and other types of waste products, as well as 
dirty industries seeking to establish themselves in areas with little to no resistance from 
the local community. Marginalised communities will continue to be soft targets for 
corporations relative to integrated middle class communities, or even poor ‘white’ 
working class communities unless they are able to challenge and redress the inequalities 
present within the decision making institutions which regulate the production of these 
types of environmental hazards.  
The process of globalisation has further exacerbated the development of a growing 
income disparity internationally. The ever widening gap between incomes of the have’s 
and have-nots at a global level, where economies are increasingly being forced to exhibit 
a greater degree of openness to comply with international donor requirements creates 
ample opportunity for the NIMBY-ism of the first world industrialised economies to 
produce environmental hardship in countries around the globe. Thus whilst the 
Environmental Justice movement in the past has indeed managed to produce a number of 
gains,  
the leadership of the movement has only begun to scratch the surface of 
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the complex global and domestic forces that underlie the paramount trend 
of increasing inequality.237  
Increasing inequalities brought about by globalisation in the context of the post Cold War 
triumph of capitalism has spawned an increase in particularistic identity politics.  
In order to successfully challenge the environmental injustices in the South African 
setting, these fractured political groupings will have to deepen their concerns, 
involvements and popular support base. Failing this; Environmental Justice movements 
will either disappear, or forever be confined to simple NIMBY-ism instead of radically 
empowering poverty-stricken communities to facilitate social justice at a local, national 
and global level. For Harvey the challenge amounts to the adoption of, 
a politics of abstraction capable of reaching out across space, across the 
multiple environmental and social conditions that constitute the geography 
of difference […] without abandoning its militant particularist base.238 
Neo-Liberalism and Development in Post-
Apartheid South Africa 
With the transition to democracy in 1994, the new ANC-led government set about on an 
ambitious plan to restructure institutions and break down the inequalities of Apartheid. 
Service delivery and its extension to all of South Africa’s people regardless of race, 
gender or economic standing was key to this process as embodied in the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP). The programme articulated ideas of service 
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delivery and the reformation of development of local government which were popular in 
the Mass Democratic Movement in the 1980s and 1990s.239 
Increased production of housing and other basic services, and their provision to all South 
Africans was integral to the ideas of redistribution advocated by labour groups such as 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), civics groups such as the South 
African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and various scholars and politicians in 
the pro-democracy movement. Redistribution was held to be most effectively driven by 
state-led initiatives utilising existing civic associations dealing with issues of service 
delivery, emphasising the need to work with the community to redress issues of 
inequality in the past and present.240  
Privatisation as an acceptable option was rejected in favour of state-community 
partnerships, “The state must ensure that these basic services are retained in public hands 
and any such services that have been privatised should be renationalised.”241 
These ideals of state involvement in redistribution of benefits to previously excluded 
groups were immensely popular in the years leading up to the 1994 elections, and 
continued to garner much support until the government’s adoption of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in 1996. According to Pape and 
McDonald, the move from the RDP to the GEAR framework was informed through a 
number of meetings between ANC leaders and various international financial 
organisations such as the World Bank, some meetings as early as 1990.242 Eager to see 
the end of protectionist measures formulated under Apartheid, these institutions 
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advocated neo-liberal principles of market-lead development, cost recovery and 
privatisation; principles which were to later underlie the GEAR framework, a series of 
legislative and policy prescriptions which acted to entrench neo-liberal economics and 
transfer immense benefit to corporate capital. Despite the adoption of the Constitution of 
South Africa in the same year as GEAR, a document which grants equality to all citizens 
as a fundamental right, and further allows citizens rights to a healthy environment, access 
to food and water; the adoption of the neo-liberal GEAR framework effectively linked 
the realisation of these rights to issues of affordability, market availability and cost 
recovery – shifting emphasis “from the redistribute state to the neo-liberal “enabling” or 
“facilitating” state.”243 
The particular course of post-Apartheid development ideology premises the development 
of the formal market economy, as a means for the socio-economic upliftment of the 
entirety of South Africa’s population. Benefits gained from the ANC’s market economic 
policy are believed to produce beneficial results for those in the informal economy 
through a “trickle-down effect”, allowing recipients to rise from the informal economy to 
the market economy, so that growth at the top of the economic spectrum for ‘the few’, is 
rationalised as translating into the eventual growth for ‘the many’. The development 
discourse of the post-Apartheid government views the capitalist world market-economic 
model as the appropriate mechanism both for the production of wealth as well as the 
distribution of goods and services to populations.244 However, as the majority of the 
country’s population are unable to effectively engage the capitalist market, the net result 
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of such a policy results in the increased concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
affluent – and the further exclusion of the majority poor population.245 
The current developmental model applied by the ANC-lead government can be seen as a 
clearly negotiated and structured program; wrought in partnership with global multilateral 
financial lending institutions, the economically powerful elite and key members of the 
government.246 Ideologically, the program adopted corresponds to central tenets of neo-
liberal development. Economic stagnation in the late 1980s offered significant challenges 
to the National Party rule, resulting in growing pressure for the massive restructuring 
deemed necessary for competition in the world market economy. As it became obvious 
towards the late 1980’s and early 1990’s that the National Party was unwilling to affect 
the meaningful democratisation or redistribution envisioned, economically powerful 
sources of capital sought opportunities to closely ally themselves with the ANC led 
majority, in order to secure an end to Apartheid and National Party rule; agreeing to 
“concede to majority rule if there was only limited economic redistribution, and if the 
political framework allowed for renewed accumulation.”247 
While the particular form of neo-liberalism adopted in South Africa still permits a certain 
degree of state involvement in the economy, permitting state subsidisation of certain 
developmental aims and black economic empowerment; Greenberg (2004) argues state 
assistance in these forms do not contradict the dominant global neo-liberal project;   
Where markets are not functioning effectively or where no markets exist, the role 
of the state is to improve their functioning, or to create markets […] to provide a 
basic level of resources to enable participation in markets for housing, services, 
land and so on for those excluded.248 
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Despite this, the outcomes of the policy have shown little in the way of a transfer of 
political and economic power has resulted to date. Whereas the political elite of the 
National Party was replaced, the ruling elite formed by the interests of local capital has 
remained at the helm of political, economic and social power in post-Apartheid South 
Africa – albeit with new alliances and partners, in the form of the ANC and its allies. 
Rather, the hegemony of Apartheid has been re-established, allowing neo-liberal 
development and the ascendancy of capitalist market economy to be presented by this 
dominant ruling class as being in “the universal interests of the citizenry as a whole.”249 
The Socio-Economic Costs of Restructuring in the post-Apartheid Era 
The application of the ANC’s GEAR policy and the interests of capital have had 
profound impacts on urban centres in South Africa. In line with neo liberal economic 
policies, urban planning and development in the post Apartheid period has involved a 
trend to address spatial integration and build partnerships in service delivery through 
privatisation programs, hereby limiting state expenditures in the interests of fiscal 
restraint at both the local and provincial government level. Despite rhetoric of the 
benefits of privatisation, the outcome of this process has been the exorbitant increase in 
tariffs for basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation – costs which have been 
unjustly borne by the most vulnerable – the country’s poor. 
In terms of urban integration, the effects of Apartheid city spatial dislocation of the 
country’s marginalized poor (most often ‘black’) populations by the practices of ‘race-
zoning’ and urban influx control; gave rise to significant support for plans to adopt a 
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‘compact city’ approach to promote integration.250 However, urban planning post-
Apartheid has done little in the way to provide redress to marginalized populations.  
Urban development programs have clearly reflected the logic of capitalist economic 
development – prioritising the expansion of market-enhancing commercial development 
over meeting the interests of the marginalized poor. Housing provision to those excluded 
under Apartheid has followed a similar trend, with a market-centred housing policy 
despite the provision of a state subsidy to enable market access to a broader sector of the 
population; and developments involving private sector providers to construct housing.251 
In both urban and rural centres, the promotion of the ‘willing seller – willing buyer’ 
approach to land reform places rural land reform firmly within the realm of the capitalist 
market economy, despite the existence of small state subsidies. 
Thus, in keeping with neo-liberal development, the promotion of integration in both the 
urban and rural centres post-Apartheid serves to prioritise the interests of the capitalist 
market economy, placing it at the very centre of policy at both the national and local 
level, following the logic that economic gains at the upper echelons of society will 
eventually permeate the lower levels of society – extending the capitalist market in order 
to capture the broader population into the formal market economy. 
Accompanying the adoption of GEAR, civil society in the post-Apartheid era has 
witnessed the re-alignment of post-Apartheid civil society with the interests of the 
dominant ruling class program of neo-liberalism and capitalist market economics, 
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reflecting a changing enemy from ‘oppression’ or ‘racism’ as under Apartheid, to the new 
political objective of “nation building with the enemy now being an apolitical 
‘poverty’”.252 
This re-alignment of formal civil society with the dominant development ideology has 
created a vacuum at the level of grassroots engagement. 
Whereas, the period following the 1994 election until the second election has been 
described by numerous analysts as one of government willingness to engage in 
collaborative arrangements with civil society in policy making;253 with notable successes 
being won for the advancement of various concerns relating to the poor, this collaborative 
spirit was short lived. For many in civil society, the adoption of the GEAR program in 
1996 was seen as a dramatic signal to those advocating social justice and redistribution 
that the neo-liberal demands of business, the World Bank and foreign investors would 
assume the primary focus of government.  
Whereas few disagree that Apartheid was responsible for a large portion of the current 
crisis, many have argued the increasing adaptation of South African development to the 
neoliberal model as a result of policies such as GEAR have resulted in inequality and 
poverty being worsened after a decade of democratic government.254 
Despite optimism in the early 1990s that democracy would herald the delivery of land 
and services to those dispossessed during the forced removals of the Apartheid years; the 
adoption of cost recovery mechanisms and a “willing seller, willing buyer” policy by the 
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ANC led government have all but dashed hopes for a meaningful land reform program 
benefiting the poor – in favour of a commitment to capitalist economics and neo-liberal 
development. 255 
This adoption of a development discourse which acts to reinforce exclusion – both social 
exclusion, economic exclusion, and political exclusion through inadequate reform and 
insensitive local government – has resulted in what Greenberg terms “the re-
establishment of hegemony in the post-Apartheid era.”256 
The Crisis of Local Government 
A significant portion of the critical theory of neo-liberal development under the GEAR 
framework has pointed to the existence of a crisis at the level of local government in 
South Africa; relating directly to the ability of local government to effectively formulate 
development initiatives and effect their delivery to populations.257 
The contemporary crisis at the local government level in South Africa has its roots in the 
political exclusion of Apartheid. Apartheid entrenched the political exclusion of those 
populations marginalized by the socially constructed ‘race’ based ideology, through 
exclusion from political processes at both the national, as well as local government level. 
In both urban and rural centres, ‘white’ local governments were given jurisdiction over 
‘black’ populations – while ‘black’ populations were given virtually no voice at the level 
of the ‘white’ local councils. Service provision was held to be the responsibility of local 
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government, with the result being the dismal level of basic service provision and housing 
provision which characterised the residential spaces for Apartheid's excluded 
populations.258 As the urban populations in areas like Johannesburg swelled after the 
1970s, local governments were given wide discretionary powers to affect influx control 
policies, and the policing of key Group Areas legislation such as the Separate Amenities 
Act and the monitoring of racially segregated urban spaces. Local governments were 
further responsible for housing schemes for those marginalized populations legally 
resident in urban spaces, a process which with increased attempts to limit the numbers of 
urbanised ‘blacks’ through influx controls – lagged far behind the numbers required, 
resulting in massive overcrowding in formal residential spaces and the dramatic growth 
in informal settlements in areas with no service provision.259  
Local government in the post-Apartheid period has been the site of major restructuring in 
order to meet the demands of the capitalist market economic system. Local government 
has a pivotal role in the development model adapted post-Apartheid, specifically in the 
management of state subsidies and the extension of the market economy to the previously 
marginalized.260 At the municipal level, the process has prescribed an end to the racial 
segregation of municipalities, joining those previously fragmented under Apartheid into 
large Metropolitan municipalities, a process which reduced the number of municipalities 
from over 800 in 1994 to approximately 250 by the year 2000.261 
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With the adoption of the Constitution in 1996, responsibility for the provision of basic 
services was passed on to local governments and their institutions – tasking these bodies 
with the enormous goal of extending delivery to previously un-serviced areas and 
populations. 
 Local government and municipalities are tasked with the responsibility of designing 
mandatory integrated development plans (IDPs) for the urban planning aims and 
integration of local government policies in order to meet service delivery needs and the 
political, economic and social integration of previously marginalized populations. 
Whereas formally, the governments land reform and redistribution program falls firmly in 
the ambit of the national and provincial governments responsibility – local government 
are able to influence discussions and policy governing local land use through the process 
of Land Development Objectives, which find expression in IDPs.262 Yet under neo-liberal 
development programs, with increased fiscal accountability on local government, and 
increased investment competition between local governments – local land usage becomes 
subject to capitalist market production; resulting in the most acceptable land use 
favouring income generating strategies as opposed to redistributive outcomes, with the 
consequences being an increased commodification of land, specifically unoccupied land 
creating “incentive to landowners and local councils alike to move tenants from the 
land.”263 
The Failure of Neo-liberalism’s Economic Project 
After almost a decade of development under the GEAR program, promises of the rhetoric 
of neo-liberal development and the adoption of capitalist market economics have not 
                                                 
262
 Greenberg, op cit, p. 11 
263
 Ibid, p.11 
 122 
been fulfilled, and while “the time frame for change recedes ever further into the future 
[…] fallout from the developmental and growth path adopted is experienced every day by 
millions in insecure locations across the city and beyond.”264 This failure of neo-liberal 
development has not only reproduced the exclusion of those marginalized by Apartheid, 
but indeed in many cases has deepened the burden on the country’s poor. Despite 
liberalisation, “formal deracialisation is accompanied by continued exclusion based on 
economic ‘value’.”265 In all spheres of the proposed plans for urban integration, the 
supposed beneficiaries of the programs have suffered disproportionate costs of market 
economic logic. Whereas housing provision has begun to address the enormous backlog 
left by Apartheid; the entrenchment of market logic has resulted in the practice of 
constructing new housing schemes far from employment and commercial opportunities 
on the peri-urban fringes of urban centres – hereby reproducing the phenomenon of 
spatial dislocation of marginalized populations. The commodification and application of 
principles of rational use and efficiency to land under the post-apartheid development 
path has further resulted in a need by provincial and local government to eradicate 
informal settlements – resulting in a fresh phase of population relocations, reminiscent of 
forced removals under Apartheid rule.266 
Despite the constitutional protection of tenure for communities of persons, “legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices”, and the entitlement 
“either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress”267; populations 
relocated under the current development policy are rarely offered improved 
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circumstances – primarily as a result of an increasingly narrow interpretation of the right 
to property. As Greenberg states, “Improvement of conditions is separated from 
removals. Thus the situation where the council (Johannesburg City Council) plan(ned) to 
remove 36,000 households from 26 settlements by 2004, yet only plans to eradicate the 
housing backlog by 2007.”268 
Forced removals of populations from land in urban areas remains a tool in state urban 
planning initiatives despite the demise of Apartheid – with populations often being 
resettled in remote un-serviced locations or in government housing developments on the 
urban fringes – thus reproducing the Apartheid tendency to treat entire human settlements 
in informal conditions as local unwanted land uses; if not in terms of Apartheid’s 
‘racially’ constructed ideology – then in terms of market economic logic.  
Despite Constitutional imperatives, tenure security in the post Apartheid era remains a 
significant area of concern for the vast majority of South Africa’s poor housed in 
informal settlements or in illegal tenure on formal land. Evictions and relocations act not 
to redress past inequalities – but rather to reinforce the Apartheid era social and economic 
exclusions – by the resettlement of populations far from all but the most menial forms of 
employment, education and opportunities for financial remuneration. Coupled with this 
has been the emergence of a plethora of ‘hidden costs’ to relocated populations, in 
particular those resettled in formal housing for the first time and subjected to exorbitant 
costs of newly privatised service provision – as well as increased transport costs 
associated with life on the urban fringes. Limited access to skilled employment, training 
and education has effectively resulted in the transition to the modernised capitalist 
economy in South African resulting in a dramatic swelling of the poverty-stricken urban 
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underclass, without access to the means for socio-economic upliftment; a reproduction of 
the Apartheid eras unskilled labour pool – hounded for profits by newly privatised 
service delivery firms and forced into inter-urban flows from fringe settlements to 
employment and commercial opportunities. 
The Ascendancy of Neo-liberal Service Delivery 
Service delivery to resident populations has been a second major sphere of restructuring 
in terms of the market model. Whereas under Apartheid, local governments routinely 
utilised cross subsidisation schemes in the delivery of basic services; under the post-
Apartheid market model this process has been replaced with the economically efficient 
(neo-liberal sanctioned) program of ring-fencing and privatisation of service delivery. 
Accompanying privatisation has been the implementation of cost-recovery mechanisms 
with cut-offs for non-payment, with disproportionate costs being visited on poorer 
populations in the interests of reducing the practice of industrial and commercial sector 
subsidisation of residential service users.269 Privatisation of municipal services has not 
only involved the passing of a disproportionate burden to the country’s more vulnerable, 
previously marginalized poor – but has also amounted to a severe blow to hopes for 
redistribution of opportunities to the previously marginalized. 
Yet despite the sanctioned program of local government delivery, evidence from the 
beginning of 1996 has shown that many local government municipalities and other 
authorities suffer a wide range of capacity and institutional weaknesses, including but not 
limited to inadequate training and expertise, and declining levels of staff and new 
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appointments to deal with the enormous increases in demand from the previously un-
serviced populations under Apartheid.270 
Coupled with issues of capacity facing local authorities, have arisen problems stemming 
from an acute lack of funds to overcome the services backlog, estimated to amount to 
between R47 billion and R53 billion in 2003.271 These financial difficulties at the local 
government level were exacerbated by declining levels of fiscal transfer from national 
government in keeping with the GEAR framework, a factor which reduced local 
government effectiveness in extending or upgrading service infrastructure to improve the 
quality and extent of delivery of basic services. 
As a result of institutional weaknesses, capacity issues and fiscal constraints, as well as 
the gradual ascendancy of the GEAR neo-liberal market logic at the national level, policy 
makers steadily began to alter their views from the promotion of state-control of service 
delivery, to alternate methods involving the private sector in a variety of state monitored 
partnerships. 
Aside from a number of successful instances in extending infrastructure networks to 
previously excluded areas, increasingly neo-liberal market forces became visible at all 
levels in national and local government, undermining service delivery initiatives and 
redistribution agendas. A salient example of this is that,  
while two million households may have been given access to water between 1994 
and 1999, cost recovery measures and bureaucratic inefficiencies made many 
such projects inoperable.272  
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This inoperability was often caused by the cutting of budgets, lack of follow-up with 
maintenance and the reactions of local communities to cost recovery mechanisms through 
vandalism or illegal connections.273 Despite objections from local populations, cost 
recovery became gradually entrenched in government policies in service delivery after 
1996, systematically eroding the quality of a number of the basic rights of citizenship as 
granted by the Constitution. 
Scaling back of budgets and a rationalisation of administrative personnel through the 
GEAR framework dictated at the national level often resulted in the outsourcing of 
service delivery to private contractors by local governments, a process actively promoted 
by national government through the Department of Provincial and Local Government’s 
Municipal investment infrastructure Unit (MIIU).274 The inevitable outcome of these 
factors was the growing promotion and acceptance of the practise of cost recovery, and 
declining control of municipalities over service delivery – transferring power to private 
interests. As a result, poor populations were once again excluded, both through the 
imposition of high costs for these basic services which amounted to a disproportionately 
high burden in comparison to their income earnings – and by denying their inherent right 
to dignity, equality and services as set out in the Constitution. 
The scale of privatisation projects after 1996 often made public opposition difficult, yet 
numerous public-private partnerships (PPPs) were vehemently opposed by members of 
local communities and organisations such as COSATU, the Soweto Electricity Crisis 
Committee (SECC) and the Anti Privatisation Forum. One of the most notable examples 
was the reaction to the implementation of the iGoli 2002 privatisation and rationalisation 
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programme. At the heart of this programme was the attempt to implement cost recovery, 
cutbacks and privatisation on a large scale – entrenching market logic within service 
delivery. Numerous organisations protested the campaign, most notably the SECC which 
launched a varied program of illegal reconnections, mass protests and legal measures to 
combat Eskom's attempt to institute cost recovery in Soweto.275 Yet despite ongoing 
protests and opposition, government remained committed to market logic at all levels, 
and throughout the country the incidence of privatisation and cost recovery escalated – 
translating into an affordability crisis with respect to these supposed rights for the 
majority of the country’s poor.276 
While issues of affordability remain the central complaint for activists and residents, a 
second common form complaint typically relates to issues of differential quality of  
service to marginalized populations.277 A study by the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 
2003 concerning service delivery in Johannesburg by City Power showed considerable 
customer reaction as to the effectiveness of communication and customer care in newly 
privatised service delivery arrangements.278 Respondents from two previously racially 
defined areas (namely Alexander Township and Lenasia in Johannesburg) further gave 
evidence alleging unequal treatment in comparison with those in affluent areas, claiming,  
smaller users were being left to fend for themselves while City Power provided 
better quality of service and care to bulk users of electricity with larger 
accounts.279  
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The crisis of affordability of basic services is a common dilemma facing many poor 
families in SA, with the poor often being burdened with an unequal proportion of costs 
for services relative to their socio-economic standing. South Africa is one of the most 
unequal countries in the world in terms of distributions in income, with the poorest 20% 
of the populations earning a mere 1.6% of the total country’s income in 2000.280 
Due to declining levels of job creation and an alarming growth in unemployment 
statistics, poor families throughout the country often have to make do with the income of 
one family members or pensioner in order to survive. Newly privitised service delivery 
divorces these more vulnerable people from their socio-economic context, and often 
among those people targeted for cut-offs are pensioners, indigents or people with other 
economic difficulties.281 Here the GEAR framework and privatisation has failed the poor, 
resulting in job losses despite programs aimed at the creation of secure employment. 
Whilst the sources of economic pressures vary, the overall result is a decreased income 
earning potential for South Africa’s poor. 
Many residents responded to affordability issues and cut-offs by framing access to 
service with the realisations of basic rights inherent to citizenship, and moreover as 
having the right to income to pay for these services.282 This notion of realisation of the 
rights to citizenship is of profound importance in South Africa’s transition to Democracy. 
Whilst the Constitution of South Africa acknowledges the basic rights of citizenship to 
include access to services, employment and other social goods; the ascendancy of neo-
liberal market tendencies embodied in the GEAR framework has resulted in a situation 
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where “residents are defined and treated first as customers before they are treated as 
citizens.”283 
While GEAR has in some cases successfully extended cost recovery mechanisms to these 
populations, other elements of the framework such as the promotion of employment 
creation have not matched these extensions. Thus rising unemployment exacerbated by 
privatisation schemes have resulted in poor communities bearing a disproportionate 
burden for services in relation to economic opportunity. Further, service delivery is seen 
by many to enforce difference within society through the provision of unequal services to 
the poor. Despite the extension of services to previously excluded populations, the quality 
of services in SA remains heavily skewed in favour of traditionally white areas, arguing 
“willingness to pay is linked to government’s political will to upgrade service quality in 
historically black areas.”284 In the Lenasia region in Johannesburg, CPS researchers 
reported inconsistencies in the willingness of City Power to upgrade electricity 
infrastructure in this area, some of which is over 30 years old, as opposed to frequent 
upgrades and maintenance in white areas - resulting in a high frequency of power outages 
to these less affluent communities.285 These factors reinforce a sense of inequality in 
these areas, with private service providers being seen to respond more efficiently to 
affluent ‘white’ concerns in contrast to the concerns of poorer formally racially defined 
communities.  
The crisis of affordability and differences in the relative quality of services provided 
threatens to further erode the gains of citizenship as stipulated by the Constitution, a 
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situation which Khunou argues carries the threat of producing “a negative definition of 
democracy.”286 
The practice thus contains within it the ability to erode a number of the benefits to South 
Africa’s transition, and to affect the continued exploitation of the vast majority of the 
country’s population by the priorities of fiscal restraint and profit maximisation inherent 
in the GEAR logic. 
 
The Un-sustainability of Current Housing Delivery 
Despite massive attempts by the South African government over the past decade to 
address the enormous housing backlog resulting as a legacy of Apartheid urban 
development; the rate of housing delivery in the Post Apartheid period has failed to keep 
pace with the formation of new urban households.287 As a result, informal settlements 
continue to dot the urban landscape of all major urban centres, with residents in these 
types of settlements being unable to transcend the various health implications, economic 
strains, or the various incumbent social pathologies associated with their entrapment in 
poverty and inadequate housing. 
Yet despite the predominance and prevalence of informal human settlements, the 
response by the ANC-led government has left much to be desired in supporting the socio-
economic and socio-political implications of poverty to residents, preferring instead to 
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structure delivery “through the narrows lens of housing policy.”288 Yet the operation of 
Goldberg’s argument show that spatial dislocation and unequal settlement patterns 
emerge not as an accident or incidental outcome of contemporary urban development,289 
but rather these patterns relate directly to a plethora of implicit development beliefs 
which reinforce categories of difference in spatial terms, underlying power relations and 
the operation of social pathologies at all levels of societal engagement. 
The argument for an adaptation of the international policy of a ‘compact city’ approach to 
the South African context is a widely accepted notion in Post-Apartheid urban 
development policy.290 This approach is seen as vital if the South African government is 
to meet the aims as highlighted in the 1994 Housing White Paper of “viable, social and 
economically integrated communities situated in areas allowing convenient access to 
economic opportunities as well as health, education and social amenities.”291 Yet despite 
these aims current developments have done little to address the glaring spatial differences 
inherited as legacies of Apartheid planning; while considerable evidence suggests these 
spatial divides are being reinforced allowing for the continued socio-economic and 
spatial marginalisation of the poor on the urban peripheries.292 Todes et al argue a key 
reason for these continued and indeed exacerbated spatial imbalances is the government’s 
focus on accelerated delivery in “sterile and dormitory suburbs on the urban periphery” in 
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favour of compact development on well-located land; a practice which has “militated 
against a consideration of spatial factors.”293 
Given the history of this type of settlement pattern both in South Africa and throughout 
the world being linked to race-based marginalisation, the question naturally arises as to 
why this extent of dispossession and inequality continues to exist in the context of South 
Africa’s newly democratic polity. For Marx (2003), part of the explanation emerges from 
the dualistic conception of ‘informal’ versus ‘formal’ patterns of human settlements; and 
partly from the inherent spatial complexities of informal settlements, particularly the fact 
that they represent the “legal, social, economic, environmental and political forces of the 
day.”294 As to the first of these arguments, the operation of the formal/ informal dualism 
creates a perception of formal as being desired or superior, while informality is seen as 
requiring change or improvement – often improvements defined in terms of those 
occupying the ‘formal’ world. In this way, those living in the formal world are able to 
construct informality as deviant or other, and in doing so, set the basis for improvements, 
a process “rarely defined by the voices and needs of the informal settlement dwellers by 
powerful people in the formal realm of society.”295 
Failing to view informal settlements as both a commonplace occurrence in urban 
development and as intimately related to the dominant socio-economic and political 
context in which they occur, naturally supports this simple dualism and validates the 
seemingly simple technocratic solution of ‘formalising the informal’. The danger of such 
a view, is that it carries with it the tendency to obscure the underlying grounds for the 
                                                 
293
 Todes et al, op cit, p. 256 
294
 Marx, op cit, p. 300 
295
 Ibid, p.300 
 133 
existence of informal settlements in their current urban positions in the first place296, a 
factor which in the case of relocation of human settlements as part and parcel of the 
formalisation process – has enormous implications for the sustainability of newly 
relocated ‘greenfields’ developments.297 
In contrast to this view then, it is important in the interests of sustainability to locate the 
reasons for the formation of informal settlements and the various relations they incur 
within a broader framework. The vast majority of informal settlements in urban 
Johannesburg form in relation to proximity to employment opportunities, and as such 
relate to questions of access – both to employment, areas of consumerism and (to some 
extent) service delivery associated with existing urban service provision.298 
Dangers of unsanitary living conditions in these locations are to some extent offset by 
their proximity to job centres – both in the informal and the formal economy, with 
residents not only able to secure scarce employment but also avoid high transport costs 
associated with residence elsewhere. Further, the visibility of informal settlements in 
built-up or developed urban areas allows for a number of hidden subsidies to residents, as 
government, local authorities, businesses and local residents amongst other concerned 
actors may attempt various forms of intervention to alleviate the burgeoning health crisis 
associated with informal life.299 
A critical question relating to the sustainability of South Africa’s new urban development 
framework, relates to the relationship between human settlement development and the 
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process of integration and poverty alleviation – and in particular whether new forms of 
urban development are seen to alter the lives of the poor for the better.300 
Whereas housing policy and service provision in the post-Apartheid era have achieved 
some measure of success in extending both delivery of housing and basic services to 
populations identified as ‘previously disadvantaged’; overwhelmingly evidence suggests 
a number of alarming incidences where development projects are seen to worsen the lives 
of the most marginalised populations. Activists and authors would seem to agree that a 
significant cause of these failures is to be found in an incomplete or narrow 
understanding of the power relations underlying poverty amongst South Africa’s 
marginalised, resulting in development strategies which entrench or deepen poverty by 
impacting on the survival strategies of the poor.301 
Neo-liberalism and Housing in South Africa 
In keeping with the neo-liberal GEAR strategy, South African housing policy has 
primarily been understood in macroeconomic terms, with inadequate housing link to 
income poverty.302As a result, the development policy aims at increased macroeconomic 
performance in order to improve delivery and access to housing, effectively subjugating 
housing delivery to the economic outcomes of the GEAR strategy. Yet while the GEAR 
program further directs both national and local government to conservative fiscal 
spending, limiting the availability of funds for service provision until economic goals of 
the program have been met; the macroeconomic outcomes of the GEAR policy have 
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failed dismally to provide the benefits to the lower strata of the populations envisioned in 
the rhetoric.303 
In terms of eradicating the spatial exclusion of South Africa’s informal settlement 
residents, the Housing policy has adopted the subsidy program. This measure is not 
wholly anathema to the neo-liberal development program adopted by government in that 
subsidies are “seems as a temporary measure, pending the growth of the economy and the 
trickle-down of resources to the poor.”304 The housing policy separates beneficiaries 
based on formal incomes, with these households earning less that R1,500 a month 
qualifying for a full government subsidy. Thus the housing policy identifies recipients not 
on the history of racial based oppression and dispossession under Apartheid, but rather as 
a result of poverty of the inability to participate effectively in the formal market 
economy. 
By identifying beneficiaries purely in market terms, this view obscures a plethora of 
underlying relations of power which serve to marginalise populations in poverty – both as 
a historical legacy of Apartheid and as an ongoing effect of narrow-focus neo-liberal 
market driven development strategies. For true sustainability and integration to occur, the 
environmental justice perspective requires that we take cognisance of these underlying 
political, social and economic relations underpinning informal settlements, in order that a 
lack of adequate shelter is understood not purely in market terms, but further in relation 
to a host of issues which propagate the ongoing intentional racial-spatialisation of 
residence and social life in post-Apartheid South Africa.305 
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An examination of income levels in South Africa has shown a significant correlation 
between those having to rely on the full government subsidy for housing and those denied 
by the Apartheid policy as ‘black’ or ‘non-white’, amounting to 75% of the ‘black’ 
populations.306 Further, a significant number of these households (15%) are currently 
housed in informal settlements or informal housing.307 Whereas these figures have 
undoubtedly been severely influenced by the legacy of oppression and dispossession 
under Apartheid, the question arises to what extent these inequalities can be effectively 
dealt with under the current neo-liberal development strategy employed by the South 
African government. 
Subsidies allocation for housing are directed by local government to private contractors 
and developers, with the subsidy being spent on land, service provision and finally the 
top structure itself. Often the result are tiny, uniform houses located in unsustainable 
locations of the urban peripheries. The decision by government to progress with housing 
developments despite these outcomes suggests that; “for poor people living in informal 
settlements, a cement-block structure with a tap and toilet, no matter how small or poorly 
located, is an improvement.”308 This interpretation is directly in conflict with the more 
social-minded outcome envisioned by activists and NGO’s, “Basically adequate housing 
has to provide shelter from the elements, provide suitable living for the inhabitants, be 
located within a pleasant living environment, and be well located for economic and social 
opportunities (such as shops and places of employment).”309  
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For Marx, the contemporary system reinforces informal settlements due to a focus on 
informal settlements which are project-based; driven by a conception of informality as a 
housing issue; and that reinforces Apartheid-era spatial, economic and social 
exclusion.310  
The Projectisation of Housing Delivery and Policy 
In keeping with the basic tenets of neoliberal development which defines poverty as the 
root cause of underdevelopment, the dominant logic of the current approach to informal 
settlements in contemporary South Africa regards residents of informal settlements as the 
‘other’, defining them as the problem which requires their relocation elsewhere.311 In this 
way, attention is diverted from the system-wide inequalities in relation to economic 
access or property rights in favour of focussing on the internal characteristics of informal 
settlements and their residents. 
These factors facilitate the process of greenfields developments in large project-based 
attempts to relocate residents in peripheral locations, under the guise of pro-active 
development through formalisation. Yet, despite the dominant logic, the result of these 
attempts often serves to entrench residents as outside the broader urban framework, 
hereby depoliticising the development process and reinforcing inequalities relating to 
spatial dislocation and the dominant national integration objectives.312 
Eradication of informal settlements is driven through the housing policy, as informal 
settlements are typically viewed as existing due to a lack of affordable housing. The 
provision of housing in the post-apartheid era has been hampered by a variety of 
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institutional factors and limitations – resulting in difficulties for government in the 
building of sustainable human settlements to cope with the burgeoning informal 
settlements populations. 
Arguably the greatest obstacle to the fulfilment of thee aims have been the lack of 
government willingness to expropriate land in the public interest.313 Despite the existence 
of provision in section 25(2) and 25(4) enabling the state to appropriate land in order to 
meet the goals of equitable integration; the overriding sanctity of private property and the 
need to protect private property prices, a by-product of the government’s commitment to 
neoliberal development policies, has restricted the ability of housing development on 
well-located land close to employment and other development imperatives.314  
The acquisition of well located land and the promotion of integration remain as 
fundamental challenges to the building of sustainable human settlements in South Africa. 
Despite this, within the dominant discourse a number of factors have hampered the 
promotion of well-located sustainable and integrated settlements. 
The Greenfields development model is widely regarded to be more favourable for 
developers as opposed to upgrading, which due to the project nature of development 
projects makes vacant land more suitable. This bias causes many developers to look to 
the urban fringes for vacant land perpetuating the peripheral locations of poor 
settlements.315 
The result is the increased relocation of residents of informal settlements in peripheral 
spaces, internalising not only increased socio-economic costs to the marginalized in the 
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absence of proximate employment and increased transport costs to centres of 
consumerism; but further serving to recreate or perpetuate the spatial, economic and 
environmental inequalities of the Apartheid urban model. These contemporary 
peripheries bear many of the hallmarks of their apartheid era counterparts – often existing 
without adequate service provision, health-care facilities, environment quality and 
prospects for sustainable job creation.316 The socio-economic shocks of these and other 
hidden costs to relocated populations despite their sudden ‘formalisation’ – shows the 
dominant logic of housing provision as a wholesale solution to informal settlement to be 
unsustainable and a potential contributing factor to the further impoverishment of 
marginalized populations. What is ignored in this approach, are the underlying power 
relations relating to spatial, environmental, economic and social exclusion which foster 
the creation of informal human settlements in their original locations and forms. 
The Hidden Costs of Social Exclusion 
Informal settlements in South Africa’s urban areas then cannot be viewed in isolation 
from a number of internal and external underlying power relations; relating to their 
social, economic, environmental and political exclusion of the marginalized from all but 
the most abstract interpretation of rights to citizenship. Marx argues an inadequate 
understanding of the specific forms of exclusion facing residents of informal settlements 
informing current discourse for the ‘improvement’ of these settlement patterns, has 
resulted in a number of disparities between the intended and real outcomes of 
formalisation projects.317 Whilst it is commonly accepted that residents of informal 
settlements suffer debilitating insecurity as a result of their informality and intransigent 
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way of life, resulting in an increased vulnerability to local leadership and politics coupled 
with a corresponding lack of investment in housing; evidence from projects has shown 
formalisation to have little effect on bolstering security in other aspects of life. Market 
logic that formalisation will foster increased property development falls short of 
expectations as residents are confronted with the hidden costs of new service provision 
and other incumbent costs of formalisation. Increased economic strains compound the 
vulnerability of these residents, with the most severely marginalized often being 
women.318 
A narrow focus on formalisation through housing obscures acute differences between 
residents of informal settlements, the effects of which often increase pressure on the most 
marginalized, such as women or the elderly. Current policy obscures the lasting effects of 
decades of not only racial laws, but gender-biased laws as well, largely ignoring the fact 
that 20-25% of households in informal settlements are female-headed, and that access 
and remuneration from employment remains the site of a profound gender bias.319 Often 
relocation projects negatively affect the various coping mechanisms adopted by residents, 
such as tenancy or the use of private household space for business to off-set mounting 
economic pressures. Instead exacerbation of access to sites of employment, the paucity of 
opportunity for job creation from within newly formal settlements, and a plethora of 
economic strains to residents as a result of formalisation – forces many residents 
(particularly women) into the informal economy.320 
A further enormous threat to informal settlements is the number of residents who will not 
qualify for housing subsidies, either on the basis of too high an income or (more often) 
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those who do not qualify at all for the full subsidy. The numbers of those not qualifying 
for housing subsidies are a significant threat to the process of formalisation, as are the 
numbers of those not qualifying at all because of a lack of positive identification of 
citizenship or residence. Invariably these populations will typically join other informal 
settlements in other areas – hence perpetuating the cycle of settlement formation. 
A significant problem in the South African context is the selling of RDP housing by those 
relocated to subsidised houses, often at a price significantly lower than the projected 
value advertised by the Housing Department.321 This phenomenon suggests that the net 
gain of a formal house advocated by the market model, is often not perceived as 
beneficial by previous residents of informal settlements – a fact which relates directly to 
the policy’s insufficient understanding of poverty and the building of sustainable 
settlements. 
Any number of the negative effects of South Africa’s housing policy’s tendency to 
increase the economic burdens on poor populations can help to explain this phenomenon- 
where increased economic burdens for relocation, new services or employment loss can 
result in relocation presenting too great an economic liability to reidents. Selling of 
dwellings in this context often emerges as the only option to residents from a survival 
perspective. 
Yet aside from the negative reasons for abandoning or selling RDP housing typically 
associated with economic stresses, Baumann (2003) further identifies a number of issues 
relating directly to sustainability of livelihoods promoted by newly formalised housing 
schemes, and in particular the impact of formalisation on the various livelihood 
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protection strategies employed by poor households in informal settlements.322  Informal 
settlements exhibit a high vulnerability to a variety of economic and income based shocks 
which necessitate their building up of other assets not typically regarded in economic 
terms to cope with these shocks. Formalisation, particularly in cases where it involves 
relocation of informal settlements can serve to diminish stocks of these assets – resulting 
in poor populations suffering a loss to their assets despite formalisation. 
As argued, the poor availability of well-located land and the inadequacies of the ANC-led 
government land reform program, has resulted in the majority of housing projects being 
‘greenfields’ developments, that is on previously undeveloped land often of a low-cost 
which allows the maximum portion of the subsidy for services and the housing structures 
themselves.323 The relocation of residents of informal housing to greenfields locations 
places enormous stresses of those currently employed close to the original settlement, 
especially where the relocation site is far from alternate opportunities as in the case of 
urban periphery development. Informal settlements typically are sited by necessity close 
to employment opportunities – and over time develop sophisticated internal economies 
relating to both informal and formal economic production.324 
Relocation of settlements necessitates both a reformation of household expenditures 
patterns to meet increased transport costs, but also may serve to disrupt internal 
established informal economic practices. Increased shocks of an economic nature, when 
coupled with additional expenditures on services and rates, place strain on newly 
formalised households’ ability to save personal capital, decreasing the likelihood of 
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improving their current socio-economic standing – and their ability to mitigate the 
detrimental effects of environmentally unsound locations. 
Residents in newly relocated and formalised settlements are often further constrained by 
regulations against supplementing their income through the use of informal additions to 
their dwellings, whether for use as workspaces or for the purposes of rental to others to 
increase the overall household income. This results in a dramatic restriction on the use of 
the household by residents, which destroys households’ abilities to employ tenancy or the 
lease of backyard shacks as a survival strategy to compensate for economic losses 
suffered as a result of relocation and formalisation.325 The inability to extend houses in 
this way further results in a diminished capacity for residents to provide support networks 
to extended family in other areas in times of need; or indeed to accommodate aging or 
sick relatives of the family for care purposes – resulting in a reduction of reciprocity for 
residents themselves in times of need.326 
Finally, relocation of entire informal settlements seldom results in neighbours being 
relocated alongside the same families they shared neighbourhoods with previously, a fact 
which often can have detrimental effects on residents. Relocation may disrupt a wide 
variety of support groups varying from saving schemes, burial societies and church 
groups, to crèches and after-school care groups. Community and neighbourhood 
networks are integral contributors to the livelihood strategies by the poor; allowing for 
both economic alleviation in the sharing of costs relating to childcare or care of the 
indigent members of households, to promoting a neighbouring spirit allowing for mutual 
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support of one another in coping with income shocks.327 Knowledge of ones neighbours 
also serves to safeguard residents against crime – an enormous concern to all residents of 
both informal and formal settlements.328 
 
When examined from a deeper livelihoods perspective, the simple arguments of market 
driven approaches to development obscure the potential destruction of a number of key 
poverty reduction strategies for poor populations involved in formalisation schemes – and 
thus interventions which proceed purely in terms of providing formal housing are often 
inadequate to address the problematic of populations living in informal conditions. 
Given that the formation of informal settlements are related to a complex set of 
underlying power relations, viewing the solution to their occurrence in isolation from 
coordinated development attempts becomes unsustainable. Merely providing formal 
housing or service provision is not enough if this is done in areas far from employment or 
economic potential in order to enable residents to pay for these opportunities. What is 
required is a multi-faceted approach to development which recognises the underlying 
relations inherent both within and external to settlements in order to affect the integration 
of settlements at all levels; including housing, employment or economic opportunity, 
social, environmental and political. Project-based approaches are insufficient as they fail 
to link the problem of informal settlement creation to broader social and economic trends 
affecting residents, but exacerbate both the spatial and economic marginalisation of 
populations through relocation to peripheries. Further, the process fails to acknowledge 
the heterogeneity of informal settlements residents, in favour of advocating a single 
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solution to all regardless of difference, thus “reinforcing the institutional exclusion that 
underpins the ‘informal’ urban existence.”329 
As Todes et al (2003) argue, there is a critical need to move beyond policies which offer 
only a single outcome or possibility to all residents of settlements in favour of one able to 
support and maintain the diverse survival strategies of residents and households.330 
One such option relates to the demand for upgrading of informal settlements in their 
current locations. Where calls are evident for the upgrading of informal settlements on 
present sites, these are seemingly beneficial as this type of settlement management would 
act to preserve exiting social capital networks, and acts to recognise the reason for the 
exiting of these settlements at present locations – that of proximity to employment often 
not possible in urban fringe settlements. Present site upgrading, although popular with 
residents – is not always feasible from a technocratic stand-point,331 as often land 
occupied is not state-owned, and settlements are often far from existing developed 
service grids or more frequently, attract a high degree of opposition from surrounding 
landowners concerned about the effects of large settlements of the country’s poor on land 
prices adjacent to their own. 
However, from a poverty perspective, a significant degree of the detrimental outcomes of 
greenfields-model developments relate directly to relocation rather than the delivery of 
housing in particular.332 As a result, a fair assessment of the relation between poverty 
alleviation and the delivery of formal housing would suggest that present-site or in situ 
                                                 
329
 Marx, op cit, p. 313 
330
 Todes et al, op cit, p. 272 
331
 Greenberg, op cit, p. 15 
332
 Baumann, op cit, p. 103 
 146 
upgrading exists as a preferable option to relocation on the periphery of urban centres – a 
model which would preserve existing livelihood strategies of poor populations. 
Yet for a number of reasons, in situ upgrading has not featured as a popular outcome of 
the current housing strategy.333 Present locations of informal settlements by design are 
most often in developed areas for the employment opportunities these present to 
residents, with the result that land costs are high; and in economic terms land-owners 
benefit more from development of housing for the formal market than for low-cost 
delivery to the urban poor. Nevertheless, amongst informal settlement residents, the 
development of present sites remains a popular call at local development meetings. 
 
An inherent strength in the South African adaptation of the global discourse of 
Environmental Justice, is the recognition of the underlying dynamics which serve to 
entrench the marginalized in poverty and unsound localities. 
In this way, development undertaken according to this approach are often increasingly 
sensitive to the underlying survival strategies adopted by those living in poverty. 
Despite government ‘lip service’ to notion of sustainable development at both the 
national and international level; from the perspective of Environmental Justice, the 
current administration’s housing and service delivery scheme remains fundamentally un-
sustainable – in that it reinforces spatial dislocation and compounds pressure on the 
country’s poor. 
The demonstrated inability of the neo-liberal model to view individuals as anything save 
as customers in service delivery; or residents in informal settlements as possessing 
uniqueness in terms of needs and wants not defined in terms of formal housing alone – is 
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highly expressive of the oppressive and inherently exclusionary nature of this particular 
development discourse. 
Aside from illustrating the dislocative and un-sustainable nature of the GEAR 
framework, the examination thus far has shown the potential dangers to notions of 
citizenship presented by neo-liberalism. While the Constitutions acts to promote a right to 
housing provision, service provision and the right to a healthy environment, for many 
living in poverty the application of neo-liberal development has resulted in a situation 
where these rights can only be enjoyed in their simplest, most abstract forms. 
The tension between this abstract conception of rights to citizenship versus the real 
enjoyment or wholesale realisation of rights – is a glaring symptom of inequality in the 
post-Apartheid era. While the Constitution accepts the real enjoyment of all inherent 
rights as owed to all citizens, the effects of neo-liberal development have effectively set 
aside key entitlements only for those able to afford them. 
The exploitative nature of this process of subjecting realisation of rights to the 
performance of the capitalist market, assists in the reinforcing of racial inequalities 
inherited from Apartheid due to a continued refusal on behalf of government to effect 
meaningful redistribution. Overwhelmingly, the concentration of wealth in the hands of 
the ‘white’ minority population has not been effectively challenged by the laissez-faire 
attitude of the GEAR discourse – while simultaneously the discourse has rallied to 
protect this unequal distribution through the sanctity of private property rights in the 
Constitution. 
The dramatic power possessed by capital as a result of neo-liberal concessions has 
allowed for the continued ability of ‘whites’ in South Africa to give expression to their 
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wants and needs at the expense of the poor predominantly ‘black’ populations through 
market mechanisms – allowing for a continuation of the exclusion, oppressions and 
marginalisation of this vulnerable group. 
An example of the power which capital possesses in development is given in the case 
study to follow – in the NIMBYism of the ‘white’ dominated policy of relocation of 
informal settlements in Johannesburg, raising crucial questions as to the ability of capital 
to perpetuate unsustainable development projects in order to achieve a realisation of their 
interests despite the damage done to local poor communities. 
 149 
Chapter III 
Introducing the Case Study 
The focus for the case study includes two different wards in region 3 of the Johannesburg 
Municipality; namely wards 95 and 96.334 Additionally, the study briefly examines 
developments in neighbouring, predominantly affluent wards of 101 and 106.335 The 
choice of wards is important as each is contiguous and as such are interconnected 
economically, insofar as each contains centres of employment and consumerism for the 
other. The study area provides an area of great interest due to the fact that it is host to a 
large proportion of Johannesburg Municipality’s informal settlements – three of which 
fall in the demarcated area namely Diepsloot Informal, Zevenfontein informal, and the 
Honeydew/ Kyasands informal settlement; as well as contradictory concentrations of very 
high-income residential areas in the neighbouring affluent wards of 101 and 106. Within 
each area chosen, there exists an enormous variance in housing types, property prices; 
income; extent of service delivery; quality of environments; and access to employment 
and housing. 
The chapter initially serves to provide a brief historical, social and geographical 
background to this rather large area north of Johannesburg. The chapter will examine the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of the region, specifically insofar as it relates to the 
future of the informal settlements in the area, the provision of housing and local 
infrastructural development in service delivery. Plans for the development of Cosmo 
City,336 a new formal ‘Greenfields’-model location proposed as the site for the relocation 
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of a number of informal settlement dwellers in these wards will be discussed, as well as 
the ongoing debate between advocates of the relocation and its opponents, the Jukskei 
Crocodile Catchment Area and surrounding property owners in particular. 
The final portion of the chapter will examine a number of residents reactions to life in 
informal settlements, from the reaction to local environments, exclusion in spatial and 
economic terms and finally the reaction to relocation to the new Cosmo City project; 
including reactions from a number of residents relocated in the November 2005 – January 
2006 period to the ongoing Cosmo City development. 
The Region’s Integrated Development Plan and Informal Settlements  
In line with the Municipal Systems Act (2000), Johannesburg Municipality has drawn up 
an integrated development plan (IDP) which acts as a single, strategic development 
programme; linking all plans, policy frameworks and budgetary demands of the 
municipality. The Johannesburg 2003/4 plan is based on Johannesburg’s long-term 30 
year development plan, Joburg 2030; and on the short-term Mayoral Priorities plan – 
which runs over 5 years. Included in the IDP, is the Spatial Development Framework 
(SDF) dealing with the spatial ordering of the municipality, including its formal and 
informal settlement patterns. In the case of the study area, the IDP states the intention for 
the relocation and formalisation of most of the current informal settlements in the region 
at a new site (Cosmo City), whilst sections of the Diepsloot informal settlement in 
proximity to the current formalisation and extension of service delivery program ongoing 
in Diepsloot formal settlement will be included in this project, while those unable to be 
accommodated due to capacity constraints will join the Cosmo City program in the final 
stages of its expansion. 
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The 2003/4 IDP lists the provision of housing as an important strategy in fulfilling the 
objectives of the five-year development program. According to the document, 
Johannesburg suffers from a housing backlog of 120,000 units, while the rate of 
population influx into the city has increased dramatically;337 estimating between 101,940 
and 114,275 new households earning less than R3,500 to be formed by 2010. The city 
hopes to address this housing backlog by the end of 2007. In addition, the document 
identifies approximately 117,000 households in shack settlements, and 418,000 backyard 
shacks within the municipality as significant challenges to be faced.338 
Speaking in Pretoria in September 2004, Housing Minister Lindiwe Sisulu released 
figures of over 2.4 million households country-wide living in shacks or informal 
dwellings, of which a mere 800,000 had approached the government to be wait-listed for 
government subsidised housing.339 The minister further committed the government to 
addressing informal settlements countrywide by 2014.340 
Further, the IDP reveals a commitment on behalf of the municipality to zero tolerance 
with respects to land invasions while recognising that many of the new arrivals in the city 
will most likely join one of the vastly expanding informal settlements in the region. In 
meeting its ambitious plan to “be rid of informal settlements by 2007”341, the IDP 
proposes to continue with the development and formalisation of well located settlements, 
providing proper infrastructure and creating employment opportunities.342 The program 
envisages a situation by the end of 2007 where “…existing shack settlements should have 
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made way for serviced stands owned by people who have title deeds to their 
properties.”343 The upgrading of informal settlements is a key strategy in the achievement 
of this aim. 
Johannesburg currently comprises 89 informal settlements, housing approximately 
117,000 households.344 The IDP plans to relocate 26 settlements, upgrade 54 and include 
9 in the Alexandra Renewal Project.345 A number of these projects are already in process, 
including the formalisation of Diepsloot in ward 95 and the development of the Cosmo 
City housing scheme. Apart from the provision of RDP housing programmes, the 
Gauteng Provincial government has also instituted the People’s Housing Process, the 
model adopted in the formalisation of ward 95 (Diepsloot) yielding a large degree of 
support from the local community, whereby under supervision and with the logistical and 
technical support from local government developers, “…people are helped to build their 
own houses in serviced land supplied by government.”346 This approach is slowly gaining 
recognition as the preferred option with regards the formalisation of existing settlements. 
Cosmo City: Advocates and Opposition   
The development of a R1.5 billion integrated housing development north of the Randburg 
CBD known as Cosmo City is touted as a housing solution to at least 4 of the informal 
settlements in the region – Zevenfontein, Diepsloot informal, Riverbends Informal 
settlement and Kyasands/ Honeydew informal; while providing employment and the 
stimulation of economic activity for neighbouring communities in Honeydew and 
Zandspruit. The project was approved in February of 2003 by the Gauteng Provincial 
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Legislature, announcing the project will be composed of “more than 15,000 housing units 
with various tenure options including low cost, medium density as well as bonded 
houses”347 upon its completion. 
The announcement in February 2003 was the result of planning and policy formation 
concerning the region, ongoing since 1996.348 From 1999 until the present, the project 
was bolstered by the development of the Zevenfontein Community Development Forum 
(CDF) – formed with the assistance of Planact, the CDF sought to provide for local 
community development and upliftment, and coordinate local participation concerning 
the community’s relocation to Cosmo City.349 The CDF further played a key role in 
negotiations between local government, the Johannesburg City Council and the local 
population of Zevenfontein, concerning the re-settlement of the areas of Zevenfontein 
informal and Riverbends informal settlement.350 However, since its inception the project 
has met with significant resistance, resulting in the stalling of the project in the planning 
stages by countless objections from property owners in the area lead by the Jukskei 
Crocodile Catchment Area (JCCA) – a residents association of landowners in the vicinity 
of the proposed development.351 These objections typically argue a potential negative 
influence of the settlement on their property prices and the threat to the local environment 
as a result of the planned construction and re-settlement of these informal settlement 
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residents.352 The JCCA further claimed the area to be highly eco-sensitive – referring to 
the existence of a number of rare species, including a wetlands area.353 
In considering objections, the Johannesburg City Council proclaimed the process would 
involve a four to six month time frame, while the initial phase of development would 
involve the building of 5,000 units of low cost housing by August 2003.354 Apart from 
housing, the initial phase of planning for Cosmo City would have included the building 
of school and health care facilities, as well as the establishment of open recreational 
spaces for the population, the building of a police station and the upgrading of the 
transport infrastructure.355  
However, resistance by the predominantly white residential owners in the surrounding 
area eventually boiled over towards the middle of 2003, with the granting of a 
Johannesburg High Court interdict to halt the development until a ruling could be made 
over the future of the settlement and a comprehensive redress of all objections is 
achieved.356 Claimants, the JCCA, argue the development approval process was flawed 
and failed to take their wishes into consideration.357 On the 23rd February 2004 the local 
population of Zevenfontein were bussed to the Johannesburg High Court to protest the 
lodging of the objection to their right to housing as the Cosmo City Project, at the 
opening of the legal inquiry into the relocation; 
we did try to avoid the courts because it is going to take long – even after it 
has taken us so long for this process already, from 1997 until now. It is a 
                                                 
352
 op cit Majola, Private interview: Dela (18.01.2004) 
353
 Moloi, op cit, p. 5 
354
 Majola, op cit 
355
 Johannesburg IDP, 2003: 53; Majola, op cit;  Moiloa, op cit 
356
 op cit Majola; Private interview: Lorimer, Private interview: Mulauzi, Private interview: Dela 
357
 Cosmo city hit by legal wrangling; The Star, Mon 26 January 2003, p.4 
 155 
very long time, we are tired of this place.358 
Objections to the Cosmo City scheme have not only been brought by the landowners 
surrounding the prospered area of development. Significant criticisms have arisen from 
both within the informal settlements themselves, from the Democratic Alliance 
opposition, and even from within the ANC itself. These objections will be considered in 
detail later in the chapter. 
Despite objections from surrounding landowners and a protracted legal battle; 
compounded by a series of administrative delays and bungles, particularly in the 
conducting of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) by the local council359 - in 
February 2004 the Johannesburg High Court overturned the objections to the 
development by ruling in favour of the City of Johannesburg. An appeal from the JCCA 
was dismissed by the Provincial Township Board in October of 2004. 
Construction on the housing project began finally in March of 2005, with media releases 
proclaiming a target of 12,500 housing units to be completed by 2007.360 Housing types 
are to represent options for diverse income groups; with plans including 5,000 fully 
subsidised units of 32m2; 3,000 partially subsidised units at 60m2, 3,300 bonded houses 
for sale on the housing market, and 1,000 rental apartments.361 
Despite plans to relocate the first households in July of 2005 – construction and 
administrative delays resulted in the first families only being relocated in November of 
2005.362 By July 1st 2006, estimates made by newly elected ward councillor for the ward 
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96, Isaac Maila claim the successful relocation of approximately 500 households, the vast 
majority from the settlements of Zevenfontein and Riverbends, all of whom have taken 
up residence in the fully subsidised RDP-model housing.363 All current units have 
metered electricity connections and metered water, and incorporate flushable toilets. 
Further planning released by developers Codevco,364 show intent to build 12 schools, 
clinics, libraries, 40 churches, sports fields, taxi ranks, markets and shopping centres.365 
Currently none of these have been formally developed, yet construction has begun and is 
pending on a school in the area.366 Further, currently all roads are fully completed to 
occupied houses, are tarred and have street lighting.367 
Diepsloot West and Diepsloot Informal, Ward 95 
Ward 95 encompasses the newly formal Diepsloot areas, Diepsloot West and parts of the 
surrounding area referred to as Diepsloot Informal. The history of Diepsloot is similar in 
many respects to the other burgeoning informal and formal settlements in and around the 
Johannesburg municipality. According to statistics from Statistics South Africa, 
Diepsloot comprises a population of approximately 33,129, in 15,906 households of 
which 13,890 (87%) are informal.368 Mmatlou Mulauzi, local ward councillor for the 
African National Congress in ward 95, acknowledges this is a conservative figure; 
Most of the people that settle here have been here for a long time, but 
every week many many more arrive. Every week new shacks are going up 
around here, mostly near building 1 [East Diepsloot away from the 
administrative section in the informal zone, where they are likely to remain 
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undetected], but sometimes even on adjacent land where we have no 
control.369  
Population breakdowns by ‘race’ reveals that the vast majority, 33,029 of the inhabitants 
are African, while only 5 ‘whites’ were recorded370, mainly due to the ward overlapping a 
number of fairly large equestrian farms on its western border.371 Despite the repeal of 
Apartheid era racial categorisations, these figures are important in demonstrating the 
longevity of the race-based marginalisation – in that the data shows the current excluded 
to be precisely those same populations excluded under Apartheid, despite the repeal of 
the regimes racial categorisation practices. 
Despite the ongoing infrastructural and formal housing upgrading of sections of 
Diepsloot and Diepsloot West to a formal settlement and the subsequent provision of 
basic services (electrical, sanitation, refuse removal, and water provision) from the 
municipality, the provision of basic needs in Diepsloot remains a problem from a public 
health perspective – particularly in the informal section of the settlement.  
Only 771 (5%) households report having water piped into their dwellings, with another 
5,787  (41 %) households with running water on site.372 This leaves 54% of Diepsloot 
forced to use either public taps (2,217 households) or water tankers (1,926 households) 
for water.373 These access/non access arrangements are significantly lower than national 
averages.374 With regards sanitation services, 5,850 (37%) households report indoor 
flushable latrines – a huge increase from the 1996 figure of 807, but an overwhelming 
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8,757 (55%) have access to only a bucket latrine, with collections taking place once a 
week on average. Most alarming for the local environment though, is the 579 (4%) 
households with no access to any kind sanitation whatsoever, even though this reveals a 
decrease from 1996 figures of 937.375 These households, mainly in the informal dwellings 
of the settlement resort to all manners of unsustainable methods of human-water disposal 
– including the pollution of the nearby Juksei River376, the disposal of sanitation waste 
within the normal refuse collection bins for non-human waste, and indeed the practice of 
merely dumping effluence in neighbouring open stretches of unsettled land.377  
An area of significant improvement in recent years has been with regards 
electrification.378 According to the statistics confirmed by the councillor, approximately 5 
718 (36%) households have access to electricity through the local service provider 
Eskom,379 of which all utilise pre-paid access.380 Unlike Soweto, most Diepsloot residents 
interviewed were quite happy with prepaid access, yet a number of those interviewed 
confessed difficult with sub-standard wiring in RDP provision housing – as well as a lack 
of understanding concerning pre-paid utilisation statistics. As a result, many continue to 
use paraffin, candles and solar energy. A staggering 9,183 (58%) households utilise 
candles for lighting381, while a television set may be running off prepaid electricity.382 
This shows a complex set of responses by residents in managing their own reproduction. 
Councillor Mulauzi acknowledges the benefits that electrification has brought to the area 
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– particularly an overall decrease in reliance on paraffin for cooking and heating.383 This 
decrease has helped the prevention of shack-fires in the area; which occur frequently in 
informal shack settlements due to the high concentration of structures in small areas, 
typically causing widespread damage, deaths and injuries as they spread unabated due to 
the inadequacies of infrastructure to combat fires. Despite these apparent dangers, 879 
(6%) households continue to use paraffin for lighting384 and a large number still make 
frequent use of candles; particularly those where employment scarcity or low-incomes 
prevent households from the enjoyment of the electrification advancements. In a 
significant portion of houses with the wiring and means for electrification, these facilities 
go unused due to affordability – raising crucial questions in provision of these services 
relating to the provision of the means (abstract realisation of rights to basic needs), versus 
the actual realisation of these rights. 
In an interview with Councillor Mulauzi, a number of the issues affecting this community 
and their environments were raised. According to the councillor, the chief problem 
underlying much of the hardship to be found in Diepsloot, is that of rapid population 
influxes from rural areas and outlying informal settlements. Population figures from the 
2001 census reveal a 143.94 % increase in the numbers of people inhabiting the 
settlement from the 1996 figures.385 
The following excerpts from one interview with Councillor Mulauzi (MM) provide a 
snapshot of some of the socio-political dynamics in Diepsloot.    
JB:386  In terms of population growth, why do so many come to Diepsloot? 
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MM:  You see this areas here where we are currently is Diepsloot West. This is the 
formal area here where we are. At the other end where you came in, is the 
reception area. People collect there in shacks, waiting to be processed for 
settlement here in Diepsloot West. Once we have processed them, they receive a 
plot, with a ‘C form’ – and they are then relocated. Diepsloot is a very fast 
developer compared to the other areas… there is a lot happening here since we 
have been formalised. Because we have the developments, people just come to 
Diepsloot thinking they will get a house. They settle anywhere just believing, or 
let me say, hoping they will be… included. 
JB: Have there been attempts to control the massive influx, the settlement of people 
here? 
MM: The population growth is incredible, you wouldn’t believe it. In one stand in the 
reception area, people there they sub-let plots, so you go in and you get 8 shacks. 
We try to control this by processing the formalisation of new areas, but we cannot 
keep up. For formalisation we need planning and only one family per stand […] 
We have a big problem with people who invade land here zoned for a school, or a 
church. Overnight they build shacks there and you wake up and they are there. If 
you haven’t seen them there after 48 hours you cannot just tell them to go, it is 
now for you to find them an alternative. This is how they hope to get a place here. 
 
Numerous problems serve to compound the challenges of housing provision. Two 
solutions were proffered at formalisation for the provision of housing; namely the 
granting of serviced sites, providing plots to families with sanitation services whereupon 
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individuals could build their own houses; or the second option of waiting for the 
development of RDP housing. The new formal housing has reflected an equal distribution 
between each of these options. RDP housing built by the government comprises a single 
room, with water piped into the dwelling, a flushable toilet and provisions for 
electrification, “…the cables and plugs are there and the meter is built in. Whether the 
people use it is up to them.”387 
Many residents however have selected not to live in RDP housing but to rather build their 
own dwellings on a designated serviced plot. In the words of one resident,  
The RDP house is too small. Look you can see here how many people are 
we in this house. These are all my children here, we can’t live in that place. 
It is better that give us land like this and you see I am building now. I work 
for 12 years building houses… there is not work for me there now so I’m 
making my place here […] This is my job now and it looks nice, ne?388 
The average numbers of people per household according to Statistics SA in the formal 
areas of Diepsloot is 3, typically 1 adult and 2 children, but as the councillor explains this 
can be misleading,  
Many people here working as domestic [workers] work in the built-up 
areas in Johannesburg and Sandton. Lots of them have a place to stay close 
by their work and they only return to Diepsloot on the weekends.389 
This situation has lead to numerous problems regarding the provision of water. Whilst the 
supply of water to the area from Johannesburg Water has been successful in many 
respects, the local community is again confused over billing procedures. All water 
connections are metered in the area yet readings are seldom taken on a monthly basis; 
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Many of these places are being billed on deemed consumption, or they get 
an account for two months at a time. Like I was saying some places are 
only used on weekends, they return home for few days. Yet they are 
charged on deemed consumption.390 
Admittedly, billing concerns have not been confined to the Diepsloot settlement however, 
and in the 2003-2004 period a large segment of the region experienced a plethora of 
billing issues and inaccuracies addressed with the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council.391 
Of principal concern in the face of burgeoning population growth has been the allocation 
of housing. Whilst the government has had relative success in the area in building houses, 
local community organisations have argued these are not being distributed fairly. In a 
report, local community newspaper The Fourways Review, commented on a public 
meeting with the Johannesburg Mayor, Amos Masondo.392 Here Susan Modise, 
chairperson of the South African National Civic Organisations (SANCO) commented;  
People in possession of the correct forms (C forms) promising them houses 
since 1996, have remained homeless, while people without these forms are 
already living in the new houses.393 
Aside from housing issues, the population explosion of Diepsloot is linked to a plethora 
of social problems. Most notable is that of unemployment. Statistics SA estimates the 
number employed at approximately 11,475 (53%) out of a total labour force of 21,762, 
with 10,287 unemployed.394  Of those employed, 2,361 (21%) are employed in private 
households, either as domestic workers, care-givers to children or the elderly, or as 
gardeners.395 Councillor Mulauzi attributes this problem to a number of factors; 
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MM: Again like I said we are overcrowded, if there is a job here everybody wants that 
job… the competition is very fierce… we also do not have many people here with 
the skills and training to start businesses here in Diepsloot. 
JB: What level of job creation has come from inside Diepsloot itself? 
MM: Where can we work here? There’s nothing here we can use. We have to go out to 
find work for the people here, there is nothing happening inside here. 
 
The Diepsloot settlement is typical of the peri-urban spaces in South Africa which form 
part of the legacy of Apartheid and the marginalisation of a racially defined population of 
Africans. The area developed largely in the 1970’s and 1980’s with the increase in 
construction projects in the surrounding designated ‘white’ areas, and to this day a 
significant percentage of the population living here are employed in the construction 
industry, 1,971 or 17% of the total employed.396 The landscape is bleak, the surrounding 
areas consisting of small equestrian and other agricultural holdings. Numbers in the area 
have sky rocketed with the increased suburban expansion of the affluent predominantly 
‘white’ areas of Fourways, Fourways Gardens, Chartwell, Lonehill and Dainfern 
(including the areas of Dainfern Valley and Dainfern Ridge). Despite the rapid urban 
sprawl in the region, Diepsloot is still relatively removed from centres of development 
and employment; 
[…] we are far from skilled employment here. Not everybody can work as 
a domestic [worker]… and taxis while they run all the time are not really 
affordable and if not regulated they can cause big problems. Most of the 
people here work in houses in these neighbouring areas, but many skilled 
jobs are in Johannesburg. Those who have to travel there are suffering 
terribly. 




Development of new housing projects in the surrounding affluent areas has shunned 
locating too close to Diepsloot, resulting in the maintenance of informal buffer zones of 
privately owned but undeveloped lands between the settlement and the affluent 
surrounding areas.  
Waste collection in the area has also proved a problem in the past, yet here formalisation 
has served the area well. The concentration of many shacks on a single stand makes the 
process very difficult. Local waste company, Pik-it-up who won the tender, have 
performed this service well despite the challenges – with regular pick ups and the supply 
of large numbers of containers to the area. Councillor Mulauzi comments,  
…the informal sections present a much bigger problem, here the houses 
are very dense and not much of the local wastes makes it into bins. The 
company does their best though, and have performed well.397 
Zevenfontein, Kyasands, Dainfern, Ward 96  
The area which comprises Ward 96 includes part of Diepsloot formal (intersecting with 
ward 95 at Northern Farm), the sprawling informal settlement of Zevenfontein, Dainfern 
(including Dainfern Estate, Dainfern Valley and Dainfern Ridge), parts of Fourways, 
Chartwell and the Kyasands Industrial Farm.398 
The ward is one of the largest in Johannesburg and forms an interesting segment of the 
municipality due to the large differences in income distribution, real estate values and 
development. The ward comprises a population of approximately 49,208 – an increase of 
212.47% since 1996 – in 18,363 households, of which 6,627 (36%) are informal; of these 
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approximately 37,762 (78%) are African as opposed to 10,458 (21%) whites.399 Again, 
ward councillor until March 2006, Siphiwe Dela acknowledges these statistics to be fairly 
conservative owing to the presence of two ever-swelling informal settlements in the area; 
Diepsloot informal and Zevenfontein.400 
Contrasted to the informal settlement spaces, the Dainfern Estates and Dainfern Ridge 
comprise some of the most affluent areas in the Johannesburg municipality. The area is 
situated in close proximity to numerous areas of consumerism within Fourways and 
Lonehill; while it is composed of a number of high security areas with strict access 
control to residents, non-residents and workers. Dainfern further contains within itself 
numerous spaces for leisure activities, including a golf course, lake and park area, and 
numerous playground and park areas. All these spaces are maintained by the Dainfern 
Body Corporate through the local Dainfern Residents Association, and fall outside of the 
management responsibility of Johannesburg City Parks due to their nature as privately 
owned, developed and serviced spaces. 
The predominantly affluent areas of the ward are taken to include Dainfern, Chartwell 
and parts of Fourways.401 The environments and infrastructure in these areas are very 
well development, with little in the way of complaint from these areas being registered 
with ex-Councillor Dela; 
They don’t have any issues to raise with me about their environment 
because they have everything. That they raise with me is around the road 
closures, boom gates… and even if there are some developments taking 
place and they have objections or issues – I am brought in to speak with 
the developers. But that concerns the local areas, the Dainfern place itself 
is maintained by themselves in there, the people living in there. They did 
bring to me some problems with billing, but nothing about their 
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Within these predominantly ‘white’ areas of Dainfern, Chartwell and Fourways there 
exists a well-developed infrastructure and services. The overwhelming majority of these 
have water in the dwellings supplied by Johannesburg Water, and flushable toilets with 
sanitation services. Those isolated households not serviced by Johannesburg Water in the 
areas, typically utilise borehole water – and according to demarcation statistics, 123 
households receive part or all of their water in this way.403 Further, the vast majority of 
these households have electrification through the local service provider Eskom. The 
informal settlement of Zevenfontein forms a complete contrast to the development in 
these areas.  
Councillor Dela explains the figures for population in Zevenfontein are incredibly 
difficult to determine;  
There are many shacks on a single plot here, the people were given a plot 
to build a shack and they sub-let. So you get lots of houses on one stand, it 
is difficult to stop them from going up all the time so it is very difficult to 
manage all the numbers of people living here […] many of the families 
living here are having the mother or the father away for work in the other 
place where they can find jobs. They leave the children here with the 
grandmother or someone who is not working. They normally come back to 
bring money on weekends or at the last of the month.404 
Zevenfontein comprises a significant fraction of the total number of households in the 
ward. Despite the muddling of true numbers through the sub-letting process, statistics for 
the ward reveal 2,733 (15%) households which have to rely on water tankers as a supply 
of fresh water, while 2,037 (11%) households utilise community stands, with 1,467 (8%) 








using community stands over 200m.405 Further, 171 (1%) households use the natural 
water supply in the areas, most often the Jukskei River which flows within a few metres 
of the northern border of the Zevenfontein informal settlement, and still 225 households 
use stagnant water.406 The majority of these households without formal access to water in 
their dwellings are within the Zevenfontein settlement and the tiny portion of Diepsloot 
informal, which has expanded to overlap the ward boundaries.407 
The situation with regards sanitation is equally illustrative of the vast disparities at the 
ward level. Out of the total number of households in the ward only 10,092 (55%) have 
access to a flushable toilet408, predominantly in the white areas.409 On the other hand, 
3,306 (18%) households are listed as having only access to a bucket latrine, with 630 
(3%) using pit latrines. Most alarming, is the 2,394 (13%) households in the ward which 
have no access to sanitation services of these types at all.410 
An interview with then Councillor Siphiwe Dela (SD), reveals that these issues are 
frequently relayed to the ward councillor in private and public meetings; 
JB: In Zevenfontein itself, what are some of the issues people bring to 
you? 
SD:  There are so many, because they… we didn’t think at this stage we 
will still be living here. So they will be complaining that our shacks are so 
close to each other, when one burns it spreads to all the other. Sometimes 
the truck which is bringing us water doesn’t come so they will complain 
about that. Shortage of toilets, grading of these sand roads… there are the 
things we are looking at. But the biggest problem is that one of land. 
JB: What land issues are brought to you? 
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SD: Well you see out here, you can look around and there is nothing 
from here up until you reach Diepsloot. So the people say there is still 
much land that is open – but we cannot just… take up too much room, 
because the land doesn’t belong to the state. If we allow the shacks too 
much room it will impact on the Cosmo City development. 
JB:  How do people feel about the issue of space? Do they understand 
why they cannot use it? 
SD: Well we explain to them, last year the MEC for housing explained 
to them; we opened a new section here because of heavy rains that were 
here. It was a disaster and we had to relocate some of the families… those 
close to the river there. Some people put others in their backyards. But if 
we put other people on that land, it becomes a big problem for the 
municipality… and it delays our move from here. 
JB:  Now I see people are still living by the river there. 
SD: What can we do? There is nowhere else, we warn them but they 
can’t listen. 
JB: What about recreational facilities or playgrounds? 
SD: In Diepsloot we have soccer facilities – some well developed and 
some still under construction. There are youth centres where these are 
sited. Here we have only minor facilities because we are temporary… 
whereas in Cosmo City they will be formal. 
For the past 5 years, the IDP has been jointly configured with that for Diepsloot, and aims 
at the promotion of infrastructural development, economic development with priority 
focus on the Kyasands industrial Park, the establishment of the CBD and various job 
creation strategies.411 
The focus of job creation has been the Kyasands industrial areas and the surrounding 
predominantly ‘white’ suburban areas. Out of a total labour force of approximately 
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30,474 in 2001, the area lists approximately 20,319 (67%) employed with the numbers 
unemployed at approximately 10,155, a 629% increase from 1996 figures.412 Further, 
7,170 are recorded as being under the age of employment.413 As in the case of Diepsloot, 
a high degree of employment is undertaken in private households, as domestic workers, 
gardeners or child minders – with 3,762 (19%) people employed in this field. Further, 
owing to the genesis of the settlement, 2,595 (12%) are employed in construction 
programs. Within Zevenfontein, the numbers of young adults entering the market place is 
a significant worry, “…many of them are now leaving school and will join the many 
others who journey from here every day to find jobs in the surrounding areas.”414 
In terms of infrastructural development the area has seen little in the way of improvement 
over the term of the last 5-year IDP, specifically for the Zevenfontein area itself. Aside 
from moderate attempts to induce public-private partnerships within the area, attempts at 
infrastructural development have concerned upgrades in more remote areas in Fourways 
for the ever expanding consumer centres in this area and the rapidly expanding housing 
developments in the affluent areas - rapidly becoming populated by sprawling complexes 
of townhouses and cluster units, all barricaded behind high security walls and marketed 
as secure housing options for the young affluent. For the most part, infrastructure within 
the ward as a whole has concerned the settlement of the areas of Cosmo City, and the 
continued development of RDP housing in Diepsloot.415 
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History of Zevenfontein Informal  
The informal settlement at Zevenfontein is now situated on an area known previously as 
the Zevenfontein Farm, harkening back to the period when all land in this now largely 
developed area was comprised of mainly large agricultural units with only a small 
number of dwellings per hectare. ‘Non-white’ settlements in these areas were small, but 
significant enough to produce uproar in recent months over past histories of exclusions 
and Apartheid era evictions. An article in the local Fourways Review,416 recalls how in 
1971 a number of families were removed from the area to make space for the 
encroaching white residential spaces. In the Fourways Review, Lucky Moshimane a local 
resident seeking to reclaim the lands rights where the Dainfern Valley, and Dainfern 
Estates complexes exist today, land which he claims previously housed a cemetery; 
recalls how, “In 1971 we were given 5 days to move out of our houses… Who were we 
to fight against in those days?”417 
Families were evicted from the land by force losing possessions and considerable 
livestock in the process.418 The farm was subsequently subdivided by mining group JCI 
after 1985, and portions subsequently sold to developers. The dispute is still being waged 
between Lucky Moshimane representing 220 families claiming prior residence on the 
Zevenfontein farm, the current development of Dainfern Valley, JCI (now Johnnic 
holdings), and local funeral services home Avbob.419 Moshimane and families have been 
demanding the disclosure of the whereabouts of approximately 590 graves, allegedly 
removed without records in 1987 from land which relatives who were evicted from the 
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land recall stretch from the current Dainfern Valley to the Dainfern Golf estate.  Further, 
they have entered into legal proceedings to claim compensation for land lost, as well as 
the loss of possessions and livestock.420 While 2005 saw a number of these disputes being 
settled with the exhumation of a number of these sites, the dispute continues for the 
identification of a number of missing burial sites and redress for families concerned – a 
dispute with a significant degree of publicity in the settlement of Zevenfontein, 
contributing to the growing animosity between the informal settlement and the 
neighbouring Dainfern residential complex. 
The site bears reminders of a mass cemetery as offerings and small collections of graves 
continue to be tendered to, immediately adjacent to the massive security walls of the two 
disputed white residential complexes. 
Initial attempts by Avbob funeral services to relocate the graves were fruitless due to lost 
records. Moshimane believes racial issues have prevented the proper reburial of many of 
the graves found belonging to black families. He believes many were buried in mass 
graves, while others still lie unmarked beneath the ground now covered by the Dainfern 
residential complex, walled off by residents.421 
Forced removals from the area of Zevenfontein farm caused many to be displaced in the 
surrounding areas into other informal settlements, whilst in some cases the populations 
were forced to move to the homelands or join other peri-urban settlements in the margins 
of the rapidly developing Johannesburg municipality. 
Resettlement of the Zevenfontein area began in the mid 1980’s, and with the relaxation of 
influx laws towards the end of the decade, the numbers in the area increased dramatically. 
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The present site of Zevenfontein informal has not been the permanent site for this 
community however, due to all the development in the area attracting movements and 
involving some relocation. However according to Councillors Mulauzi of Diepsloot, Dela 
of Zevenfontein and Dainfern, and Councillor for the DA Kate Lorimer (ward 101) 
amongst other respondents; the present site has been occupied for approximately 15 
years.422 All respondents except one interviewed now living in the community, claim to 
have been born in or around the area of Zevenfontein farm, with one respondent Felicity 
Sithole (62 years old) having previously held residence on plot 172 of the Farm, adjacent 
to the alleged site of the now disputed relocated graveyard; 
I can’t even go there now to visit my ancestors because it is closed. They 
move all the bones from that place and now I can’t see which of those 
bones is my grandfather. I think about it and I get very cross, I just want to 
cry.423 
Dainfern and Zevenfontein  
Zevenfontein informal is located at the boundary wall of the Dainfern Golf Estates and 
within clear view of Dainfern Valley and Dainfern Ridge on the other side of the banks of 
the Jukskei River. At some points less than a hundred metres separate the shacks, where 
rentals of plots reach at most R50 a month; from the razor-wire enforced boundary walls 
of the multi-million Rand housing complex. 
According to Councillor Dela, while Dainfern have little complaints about their internal 
environment, their attitude towards the informal settlement of Zevenfontein is often 
expressed to him; “They say the life here is not conducive, that we are making the 
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environment unhealthy, they do not want to see us living here.”424 The majority of 
reasons given by the Dainfern objections to the location of Zevenfontein refer to the 
environmental damage which the area precipitates. The Fourways Review reported in 
June 2003 of objections to both the Zevenfontein settlement and Diepsloot based on the 
number of coal burning fires polluting the atmosphere.425 
However, Councillor Dela argues that other factors have been expressed to him in 
meetings concerning the settlement;  
Dainfern is in support of the move of the people here in Zevenfontein, 
because of the value of their properties next to the informal settlement and 
because the land where we are now, it is not state land. Dainfern is a multi 
stakeholder of the land here so they say they want to develop.426 
Concerns about road closures in ward 96 did not feature as highly on the agendas of 
community meetings since their re-introduction in 2003 in comparison to other wards. 
JB: How many closures do you know about in your ward? 
SD: Not so many, I only know of… not more than 5 were approved. 
JB: These are all in Chartwell and Dainfern? 
SD: No, not really – Chartwell and Bloubosrand. Not Dainfern, they have their own 
access control and security there. They don’t need the boom gates. 
JB: What do you believe is the main motivation behind these closures? 
SD: Well you see all the suburbs within the city, they don’t just develop 10 houses and 
leave them anymore. They have to fence… they have these high walls and gates 
with security – all over. This is because people want to protect themselves. The 
JRA (Johannesburg Road Agency) has decided because of problems to make each 
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boom gate need an application, because they have no right to close the road unless 
they get permission. If there is no objection from surrounding areas – then there is 
no problem. 
JB: What is the response from the community here about road closures and security 
such as this?  
SD: I have had some people ask me about them and complaining they cannot go in to 
these places. Yes, I think the people here feel bad, they can’t even look for jobs in 
there now […] Because of the fences and the booms we cannot have access there 
now. I cannot just go there and sign in and say I want to sit on the grass there 
under the trees – [laughs] that will not happen. 
JB: Do you feel these closures which divide different communities’ impact negatively 
on integration of the population? 
SD: These areas are scared of crime. They don’t want anybody who doesn’t belong 
there to get in to commit crime inside. They have a right to protect themselves and 
their families. But… well the Constitution… it does not allow for white and black 
areas anymore – the people have to be integrated and live together, the rich and 
the poor. This we can’t do here because there are many objections. But the style 
of Cosmo city that is going to be developed - the rich, the middles and lowest will 
be living together. So the environment will be one. 
JB: Have there been programs to stimulate partnership between areas such as this and 
affluent areas, to promote integration, as well as upgrading of the environment 
here? 
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SD: The programs we have in this area where we are staying now, it is just to educate 
our people here, you know the type of situation we are living in here, it 
demoralises the people – so to uplift morale of the people while we are waiting 
and we are sitting in these tin houses […] we have to clean up the area. But since 
we have started that there is not any other from the surrounding areas who come 
to appreciate that. Because they are already living on their healthy environment – 
they don’t know or think about what is happening here. What they want to see – if 
they still see these shacks here they still see an unhealthy environment for them 
there. 
 
Douglasdale, Jukskei Park, Northriding, Ward 101 and Fourways, 
Ward 106 
The areas surrounding the two wards serving as hosts to the informal settlements of 
Diepsloot and Zevenfontein form a complete contrast to these settlement patterns – again 
highlighting the vast inequalities present in this relatively proximate region of the 
municipality. Only two of these wards will be examined in any significant detail for the 
sake of brevity – namely wards 101 and 106. 
In terms of the surviving ‘racial’ demographics of Apartheid classifications – statistics for 
these wards assessed in 2001, show a population of 31,378, amounting to approximately 
12,981 households in ward 106, of which 1,845 (25%) fall into the Apartheid category 
‘black’ while 71% are ‘white’; while neighbouring ward 101 houses 30,993 in 
approximately 12,147 households, amounting to 5,683 (18%) ‘black’ and 23,760 (76%) 
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‘whites’.427 The extent of ongoing development attempts in these areas is illustrated in the 
growth figures in terms of households from 1996 of 38.36% and 51.70% for wards 106 
and 101 respectively.428 
In terms of housing provision, the vast majority of houses in both ward 106 (98%) and 
ward 101 (97%) reside in formal dwellings. Service delivery levels are equally 
impressive. Of the total households in ward 106, 98% possess flushable toilets, 99% bear 
some for of electrification through local provider Eskom, and 88% possess piped water 
into their dwellings, services by Johannesburg Water.429 Ward 101 is a similar case with 
99% electrification, 97% with sanitation in the form of flushable toilets, and 88% piped 
water provision.430 
Dramatic differences in terms of socio-economic opportunity in these wards is further 
exemplified by the enormously favourable employment statistics. Out of a total labour 
force of approximately 19,245 in ward 106, 18,585 were recorded as having employment 
in 2001, with only 600 (3%) unemployed.431 These figures are again represented in 101 
with 18,171 (96%) employment from the total labour force in the ward of 18,957.432 Both 
of these areas then reveal dramatic advantages over the national averages for 
employment, which listed the national unemployment figure at 26,7% in September of 
2005.433 
A number of methodological shortcomings are present in the study of the affluent 
surrounding communities, not unrelated to the relative ignorance of these populations of 
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both the existence of informal settlements (aside from that in Diepsloot due to increasing 
local press coverage of formalisation efforts); or indeed the scale of the problem 
involved. The relative isolationism of informal settlements in terms of the affluent spaces 
in this region, is typical of exclusionary spatial relations in post-Apartheid urban 
development, despite the repeal of discriminatory legislation. 
In an attempt to overcome these methodological complexities, close analysis of the local 
community newspaper, The Fourways Review, provides tremendous insight into these 
two predominantly white suburban areas. The paper is free weekly to residents and 
businesses in the ward relying on advertisements for its production. Through analysis of 
roughly a year’s worth of issues, a number of casual findings can be inferred and key 
topics of concern identified which affect the region. Based on a year’s analysis, the 
average edition of the paper comprised 30 pages of news and advertising concerning the 
area which includes the main areas of study in this dissertation; wards 95, 96, 101 and 
106.  
Aside from providing an insight into the consumerism of the region, the main body of the 
newspaper deals with a number of issues pertinent to the community. Issues which the 
paper addresses over time can be placed (albeit rather generally), into a number of broad 
categories: local issues (21%); crime (10%); environmental (10-12%); social happenings 
(12%); local sport (10%); community empowerment and outreach endeavours (10-12%); 
and happenings and achievements at local schools (10%). Admittedly these categories 
often assume a significant degree of overlap, for example reports on local community 
greening project could fit into either environmental projects or local community 
empowerment endeavours. Neither category is typically impermeable. 
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Environmental issues typically relate to issues surrounding the activities in the region of 
local groups involved in species conservation of animal rehabilitation in the region. Apart 
from the society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), which operates 
country wide, two further non-profit animal rehabilitation centres are housed and operate 
in the region, the FreeMe Animal rehabilitation project434, and the Centre for Animal 
Rehabilitation and Education (CARE) in the Douglasdale area. 
Apart from the average 10% of reports which concentrate on crime in the area, each 
issues typically features a column entitled ‘Police Bulletin’, where local police report 
back on crimes solved, request information relating to crimes, identify hot spots for 
criminal activities and release statements on crimes committed within the precinct. 
Tying into broad themes in environmental racism and exclusionary communitarianism,435 
in the affluent area around Fourways, the single most common source of articles and 
fervent readers’ letters in the local paper over the course of 2003 and continuing through 
2005, were the challenges relating to the provision of security through road closures. 
Ward councillors for the wards 101 and 106, Katherine Lorimer and Dennis Hunt 
respectively, confirm that coupled with issues surrounding general crime and municipal 
capacity; these issues serve to dominate local community meetings, residents’ and 
ratepayers’ meetings and many instances of private communication between individual 
members of the public and ward councillors.436 
Closely linked to these demands for increased security among the affluent are beliefs 
relating to a number of social pathologies relating to the marginalized. Numerous reports 
in the local community newspapers of the surrounding affluent area reinforce a 
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connection between homelessness or informality and elevated crime levels. In two of 
such reports, This is Home (Fourways Review: July 14 2006) and No Shack, no Hope 
(Midrand Report, June 2 2006); informal populations were alleged to have been directly 
linked to a series of crimes in the adjacent areas despite both reports containing little in 
the way of concrete evidence from the authorities. In both reports, the informal residents 
in question were labelled as ‘vagrants’ and possibly ‘illegal immigrants’ in the country 
for employment in construction jobs.437 
These two examples provide evidence of the continued operation of a number of social 
pathologies in the surrounding affluent areas relating to the ‘others’ preoccupation with 
deviance and crime. Further, the pathology of the poor as uncaring or naïve about the 
dangers of their environments is reproduce in “No Shack, No Hope”, where the local 
ward councillor justices to the informal squatters that they have to move based on health 
reasons relating to waste disposal and sanitation, despite admission that the council had 
made no arrangements to resettle the families in improved circumstances.438 
While it would be impossible to infer a general belief in social pathologies of this nature 
in the surrounding affluent areas, the prevalence of articles reinforcing these beliefs in 
local newspapers hints at the growing insecurity on behalf of these populations as to the 
presence of the marginalised within proximity of affluent predominantly ‘white’ 
residential spaces. The equation of poverty and informal living with social decay in crime 
or deviant behaviour – and with environmental degradation in terms of litter and disease 
in these pathologies – allows insecure populations in the affluent areas to justify their 
attempts to externalised the ‘other’ through relocation on the basis of personal security. 
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The outcomes of these proceedings are often the oppressive and inherently exclusionary 
practices of increased relocation of the marginalised and often ‘criminalised’ populations 
away from ‘white’ areas – accompanied by the increased fortification of affluent areas 
against future deviant transgressors on their boundaries. Road closures and the formation 
of gated communities is one method adopted in the area of the case study to achieve the 
insulation of these communities against the ‘other’. 
Road Closures 
The debate surrounding the closure of roads in the Johannesburg Municipality was 
sparked by a decision by the Metro Council in May 2003 to force the reapplication of all 
areas closed off with vehicular booms. The motive behind forcing the reapplication was 
the extent to which these deprived motorists of alternate routes, resulting in high traffic 
flows on mains roads.439 The Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) made the decision to re-
open applications to areas, forcing existing closures to reapply to keep their security, and 
sparking off a host of new claims.440 
Three important policy directives were listed in the JRA’s guidelines for application.441 
The purpose of access restriction must be to enhance safety and security – 
closures will not be granted for any other reason. 
Unrestricted public access to an area must be available at all time. 
Access personnel may not search or register through traffic, and it may not 
incur lengthy delays. 
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The JRA admits the closure of roads is undesirable in Johannesburg, with one respondent 
from their offices quoted as remarking, “The policy has to be the vehicle which balances 
the security desires of one group against the access rights of others.”442 
Residents’ responses to the issue of road closures in the areas of Fourways, Douglasdale 
and the surrounding areas have generally been favourable. Ward Councillors 
acknowledge a great deal of support for these structures,443 despite the huge costs 
involved; the application alone to the JRA carrying a R6,200 fee. A report in the 
Fourways Review in August listed an overwhelming 91% support for applications in 
nearby affluent areas.444 
This phenomenon it is often argued has developed because of the alarmingly high crime 
rate in the Johannesburg area,445 yet the closing of suburbs is often seen by ‘white’ 
residents in affluent communities outside of these structures as damaging to their 
interests. As one Fourways resident Adrian Burford argues in a letter to the Fourways 
Review,  
These structures concentrate crime into nearby areas where communities 
do not possess the resources necessary for the erection of booms, resulting 
in a situation where only the rich can stay protected. Why should I suffer a 
further burden because I don’t have the money or support in my area?446 
The extent to which there is a violation of rights by these structures then is dependent on 
- and perceived differently according to social-economic situation. A report published in 
March of 2005 on the subject of Road closures in South Africa by the South African 
Human Rights Commission, while acknowledging the high incidences of crime in South 
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Africa and accepting the Constitutional right to self-protection; nevertheless the 
Commission condemned these measures on a number of bases – arguing road closures 
“…cause social division, dysfunctional cities and lead to the further polarisation of our 
society.”447 The report further found these features to violate a number of fundamental 
rights as stipulated in the Constitution, and further that the Commission remained 
unconvinced both in the effectiveness of these measures, and that in most instances 
“…alternative measures for safety and security had been sufficiently explored.”448 
Apart from a growing amount of evidence suggesting that these measures in fact do little 
to prevent crime in these areas; a principal concern to Jody Kollapen, Chairperson of the 
SAHRC was that,  
Given our own history of exclusion and separation we should be extremely 
careful, even if our motives are otherwise commendable, in embarking on 
an urban design that works against the notion of a united society. There 
was considerable evidence that booms and closures do indeed exclude and 
separate in a manner inconsistent with the idea of an open city.449 
However, despite these objections the power of capital proved successful in forcing 
through the process – enabled by Constitutional rights to self-protection and private 
property superseding the rights of less affluent citizens. 
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The Experience of Exclusion 
The final portion of the chapter deals with responses to exclusion in all its manifestations 
amongst the settlement populations of Diepsloot and Zevenfontein. Public-private 
partnerships in the two settlements are compared in respects of community response and 
support for these attempts to manage their living spaces and improve their general 
environments. Involved in this discussion will be an illustration of many of the social 
problems faced by the various populations, as well as a significant degree of feedback 
concerning resident reaction to examples of ownership, in opposition to social exclusion 
suffered by settlement inhabitants. Exclusions will address environmental exclusion, 
exclusion from settled land and spaces, and exclusion from those areas delineated as the 
affluent and predominantly white urban spaces. 
Plans for the settlement of Cosmo City will be examined to the extent that these introduce 
a wide variety of practical problems to inhabitants of the settlements in the areas. 
Residents’ reactions as to the nature and desirability of relocation to the proposed Cosmo 
City development will provide a significant portion of this discussion, as will a discussion 
of resident and local councillors’ visions for the future of informal settlements in the area 
concerned. 
Public – Private Participation in Diepsloot 
Numerous projects involving private-public participation and local community 
empowerment have originated in Diepsloot since its formalization; including community 
greening and gardening campaigns, the establishment of recreational facilities for schools 
in the area and the formation of a literacy project, extended to the building of a public 
library in the area. 
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The literacy project run by Meinis Hattingh with donations from international 
organisations and the Rotary Foundation has been successful in establishing local school 
libraries at three schools in Diepsloot’s newly formal areas.450 Still in process is the 
establishment of a public library in Diepsloot West made possible through various 
charitable donations and the work of the Gauteng Provincial Library Service. A ‘mobile 
library’ is also in the pipeline to service areas of the informal settlement.451 
Community greening projects have included numerous projects from non-profit 
organisation Food and Trees for Africa, Eduplant and recent donations from business 
group Barloworld to celebrate their centenary.452 Barloworld’s centenary was marked by 
a decision to plant 23 000 trees in disadvantaged communities throughout South Africa, 
690 of which were earmarked for Diepsloot West.453 
This scheme has complimented many attempts by Food and Trees for Africa undertaken 
since Diepsloot’s formalisation. The company acts to encourage environmental 
awareness, planting of trees, and the establishment of local gardening projects.454 
According to Jeunesse Park, CEO of Food and Trees for Africa, the effects of the project 
have been;  
…increased property values, encouraging people to plant gardens, settle 
erosion, cleaned the air, controlled noise levels, provided shade and 
increased civic pride.455  
Councillor Mulauzi is in awe of the effects of these and other partnerships; 
                                                 
450












MM: The community love them, if you can see when we have trees the people come in 
numbers to try and get one or two. The gardening programs assist people here a 
lot too. It really helps the development of the community because it is not just a 
giving of something. Building partnerships it is much better because it involves 
people working with their own hands. Like the new sports grounds here, the 
people see it as positive. Every new development… every piece gives them new 
hope. 
JB: Is there a transfer of skills involved? 
MM: We try to get as much skills development from each one as possible. For example 
there is a lot of involvement from the areas around and schools like St. Peters in 
the schools here in Diepsloot. Those are very successful. 
JB: How has formalisation assisted in this process? 
MM: Formalisation has been the main reason behind so many improvements here… 
ownership of this place for the people has helped a lot. Companies and individuals 
are more ready to help us here now, because they see it will now last a long time. 
 
The success of building private-public partnerships and service delivery in newly 
formalised Diepsloot as opposed to the difficulties of those of building similar projects in 
informal settlements is often related to questions of ownership of land.456 Ownership is 
often touted by residents and administration officials as a prime solution to questions of 
transient populations.  Ownership and formalisation bring numerous advantages; 
…it is very important […] you can see if you walk around which areas are 
settled now, the difference is there. We know we belong here now, that if 
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we move it is because we decide.457 
However, ownership and formalisation are not without their own problems. Ownership of 
property in newly formal settlements is hampered by the legacies of Apartheid’s 
Homelands Policy; 
Under the previous government, Tswanas were settled in one place… 
Zulus in another, people had little plots there which still exist. People call 
this place ‘home’ like we have ‘roots’… we have this thing of ‘going 
home’ all the time […] The problem is a big one, the challenge is to make 
here their home, because otherwise people get a house from government, 
stay for few years and can’t get a job. So they sell it and go ‘home’[…] we 
need to remove this mindset. There are now some people who call 
Diepsloot home and they are very proud of it. You can’t get these people 
to leave… that is the way we want to build it.458 
This discussion highlights an important issue concerning the sustainability of the 
formalisation of informal settlements. Efforts aimed at the provision of housing have 
suffered numerous setbacks due to the resale of government allocated housing by those 
struggling with poverty in peri-urban settlements. Typically, those selling their properties 
return to a shack settlement often in the same area, or resettle in settlements in the rural 
areas – often in former homelands.  
Development projects and job creation projects are key to overcoming this problem. The 
formalisation of housing for those unable to afford the added (yet often hidden) economic 
burdens which housing brings is often counter productive due to this phenomenon. 
Without increases in economic opportunity in the form of employment and wages, the 
sustainability of permanent populations within newly formalised settlements is often 
impossible. Ownership is therefore not without its problems, presenting a number of 
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significant challenges relating to the socio-economic development of informal 
settlements. However, in the instance of Diepsloot the advantages of formalisation and 
ownership have been proved, and as such have allowed for stimulation of a notion of 
permanence amongst the population. 
 
Public-private Partnerships in Zevenfontein 
Numerous small public-private partnerships exist within the Zevenfontein informal 
settlement which impact on various brown issues. With regards waste, local contractor 
for the Johannesburg Municipality, Pik-it-up has instigated a waste collection program as 
response to President Thabo Mbeki’s program of Zivuseni (pick yourself up). In keeping 
with the rhetoric behind the programme, the project aims at involving the local 
community in the areas involved to assist in the improvement of their areas. Both 
Diepsloot and the Zevenfontein settlement are involved; 
The focus is on education of the people on the environment because the 
whole thing is on environmental health and people taking care of the 
environment. We still want to develop further programs to involve the 
people. because we don’t want the people to just sit down and say the 
environment is negative… they have to do this on their own as well.459 
The program employs local labour from the area to collect waste in the streets and spaces 
around the settlement. Whilst as facilitators, Pik-it-up claim to be sponsoring some 
degree of education about waste disposal and its importance to the local community, the 
program has been hugely advantageous in providing much needed employment. The local 
community has acknowledged some of the successes of the program,  
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It is much better than before, but still it is up and down. When it rains here 
it is very terrible because the litter runs through the streets from these big 
skip bins. But still it is better than before.460 
Dela agrees with this assessment saying community response has been good,  
The people highly appreciate [the program]… it has assisted so many 
people who are just sitting around doing nothing, having nothing to eat, at 
least now they are getting paid a little bit… R400 every two weeks.461 
A second set of programs in the Zevenfontein settlement concern the provision of health, 
sponsorship of education, and local empowerment. Key to these programs has been the 
work of the Rotary Ann Foundation in conjunction with the Bryanston Anglican Church, 
St. Michaels. The program has three primary forms: empowerment of local women in 
Zevenfontein through a sewing program; distribution of food parcels to crèches and the 
sick; and sponsorship for local schoolchildren in both Zevenfontein and Diepsloot. The 
entire project has been running for 10 years, and is supervised by Arena Brombacker, 
relying on charitable donations from private donors and businesses. 
Arena Brombacker (AB) argues that the major concerns in the area are a lack of health 
care compounded by the unhealthy environment, problems with schooling and the 
absence of recreational facilities. 
AB: Lack of health provisions for me is the worst problem. If somebody gets ill, I have 
seen them get brought to the gate in a wheelbarrow, as sick as can be…. 
JB: Are there a lot of children that get sick here as a result of their environment? 
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AB: Absolutely, in fact I’m surprised that more children don’t get sick, but they are 
remarkably resilient to these things here […] but there are definitely limits, and 
the situation here is not a joke…. 
JB: Problems with water sources? 
AB: I have never seen it personally, but I have heard some dig holes and collect spill 
over water with bags, also some the river. The women also wash in the river and 
they wash their clothes. When the river is streaming it is one thing, but when it is 
still... well you can imagine. 
Rotary Ann has been instrumental in the provision of a container for the settlement to 
function as a basic clinic, and in the subsidising of a ‘mobile clinic’, literally an 
ambulance with a dispensary for generic medicines.462 The impact of these achievements 
are difficult to measure within the unhealthy local environment. 
Malnutrition and the rate of infections of HIV/AIDS in the settlement are growing at an 
alarming rate, and part of the Rotary program has involved the distribution of food,  
We hand out E-pap, a special type of porridge which for many of the 
malnourished children here is the only staple source of food. We try to 
confine this to the crèche children and those AIDS patients we have 
identified, as it is an extremely expensive project.463 
Arena Brombacker has been very critical of recent attempts at partnerships in the 
settlement, especially the Pik-it-up program, 
The people picking up paper and picking up dirt, I don’t know how much 
that is a political joke… because they say we are now providing 
employment. In this weather, fine… but when it is hot it is another story. 
They work in the sun all day and put the bags out for collection. But by the 
time the truck comes to collect them they have broken, or the people have 
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broken them looking for recyclables, the whole thing flies all over again. 
And so, the joke begins again. I suppose it keeps the program going, but 
how efficient it is… I’m just not sure. Added to this those involved have to 
travel far to collect their wages.464 
The inadequacies of waste removal carries not only the danger of infection from contact 
with waste, but also the increased activity of disease vectors. Rats and other vermin are 
drawn to discarded waste in large populations of informal settlements. Despite infections 
from these pathogens and their biological waste, their presence is an indicator of severely 
negligent hygiene levels,  
…the E-pap we hand out, we have an incredible problem with storage. The 
rats are constantly running here […] you’ve seen the hundreds of dogs too, 
they breed all the time. There is no vet here for them, most are sick and 
unfed. They disturb bins and toilets and some get so hungry they eat 
human waste. Some of them are eaten by the starving people here as well. 
[throws up hands] I have no answers, we just carry on.465 
The Rotary Ann schooling program sponsors 87 children in Zevenfontein. Each child is 
sponsored by a R2,000 per annum contribution to the program, which provides for school 
fees, uniform and transport. The lack of infrastructure in Zevenfontein makes transport a 
huge problem, with dirt roads meaning collections cannot be organised internally, and 
with all schools being a great distance from the informal settlement; 
The transport is pathetic, the busses although they are government buses 
[…] are always hopelessly late, if they come. The solution is, that these 
pupils that we now sponsor already, have to come here in the afternoons 
and while we have no formal teachers, we try and teach them something 
[…] at best it keeps them off the streets and away from the non-working 
adults.466 








Education in the Zevenfontein settlement is severely lacking, with ward statistics 
revealing 3,129 (6%) with no schooling of any kind, and 7,125 (14%) with only access to 
some primary- or having finished primary schooling in the ward.467 
Social problems resulting from poverty in Zevenfontein are prevalent, with high 
incidences of abuse, teenage pregnancy and alcoholism. The lack of recreational 
facilities, crèches, child care and money for schooling in the poverty stricken settlement 
has resulted in a place of extreme danger for the youth. 
AB: Here there are no recreational facilities at all. The young children are amazing, 
these children are never bored, playing all the time […] our biggest worry are the 
teenagers. We have amongst the children we sponsor, 4 pregnant girls, 2 in high 
school and 2 in primary school. 
JB: What programs have been put in place to combat teenage pregnancy? 
AB: Nothing outside of the Rotary project… this year we try to give counselling to all 
the bigger children, at least the high school children. So when they come in the 
afternoons we have counselling, life skills and… they can come with all the 
questions. But that is a big problem, there is nothing for these children, nothing at 
all. 
JB: What about crime towards that age group? 
AB: It is endemic, what is shocking is that very often it is from within their own 
families. The number of stories is just too shocking. Fathers molesting children, 
happens all the time. The drinking problem here is terrible, and when they get 
drunk they get abusive. Abuse is often by the parents, and then of course the 
‘uncle’, the ‘good neighbour’… the situation is very unsafe. 
                                                 
467
 Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96 
 192 
 
The final tier of the Rotary Ann program in Zevenfontein is the empowerment of the 
local women through the teaching of sewing classes, providing skills which are then 
advertised by Rotary Ann to local clothing manufacturers.468 Further, the program has 
selected a number of dedicated women from Zevenfontein to work in a group, sewing 
and embroidering orders for companies, and for sale at local flea markets. Women are 
paid a percentage of the earnings, with the remainder being redirected into the sewing 
project and feeding scheme.469 Since its inception the sewing project has been the victim 
of at least 5 attempts at break-in and theft of both materials and equipment. 
This demonstrates again a highly complex set of responses by the local community to 
programs aimed at stimulating empowerment in informal settlements. Examinations of 
community responses to private-public partnerships in informal settlements such as that 
above, are useful in identifying a number of issues affecting emotions of pride and 
permanence felt by inhabitants in periphractic spaces. Profound differences in the public 
response to these partnerships between the Zevenfontein settlement and those in the 
Diepsloot new formal settlement; may be interpreted as symptomatic of inhabitants 
general attitude towards their local environments. Again discussions here are often 
directed to the numerous advantages to be gained by formalisation, that of a feeling of 
permanence and pride of place through ownership. The lack of permanence suffered in 
the psyche of inhabitants of Zevenfontein has often lead to a lack of both pride and value 
for these projects, which makes for their extension into a wider-community integration 
project all but impossible.  
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Juxtaposed to these considerations are the local community’s attitudes towards permanent 
structures or ownership. This discussion will turn to responses to the ongoing relocation 
and granting of ownership at Cosmo City. First the practicality of the relocation will be 
addressed in the next section, where after the local response will be examined. 
Cosmo City – Paradise or Pipe Dream? 
Amongst the many policy considerations and social justice issues surrounding the 
Zevenfontein informal settlement’s ongoing move to Cosmo City housing development, 
exist a plethora of practical problems. 
First among these concerns are issues of the availability of employment and proximity to 
jobs and areas for consumerism. The area of Zevenfontein developed largely due to 
increased migration to the predominantly ‘white’ affluent areas in search of employment 
and basic needs. Proximity to areas of skilled employment is already listed as a problem 
affecting inhabitants of both Diepsloot and Zevenfontein,470 with many technical and 
skilled jobs requiring long commutes to the Johannesburg business districts or the 
Randburg CBD, incurring high transportation costs to those already in the margins of 
economic poverty. For the unemployed, proximity is a crucial facet in the search for jobs 
while not being able to afford even the most rudimentary of public transportation 
services. As already mentioned, the vast majority of women employed in both Diepsloot 
and Zevenfontein are employed in private houses, relying increasingly on proximity to 
areas of high density residential development in fairly affluent communities able to afford 
domestic employment. 
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With these considerations in mind, the relocation of a portion of the populations in 
informal settlements in these areas to a location further away from their areas of 
employment471, presents a greater burden in terms of employment and economics to these 
populations. For these reasons, Arena Brombacker, social worker in Zevenfontein is 
sceptical of the merits of the Cosmo City project; 
It is very far, the ones that have a job will lose it immediately or at least in 
time. There is not space at present for a school I have heard, why are they 
moving there? The schools are here and transport is already a nightmare, 
they use these government buses without a brake between them472 
Despite the opportunities for employment in the initial stages of the construction of the 
Cosmo City project, the area is not one with a high distribution of residential space to 
support the current number of workers employed in private households which would 
allow them to forego their current jobs in distant areas. In short,  
…the entire project is premised on the successful development and 
reconstruction of the Randburg CBD and Kyasands Industria. These 
programs haven’t even begun to be successful yet.473 
The lack of employment in these areas has raised questions as to the sustainability of the 
relocation and formalisation, problems which are not uncommon in the development of 
Greenfield developments on the peri-urban fringes.  
Those already relocated to Cosmo City have begun to feel the effects of the decline in 
employment opportunity. One resident who runs a shebeen from her new RDP house 
commented, “Business has become very bad… nobody has the money anymore because 
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they lost their jobs […] every day you see lots of people here because they must walk so 
far to get the jobs.”474 
Attempts by some residents to compensate for losses by working from home have been 
met with resistance from local leadership and developers. Leslie Kekane, a welder by 
trade received numerous threats from developers for running a welding shop from his 
stand;  
LK: The People we are not just allowed to use this space for anything… the CLO 
she comes to tell us we must stop these things here. 
JB: CLO? 
LK: Community Liason Officer… but there is nothing else what we can do […] 
we can’t put the security gates because we have no permit. So the tsotsis break 
in… we can’t put a fence because we must all have the same so it looks like the 
same. But this is not what we want.475 
 
Alterations or additions to RDP housing have been tightly policed by the developers in 
the area – leading to a significant degree of animosity between developers and residents; 
“This CLO she is not for the community… she must be a DLO because she is for the 
development.”476 
A further major concern to the residents of Zevenfontein is the degree of capital loss 
likely to be incurred in the relocation. Within the informal settlement there exists 
numerous dwellings which have involved relatively large expenditure to the inhabitants 
in their construction. During the interview process in Zevenfontein, three out of the five 
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households visited were engaged in the process of building or improving various sections 
of their dwellings; while in Diepsloot, one such project was visited. Whilst many of the 
poorest shack dwellings are constructed from corrugated iron, wooden boards, discarded 
scrap metal and empty metal transport containers; a significant number of dwellings have 
involved more formal building materials. One respondent, Sonia Pitso (SP), a resident in 
Zevenfontein has built a home consisting of four rooms on her allocated plot in the 
settlement; 
JB: Most of the shacks here, where do the people living in them get the materials to 
build them? 
SP: Most of them are buying the tin from scrap dealers, or from traders, or from 
people who left this place [Zevenfontein] to go somewhere and do not need the 
shacks anymore. Some get bricks and wood from the hardware, or from the 
dumps at construction places around. 
JB: You stay in one of these houses? 
SP: No, I am in a brick house, it is much better than the old house I had close to the 
river, that one was tin… they moved me after the heavy rain to my new place 
higher up. 
JB: How much money have you spent on building your new house? 
SP: I’m not really sure… I bought the bricks from another place which was broken 
down – four loads and it was about R100 a load. Then the cement, I bought only 
ten bags because I did not plaster inside because we are moving. I think about 
R2,000 for all of it, maybe a little bit more than that. 
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If seen in light of statistics for ward 96, which lists 26,715 people not having any formal 
monthly income at all477, this expenditure is quite significant. The respondent is engaged 
in domestic work for a family in the Fourways area, earning less than R500 a month. The 
house she has built serves as home to herself and five children, two of which are still 
attending schools in the area; the father of her children having left the family 5 years ago, 
and not contributing in any way to their children’s upbringing. This respondent is very 
apprehensive about the move away from Zevenfontein, but welcomes it, in final 
summation as preferable to the current state of impermanence, 
Being here are not knowing where we stand is not the right thing, we need 
a permanent place. Even if it is this Cosmo City, if they give us a 
permanent place there, I will go. But not an RDP house, that is going to 
take too long and I don’t want an RDP house, just my own stand. I will 
have to build my house again – but I am very tired of Zevenfontein. They 
have been trying to get rid of us here since 1994, I don’t want to stay here 
where I’m not wanted by people – it’s not the right thing.478 
Added to the financial implications of relocation are considerations concerning the 
psychological and physical burden on inhabitants; particularly the elderly. Felicity 
Sithole (65) resident in Zevenfontein comments,  
My main problem now is they say I must move from here… I am old now 
and I must move again. I just make my house nice after they move me 
from there to here. I want to make my house nice here, but they won’t let 
me build anymore because they say they want us to move. I don’t know 
where I’m going to be this time again next year. I’m scared to carry on 
here. I lost everything when they moved me last time.479 
The emotions expressed by these respondents were typical of those amongst the wider 
population of informal settlements in the area. A history of relocation and forced 
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exclusion has fostered emotions relating to dispossession, both of land and of other 
tangibles. Crime and the threat of theft has left a life of deprivation for some residents, 
“living in these situations, you can’t just buy anything… in the shacks they remove the 
roof and just climb in, if you have a door they put the chain on and pull the wall down, 
you can’t stop it.”480 Apart from material deprivation, informal settlement dwellers due to 
their history are deprived of a feeling of permanence and belonging, again illustrated in 
differences amongst inhabitants over the treatment of public spaces and involvement in 
local community clean-up programs; 
 
JB: What has the local response been to attempts to improve the general environment 
here? 
QK481: We have got the people working in the area – but because of the conditions we are 
living in it remains bad. Some appreciate the help, but still there are those who 
think ‘what for?’ 
JB: Do you feel the people in this area suffer from a lack of pride in their living 
spaces? 
QK: You can see here which of the people don’t care. Some of these place, even that 
they are shacks, the people try and look clean. Some people they don’t want to. 
They come with rubbish and plastic bags, throw cleaning water in the streets… so 
the place is always dirty, it’s always stinking. 
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The lack of pride generated in some by the lack of permanence in settlements can have 
extremely negative effects on both economic potential and social ills. Compounded by a 
lack of employment in proximity to the settlements, the effects can generate high 
incidences of alcoholism, abuse and crimes such as theft and assault amongst the 
population; 
Some of these people here are so creative, so good with their hands 
building such nice houses. But some of the women are very flat and I can 
understand that. They sit in these places all the time and just do nothing. 
They don’t think they are a person who means anything, and they have a 
right to do something and just be. That I find is the most difficult thing; to 
give them some pride, it is very very hard.482 
Emotions of insecurity and a lack of self-esteem have not been addressed in many 
instances through formalisation at Cosmo City. The settlement has further served to 
recreate some of the more commonly listed sources of new insecurities, by separating 
neighbours of the Zevenfontein settlement in the relocation process. Of all the newly 
relocated residents of Cosmo City interviewed – only one reported being relocated in 
proximity to one of her previous neighbours.483 While some answered that forming new 
neighbour bonds has been a relatively easy process – most agreed the loss of old trust 
networks was a significant concern to them – particularly in the initial weeks of 
relocation.484 The lack of knowledge to the ability to rely on ones neighbours is a 
significant loss to many residents, many of whom remain concerned over intra-
settlements crime activities, particularly amongst the large unemployed populations 
resettled without the means to adequately cope with the costs of the relocation process. 
                                                 
482
 Private interview: Brombacker 
483
 Private interview: Ivy Sibanda 
484
 Private interview : L Kekane (21.06.2006) 
 200 
Electrification and the first time acquisition of electrical appliances by some residents 
increases their visibility and insecurity, with many residents demonstrating this new 
insecurity with the erection of security gates and burglar proofing despite development 
regulations prohibiting these.485 
A further area of concern relating to the move to Cosmo City is the qualification for 
housing in the new housing location both among those living in Diepsloot and 
Zevenfontein. Assuming the problems with the legal stalling of the new housing 
development can be rectified, the problem of qualification for plots or new houses is still 
a grave concern. Qualification requires that each person applying for a new house in the 
location be in possession of a South African Identity Document (ID), have an income  
and at least in the first phases of housing provision the process is accelerated if the 
applicant has a number of dependents.486 
Whilst the problem of a lack of income has already been elaborated on, the problem of 
identity books in informal settlements poses a significant problem to Ward Councillors 
and administration staff.487 Many in the informal settlements of Zevenfontein and 
Diepsloot are not in possession of a South African ID book.488 Two reasons typically 
exist for this problem; that of the existence of illegal immigrants in the settlements, and 
the legacy of population registration under the previous Apartheid regime. The immigrant 
problem is a significant one in both settlements. Drawn by the vast numbers of people 
living in a small place and the provision of services (although of the most basic kind), 
illegal immigrants flock to these areas due to the relative ease of non-detection among the 
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masses of shack dwellers, and the possibility however remote of finding employment in 
the surrounding centres; 
There are a lot more illegals here than I expected, I found this out when I 
tried to sell clothes [from the Rotary sewing project] to the broader 
community, and when organising UIF489 payments. There are so many – it 
creates such a problem when you try to find employment for these people. 
I’m not interested in it (politics of citizenship) personally. People have to 
eat, so I don’t care.490 
Issues arising from illegal immigrants in these settlements are often brought up as 
concerns in community meetings and protests, such as the demonstrations in Diepsloot in 
February 2004 by SANCO, the South African Civic Organisation. In this protest 
approximately 5,000 people marched on the Ward councillors office to protest the 
allocation of housing to those without the correct documentation. A central claim of the 
demonstration was that many illegal immigrants had been allocated government housing 
in the newly formalized areas of Diepsloot, before those South Africans who were in 
possession of the correct documentation.491 With regards those born in SA not having the 
correct ID books, this problem stems from the Apartheid homelands policy, where the 
racially marginalized were concentrated in remote areas under the jurisdiction of local 
‘tribal’ authorities. The registration of births in these areas proved to be remarkably 
deficient, especially relating to female births. Many in South Africa are as a result 
without birth certificates or identity documentation of any kind. According to Councillor 
Mulauzi;  
At least three times a week I have members of the public come to me for 
assistance in getting a South African green ID. Most were born here but do 
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not have any proof… because Apartheid didn’t care how many were born 
in Venda or Bophuthatswana, just as long as they stayed there. ID books 
have become very important now for the people to vote or to get C forms 
for housing.492 
Whilst the granting of ID books to those denied under Apartheid is a central program in 
the government’s policy with regards Home Affairs, the process will undoubtedly take 
time. Illegal immigrants on the other hand remain outside the borders of legality despite 
having taken up residence in these informal settlements. The immigrant question stands 
to be one of the more significant challenges to these settlements during formalization, as 
the question over what will happen to the thousands living in informal settlements around 
the country is addressed. 
Within Cosmo City itself however, many have alleged that despite not having the correct 
documents, many non-South African citizens have received housing.493 Claims such as 
these resulted in an outbreak of violence in the areas in February of 2006 – during which 
time the then ward councillors house was burned to the ground.494 The appointment of 
the new councillor for the ward heralded the solution to the violence along with the 
promise that exemptions for non-South African citizens who had been residing in South 
Africa for a lengthy period would be made a transparent process for monitoring by the 
community. 
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Chapter IV 
Reactions to Exclusion, Affluent Areas and 
Dainfern  
The experience of decades of exclusion on populations in the informal settlements is 
expressed in many ways. The initial experience of exclusion involves the populations 
alienation from their environments through the inadequacies of service provision to 
which the settlement is subjected, whilst other manifestations include exclusion from 
space and permanence. These emotions are common in most respondents, particularly in 
response to issues of environmental equity with their affluent neighbours. 
Residents Reaction to the Environment in Zevenfontein 
Inhabitants of the Zevenfontein informal settlement were found to be far from callous or 
naïve about the quality of their environments. Apart from issues of spatial 
marginalisation, common issues of concern for those living within the settlement 
focussed on water, waste (both human and otherwise) and electricity. 
The settlement varies between those using water from water tanks, community stands and 
other ‘natural’ sources. Reliance on natural resources often relates to the inadequacies of 
service provision from communal water tanks; 
SP: We want things that go forward, we want things that work now. Like the water – 
you see where we must go to get water. 
SN495: Sometimes we drink water from the hole. There is a hole at the back here. 
JB: Borehole? 
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SN: The water coming down here…. 
JB: Rain water? 
SN: Ja, it runs down the hill here into the hole, because the tanks here are not right. 
Sometimes the people are going to get water and they get the condoms coming 
from inside the tanks. 
MN496: Everything, dirty things… panties, cats, the rotten food…. 
SP: Really it is true. 
SN: They are throwing all those things in there, we don’t know where that water is 
coming from to have all this inside. 
 
The health implications of informal water collection, although well known by inhabitants, 
are mitigated by the necessity of water collection in context of scarcity of even these 
more formal sources. Problems with service provision to growing number within the 
settlement make scarcity a common experience; 
JB: Do you fetch water from the [communal] tap? 
QK: No it is from the tanks, but the tender which is in this place now, service is very 
poor. We have had at times… 3 maybe 4 weeks, no water in the tanks. 
JB: Is it difficult to get the amounts you need? 
QK: Very difficult yes, we have to wake up very early in the morning to fetch water. 
Otherwise you are going to stand here 3 days with no water in the tanks. We have 
to store it in these containers here so we can have water when we need. 
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Scarcity and the physical burden of water collection often translate into a further 
economic and time burden on the population. Quite separate from economic losses 
suffered from unclean water supplies in the form of illnesses, the necessity of water 
collection creates additional burdens on the population, a burden typically visited 
disproportionately on women. Consider part of the continuation of the above interview; 
JB: How often for you go to fetch water? 
QK: Maybe 6 times? I don’t know because you see why… we don’t do cleaning every 
day so it is different. 
JB: How long does each trip take? 
QK: About 10 or 15 minutes ‘cause I have to walk from here. 
JB: Do you have to queue? 
QK: Sometimes on weekends the queues are very bad. 
JB: So that’s quite a lot of time from your day? 
QK: Yes, and then we must still go to work. After that we are already tired. 
 
Whilst these effects are already significant on families where able-bodied persons exist to 
perform this function, the problem is compounded in those instances where the 
inhabitants are elderly or frail. Further, in instances where either single mothers are 
working to support a household with young children or elderly relatives, the effects of 
fatigue can add additional burden and work-stresses on the households economic 
situation. Single parent households are common in informal settlements due to the 
paucity of employment. One parent typically leaves to find employment elsewhere.497 
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Further, the prevalence of social ills leads to a high incidence of single mothers, either 
because of extra-marital promiscuity, or abandonment by either parent.498 
The issue of waste removal and sanitation is often dealt with by respondents under the 
same reference of waste or rubbish, a situation which is fairly fitting since often it is 
difficult in informal settlements to distinguish the two because of the inadequacies of 
service provision, “The people here with no toilets sometimes use the toilets in these big 
dustbins here.”499 
Environmental problems of service delivery are further compounded by the resultant lack 
of pride by those faced with deteriorating living conditions; 
MN: Many people don’t want to live nice anymore. Look there is running water all 
over, there is rubbish all over. It is not safe here so you can’t to the toilet at night 
so people just throw their urine in the streets, the place is very dirty. 
SN: We are staying in a pig’s place here, nobody can stay like this. 
MN: What about the kids? They play here in this rubbish because you can’t tell them. 
 
This if further illustrated by comments from another respondent, “We are in the dustbin 
here, some of us want to get out of this dustbin but we have no power to do it because the 
other people make it rubbish again.”500 The numbers of people using the public toilets 
and issues of safety has lead many to build make-shift untreated toilets in their own 
stands, often by merely excavating a deep hole in the ground and building a structure 
around it. These are often serviced by the contractors emptying the public toilets for a 
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charge.501 The informality of construction and the relative economic burden of emptying 
these toilets regularly creates a situation where waste is allowed over time to seep into the 
ground, where it might have detrimental effects on the groundwater table. Inhabitants feel 
they have little choice in the matter; 
Sometimes they [sanitation services] don’t come for a long time, like over 
Christmas they didn’t come. These toilets here were very bad at that time 
[…] and you can’t just send your children off to the toilets alone, you must 
go with in case… it is not safe for the children.502 
Despite physical safety, all respondents reported illnesses or other health problems 
arising from the level of waste, human and otherwise, in the settlement. Particular 
concern was felt by those with children, with the lack of safe clean recreational spaces 
meaning that often children are at play in and amongst waste.503 
A further issue, the prevalence of animals in the settlement compounds these problems. 
Within Zevenfontein, a large number of animals, particularly dogs are clearly visible; 
both those kept as pets by inhabitants, and those running the streets due to a low 
commitment towards ensuring pets are sterilised, both because of a lack of services and 
funds; or merely as a result of abandonment, again as a result of economic hardship. 
Some of these are bred for sale to animal loving members of neighbouring white 
residential areas.504 Despite the immediate dangers associated with disease transfer from 
these animals because of the lack of veterinary services, their frequency in the settlement 
compounds problems of waste removal and the control of human and other waste. Many 
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animals here are on the brink of starvation,505 and frequently disturb bins and tear plastic 
bags in search of food; 
Sometimes in the morning the dogs go from here and they go out and bring 
back the plastic bags where somebody has gone to the toilet and they drag 
it around. We have to wonder why the white people don’t want to live with 
us… it is because of these things too.506 
Erosion presents a related problem to sanitation. Rain in the settlement not only erodes 
roads and washes waste into dwellings, but the lack of groundcover ensures deep troughs 
whereby waste can be washed from one area of the settlement into another. Further, 
waste is often washed into the nearby river resulting in high concentrations of bacteria 
such as E-coli in the water,507 which is used by many both in Zevenfontein and elsewhere 
for water supply and bathing. E-coli in the Jukskei river in September 2003 showed the 
levels of this bacteria which is an indication of sewerage contamination at 14 million per 
100ml of water, whereas acceptable levels are 200 per 100ml.508 
Lack of basic services is often related to the prevalence of social ills in the Zevenfontein 
settlement. For example, a discussion about crime or rape may lead to a discussion 
concerning the lack of electricity to light the settlement, a lack of security services, the 
absence of day care options or safe spaces for children for recreation away from potential 
offenders. Crime is prevalent in the community, with women, the elderly and children 
bearing its harshest manifestations; 
People are beating each other, raping the women… even the old women. 
The other one was an old woman the other night she was crying for help, 
and when the people got there they found this very young guy trying to 
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rape this old lady. And he was very small to try and rape her.509 
In any discussion on services the issue of electricity for safety emerges; 
SN: We want electricity badly here for lights, because it is very dark here. There is 
many places for people to hide here, and lots of roads that people can run away. 
JB: Is the violence worse because of the conditions here? 
EM510: You see how many we are here, there are lots without work and too many 
criminals. 
SN: When there is no light you can’t even see who is there… or what is happening. 
 
Both the provision of sanitation services, and electricity are implicated in many health 
issues then, with high opportunity for crime existing where these are absent. Fire is a 
further worry to residents, with increased reliance on paraffin and candles in lieu of 
electricity; 
The shacks are made of tin and wood, and do not hold the heat inside like 
bricks. In winter they get cold and put on stoves and have blankets, which 
make the fire.511 
Members within the community have tried in the past to find solutions to these problems, 
I was doing volunteer work for ‘Children of fire’ and I spoke to the 
director about this place and I organised that they must come and put tanks 
here, these high tanks with the water from the fire department for the 
cooling down of the shack fires. But now the people who run this place say 
we are moving and we don’t need anything here. How long have we been 
moving from here? But the people die from the fires all the time and the 
                                                 
509




 Private interview: Mmapule Ndabani 
 210 
children are left without mothers while we are waiting.512 
Whilst the dangers of the unhealthy environment are felt by all; children are often the 
more severely affected. The prevalence of health issues, security concerns and social ills 
affecting these age groups are often related to the fact that clearly defined safe spaces for 
children are unavailable. Despite the building of various crèches both by private 
inhabitants as a source of income, and by various charities as donation to the settlement; 
numerous children are left without place of supervision while adults are either at work or 
looking for work opportunities. This problem is compounded by the scarcity of resources 
for schooling of children. Despite the government’s program of free education, numerous 
factors limit the availability of this to inhabitants; including the costs of transport to 
schools, uniforms, school supplies and the problem of illegal immigrants with children in 
the settlement. The lack of education, supervision and money for food makes these 
children targets for the perpetuation of various social ills, a situation not only visited on 
the young children, but on teenagers as well;  
EM: There is a lot of problems here with the young children here, taking the drinks, 
stealing and playing with drugs all the time. Our children are losing hope here. 
There is lots of children here with talents, but they lose hope here. 
SN: You can’t get help from anywhere, can’t take money from the bank because we 
are not permanent here. 
EM: Like my eldest daughter, she finished school and now she can’t find any job. Now 
she is having a baby two months ago and still there is no chance for her here. 
What is going to happen now with that baby? We are in darkness here. 




SN: I’m feeling pain, like a mother – nothing is sweet for me here. I don’t mind telling 
you… look at this place here. Your children get healthy and play nicely… our 
children they don’t get healthy […] But they say we are leaving… how many 
years have we been leaving? The children growing up here, I can just tell you this 
child [indicates to a small girl of around 7 years old] … in December this child 
was raped. 
MN: And you call the police or the ambulance, if you call the ambulance they will 
come in about five hours somebody already died. And the police, you call them 
but they don’t come. 
 
Close associations and proximity between the settlements of Diepsloot and Zevenfontein 
have lead many to envy the benefits which formalisation has brought the area of 
Diepsloot. Ownership is a hotly debated topic in the informal settlements of both 
locations. In contrast Zevenfontein inhabitants must deal with exclusions from the 
benefits of ownership of land, particularly the issues of exclusion from Dainfern and 
attempted exclusion from the area of Cosmo City through the actions of white 
landowners there. The emotions of exclusion are widely expressed throughout the 
settlement, and it is these emotions to which the discussion now turns. 
Reactions to Land, Affluence and Exclusion  
Amongst those living in the settlement of Zevenfontein, the main reason expressed for 
the current move to Cosmo City does not relate to concerns for unhealthy environments 
where they are now, but rather an attempt to push them away from the affluent areas, 
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“The white people don’t want us here, they want to build on this piece of land where we 
are staying… and they have a lot of lawyers.”513 
Popular anger towards this process is most often directed at the Dainfern establishments; 
MN: Dainfern, they treat us like the monkey, you know? They build this fence here… 
it’s like a border gate, they see us like monkeys. 
SN: They don’t take us like people. 
SP: They want to keep us away because they want to build for themselves where we 
are. 
SN: Those people in Dainfern they just want to put their own money and play the golf. 
What about us? They tell us this place must also be a golf place. Where are we 
supposed to go? 
MN:  They must move the lions to the Lion Park!514 Next to Cosmo City! [Laughs] 
SP: No, we must stay here. We can clean it here ourselves. 
 
But Dainfern doesn’t bear the sole brunt of responsibility for exclusionary practices. 
Even amongst the newly formalised Diepsloot residents a degree of animosity is present, 
It is a very strong feeling here in Diepsloot too, not only in Zevenfontein. 
The white people of Fourways and Lonehill say we are right in their 
backyard – which we are not, not even the whites now can have a backyard 
this big – and they don’t want us here. Whose land is this really? Is it for 
the whites? Or is it for all the people of South Africa? We don’t really 
have a democracy if it is not for everybody. Somewhere, some how we 
have got that, but is it really practical when you come and see what is 
here? We have offered to develop the informal spaces here and in 
Zevenfontein as formal place, to try and build up there. But then they 
change from saying the place is unhealthy to just ‘No we don’t want this 
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here’. Where are we supposed to stay now?515 
These feelings of exclusion often lead to strong feelings of alienation amongst the 
population, including feelings of inadequacy such as expressed by this respondent, 
“It is because I don’t have money, I can’t build a big house like them. 
They don’t treat me like a person. When I see the people living there – the 
white people, I think maybe God doesn’t love me.”516 
Exclusion is also often expressed as an absence of acceptance or belonging, a feeling 
compounded by the existence of road closures and the erection of high security 
complexes; 
JB: How do you feel about things like these high walls erected by the affluent areas or 
things like boom closures? 
QK: It makes me feel like we are strangers – we are from here and lived here for a long 
time but we are still strangers. And the people from the outside they are the 
beneficiaries of this place. I am not a stranger, I am not a criminal. 
JB: How do you feel to know the same problems exist at the new location for the 
Cosmo City complex? That you are not wanted there? 
QK: It is very painful. The worst is that a lot of the people in Dainfern are there by 
contract, they are coming from overseas. But we are born here – look here is my 
ID. And we have no place. I am a criminal here, but this is my own country. 
JB: So you don’t feel like you belong? 
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QK: Ja, which is why I say we are not the beneficiaries of this place. If you see the 
people in Fourways and Dainfern it is simple. They are the beneficiaries of this 
country. 
 
Those in favour of road closures, particularly those in the ‘white’ areas have typically 
argued these exist and function as a deterrent against criminal activity, that exclusion is 
not the purpose of these structures. Consider the following conversation with DA 
Councillor Kate Lorimer (KL); 
KL: The main problem with road closures is that in the past these haven’t been 
managed properly, management has been left up to the communities enclosed and 
they have been the ones excluding people. Now we have policy in place we can 
begin to monitor these types of issues more effectively. You have communities 
who took ID books away from black people entering – they are not allowed to do 
that. 
JB: And yet the issuing of permits and checking of ID books is common. 
KL: Well communities have to understand that they can’t exclude people from these 
areas, and it’s all very well to say that people are being excluded, but they all have 
to understand they have rights as well. 
JB: Is that a realistic expectation considering the history of – 
KL: [Interrupts quickly] Look, guards from security companies are told that they are 
not supposed to let anybody in that doesn’t belong there – I accept that it happens. 
This is why closures have these types of negative reputations. And it’s perfectly 
understandable for me, that any black person who comes along… because 
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restricted access is taboo, of course they are going to feel like that. It’s almost a 
self-imposed exclusion though. 
JB: You have a population here which has been kept in that role for so long, how can 
you distinguish between their reality of physical exclusion and a psychological 
exclusion to these communities? They do feel left out or unwanted. 
KL: I’m sure that feeling is there. But also with the rate of crime in our country… I 
think people have the right to protect themselves. 
 
Others within the white residential areas where the road closures occur are not always as 
forceful; 
I accept, and I have had it mentioned to me before, that it [exclusion] is a 
huge problem and no doubt as time progresses these communities within 
will get more insular or more paranoid about individuals from the outside, 
questioning their bona fides – wondering why if they don’t live here they 
should be allowed in. It undoubtedly promotes such insular thinking. I 
think most of us are unhappy with these consequences. But the whole 
problem with road closures is the fact that it is this choice between two 
unsatisfactory arrangements, crime is in a very bad state […] No doubt 
people on the outside feel excluded, but talk to those on the inside and they 
are so convinced that it works. It is a strange social phenomenon we have 
gotten ourselves into.517 
The Politics of Road Closures: the “Berlin wall” and Abstract Rights 
vs Demanding Rights 
The apparent reality of road closures and security complexes however, is that amongst 
residents of the informal settlements, they are perceived as a mechanism to halt their 
integration into broader society; 
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FS518: They make my heart sore, this is no good. When I want to go and visit my friends 
who are staying in there I am sometimes told I cannot go in. It is not alright like 
that, they are keeping us separate. 
JB: What do the guards tell you when you ask to go in? 
FS: I am told that it is not our place. We must just shut up. 
 
It is not only the ill educated, elderly or otherwise disempowered members of settlements 
who are excluded, Councillor Mulauzi of Diepsloot herself has had these experiences. 
Often perceived exclusion is reinforced by real or tangible objects signifying the persons 
status as an outsider; 
Often I can’t go into these places either, unless I’m organised to be there. 
You have to have a card which they give you to wear if you going in on 
foot, like a pass. And I don’t think white people have the same thing, they 
normally just sign in with their cars. People talk about these issues in our 
meetings… a lot. But because people who have money – they own these 
opportunities [...] Many of those people are not even South African, and 
the people here know this too. But they have a right to stay and own 
property in Johannesburg. But people who are born here like myself cannot 
live there. Even enter! They can’t even enter into those places.519 
Exclusionary practices have often been the source of many indictments of those 
communities involved, as being concerned with an attempt to segregate the population 
along the racial lines established by Apartheid; 
SN: I’m sorry to say this, but those people are still in a big Apartheid. Sometimes I’m 
asking myself, why… because Apartheid is finished. 
MN: Apartheid is still here… nothing is finished. 
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SN: These people are really in a deep Apartheid. There are some really good white 
people – but most they don’t like us and they don’t respect. Else how come we are 
living here. 
MN: They don’t want to live by us. 
 
This identification of contemporary exclusion with the terrors of forcible relocations and 
the separate development of the Apartheid years is an intensely worrying one. The 
continuation of large bodies of those racially marginalised in transient peri urban 
existence bears little hope for the future of integration and development of these 
marginalised into broader society. The idea that relocation for formalisation is akin to 
relocations based on racial categorisation under Apartheid cannot be wholly justified, in 
so far as the planned contemporary relocation does not form part of an overarching 
program of racial subordination and exploitation. 
Yet in many respects the connection in the minds of those inhabiting the margins is 
hardly surprising. The fact that many in the white residential areas surrounding informal 
settlements perceive these as unwanted, its inhabitants as other or something to be 
externalised is hardly in doubt.  
What is apparent from the research, is that the practice of exclusion through the 
mechanisms of private choice and legal measures is exemplified in these ‘white’ 
residential spaces. Crime and social ills characteristic of a spatial setting where the 
overwhelming majority of the population are marginalised economically is undoubtedly 
to blame for an increased paranoia with regards security measures undertaken by 
inhabitants of ‘white’ affluent areas in South Africa. Areas in wards 106 and 101 reflect 
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this expenditure, with high walls and sophisticated security measures introduced to keep 
those who do not belong, out. 
The high visibility of these measures to those marginalised is of profound significance to 
their effective operation. The erection of high boundary walls in white neighbourhoods, 
and enormous expenditures on security patrols and sophisticated alarm systems with 
large warning stickers in all the black languages, is keenly felt by those still reeling from 
decades of spatial separation. 
Road closures and security complexes then are perhaps the clearest example of what 
Goldberg refers to in his argument to the effect that the Group Areas Act is remodelled 
and reproduced in the context of seemingly democratic and integrated communities the 
world over. These arrangements serve to implicitly deny, or at least create the perception 
of an ability to do so, not only the marginalised’s access to private property – but further 
denies access to thoroughfares in the form of roads, economic opportunity by sealing off 
places of employment or merely extending transportation costs; and in the least, isolating 
individuals from broader community integration through the creation of isolated micro-
communities within these enclosures. 
In this way then it may be argued that exclusion is merely altered in terms of those 
methods employed to ensure its operation. Exclusion based on the legalistic operation of 
a racially constructed ideology gives way to the process of economic and private choice 
based marginalisation. Freedoms of association and the right to protect ones property 
form the mechanism whereby an infinitely more subtle process of racialized exclusion 
can be maintained. 
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The process further acts to reinforce itself by its very nature. By isolating communities 
the burden on marginalised populations to reach the level of economic competence to 
enter or at least challenge these types of arrangements increases dramatically, as 
employment opportunities decrease, and the chances for economic opportunity resulting 
from even casual social integration is impaired. 
Reaction to Cosmo City: Party Politics in Zevenfontein  
Despite the various protests form residents as to their exclusion from the proposed 
Cosmo City development, a significant portion of the population are against the move. 
A key reason for many of these objections deals with the inadequacies of communication 
between the local government representatives of the settlements and the people they 
represent. This interview from mid-2005 is a case in point; 
SP:  We have many times heard of this Cosmo City. They took us there about a year 
ago, but there was nothing there yet, just a stand they showed us the whole day. 
SN: How can they show us something that is not there? We can’t see Cosmo City; 
there is nothing there for us but the leadership’s promises. 
 
The issues arises in conversation with another respondent, 
Our leadership, those people who are the leaders here. If they are telling 
the people the truth, that Cosmo City is delayed about this and that – the 
people will understand. But they are only promising Cosmo City is near, it 
is coming next month – when they know exactly that those people at 
Cosmos City they are in court day and night because they don’t want it.520 
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Despite issues with the transparency of leadership of the informal settlement of 
Zevenfontein, a more sinister charge of ethnicism regarding the leadership of the 
settlement has been expressed. There is no doubt there exists amongst residents a general 
feeling that the interests of ANC members are paramount in the minds of the settlement 
leadership, followed by interests of those of Xhosa ethnicity521; 
SP: We ourselves also have ‘Apartheid’ in here as well – we are divided between 
Xhosa and everybody. 
MN: The ANC supporters too…. 
SP: If you want to go up to the gate (Administration building) to use the computer up 
there to type up some CV, they ask you “where is your ANC card?” If you don’t 
have it – you can’t use. 
SN: They want is to vote ANC, but they don’t want to help us. They are not ‘for the 
people’ here. 
 
These claims were confirmed in part by DA ward councillor Kate Lorimer, who runs a 
trauma centre at the Witkoppen clinic which caters to Zevenfontein, and who sits on the 
Community Policing Forum for the Douglasdale Police precinct responsible for the 
Zevenfontein settlement; 
Zevenfontein is very political, their community development forum, which 
as far as we are concerned is an ANC body – will only look out for those 
who vote ANC. They rule it with an iron fist.522 
The politicisation of ethnicity in the informal settlement of Zevenfontein further 
exacerbates the poor level of community integration. Poor transparency of the local 
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leadership underlies many of the reasons behind resistance to the relocation of the 
settlement. Most hard-felt is the burden which relocation will entail on the population 
economically, as well as a desperate need to realise a continuation of each person’s 
history; 
JB: Given the opportunity, would you prefer to stay? 
QK: Yes, the schools are here, the churches are here, jobs are here. Most of us were 
born here as children. 
SN: We went to Witkoppen school, we attended high school in Alexandra but we 
 come back here everyday. 
QK: This is our place here. 
 
These emotions are echoed by numerous residents. Despite the fragility of attachment to 
space incurred by a legacy of forced exclusion, there exists numerous other more 
pragmatic attachments,  
I don’t want to leave from here, I must stay where I can work. So they 
must come and build Cosmo City here… this can be our place and the 
place for our children.523 
Pressure from within the settlement for formalisation of the existing settlement is intense, 
with many looking to the example of Diepsloot as one where formalisation in greater 
proximity to the white residential areas has brought with it numerous advantages. 
Consider this discussion; 
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QK: I hear from people that if you are in a settlement for more than five years you can 
overpower that place. Why can’t we do that here? We’ve been in this area much 
longer than that. 
JB: How do you feel when you see the advantages gained by Diesploot through 
formalisation? Do you not hope you can gain the same at Cosmo City? 
QK: Why Cosmo City? The same thing can happen here. Councillor Mulauzi has done 
a good job there – but the leadership is strong in Diepsloot and they tell the truth. 
Here they are shy and are telling us lies. 
 
It is unclear to what extent the desire to remain at Zevenfontein exhibits the general will 
of the entire population of the settlement. Some seem genuinely optimistic about the 
various improvements in services to be offered at the new location, while others yearn for 
ownership of even a small dwelling removed from the suburban centres where they work. 
Consider again the following statement; 
Being here and not knowing where you stand is not the right thing – we 
need a permanent place. Even if it is this Cosmo City… if they give me a 
permanent place there – I will go.524 
The issues of a division in the wishes of the inhabitants concerning the relocation relates 
to the prevailing uncertainty of the future of the settlement, but also more often to the 
indignity of what is felt to be a forced exclusion from land which inhabitants have 
occupied for a great length of time, and which psychologically some lay claim to as their 
own from the past. Those opposed find little difficulty interpreting the apparent support 
for relocation; 
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JB: How do you explain the mixed feelings about Cosmo City? Some seem happy 
that you are moving. 
QK: How can these people be happy here like we are now? They only have Cosmo 
City, they only hope for Cosmo City. The leadership know this and they want the 
people to think Cosmo City is here for everyone.  The people don’t know… they 
are dying each and every day. They are scared to lose Cosmo City because they 
have nothing. 
 
These sentiments are echoed by social worker Arena Brombacker concerning the 
apparent support for relocation;  
They are excited because the place is still just a promise, a dream. But as 
soon as they stop and think and are faced with their reality, the problems of 
moving, of jobs, of schools – they want to stay.525 
Alternatives to Relocation from Within the Margins 
Whilst inhabitants of the informal settlements remain divided between the merits of 
relocation and those of formalisation, various political alternatives have been proffered 
from those engaged in political campaigning in the area. Councillor Mulauzi, herself a 
resident of Diepsloot West, is full of praise for the government’s decision to formalise 
Diepsloot on its existing site, arguing formalisation is the key to true sustainable 
integration; 
[…] there is not representation here… not at the moment, and there won’t 
be for a long time until… it is something we are working for, developing 
for. But we want to be next to the white areas like Dainfern. Myself, I 
would love to be next to Dainfern. [laughs] The people want… what can I 
say… a multi-development – the poor here, the others there. Why can’t we 
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live like this? 
The construction of informal settlements precludes permanence, to the extent that even 
public-private partnerships are unlikely to develop past simple charitable exercises.526 
A further supporter of the formalisation of Diepsloot informal and Zevenfontein is the 
DA’s Kate Lorimer, ward councillor for ward 101. She argues that practical problems 
such as qualification for housing and the un-sustainability of relocation do not present 
viable options.527 Lorimer shares Mulauzi’s view, as she argues; 
I’m a big believer in the fact that in the next few years we’ll have 
developing across the city small pockets of slightly less well-off people in 
the suburbs. The only way this is going to work is if they are properly 
formalised. But you have this white fear, they forget that these people have 
been living in their backyards for the last 40 years anyways.528 
Unfortunately history would argue that both these statements suffer from the same 
misguided view of democratic society in Western nations; a view where democracy has 
lead to true integration- that is of the whole population into a single landscape unmarred 
by boundaries based on ‘race’, separating the marginalized from society – or from equal 
opportunity. As we have argued in Goldberg’s analysis, the existence of race-based 
political marginalisation does not depend on concrete absolutes or actual legal 
mechanism – but rather that marginalisation in space is often more subtle. The 
interconnectedness of marginalisation in economics with other typologies of 
marginalisation, including that related to space; are as evident in settings such as 
Compton Los Angeles as it is in the settlement of Zevenfontein. Differences of method 
and scale not withstanding; both serve as sites for the physical concentration of a racially 
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determined Other, through a complex weave of mechanisms encompassing economics, 
social pathologies, and a denial of true permanence or place. 
The solutions proffered by political pundits in the area of the case study then remain 
naïve in light of these findings, and represent an optimistic interpretation as to the 
abilities of our integration agenda, which at present can only hope to promote 
development for a future attempt at true multi-racial or multi-class based procedure in 
policy making. For the moment however, the situation facing the marginalized remains as 
described by Mulauzi in the following passage; 
The people here know the saying ‘how we treat others…’; what are these 
people here saying to us? We do not make this mess because we like it, we 
want our own areas, we want to belong in the same South Africa – not in 
black South Africa alone. But instead we have this ‘Berlin Wall’! Why do 
they need this wall? For now we have one thing to do – we have to 
convince these people to move, because really they are not wanted there. 
The problem is very difficult, they can’t stay – the courts will be full of 
complaints night and day. They can’t stay.529 
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Conclusion 
This study attempts to place a discussion of informal settlements of the studied region 
into a conceptual framework of Goldberg’s notion of social exclusion, particularly that 
relating to space and spatial configurations in the suburban context in South Africa. By 
elaborating on the discourse of Environmental Justice, the study further attempts to reveal 
the inadequacies of the current development discourse managing the post-Apartheid 
government’s approach to informal settlements, undertaken in terms of the neo-liberal 
development model. 
The study of the four wards above demonstrates the intensity of the contestation over the 
definition of environments, their beneficiaries and permanent spaces for the marginalized 
in the contemporary suburban landscape of Johannesburg. The surviving ‘racial’ 
pathologies whether express or bearing a covert reformulation and reproduction of 
centuries of racially configured settlement patterns, which alienate uniqueness and 
reconstruct difference along socially constructed racial lines as ‘Other’, bear testament to 
the serious nature of this conflict. 
The contestation places those among affluent white communities who would embrace the 
spatial dislocation of the contemporary urban landscape, complete with the alienated and 
marginalized black non-permanent population; against the marginalized, those 
inhabitants of periphractic spaces striving to overcome their exclusion from all aspects of 
contemporary society, in the search for integration. 
The re-occurring notion of integration, or in most cases truer integration, in the 
responses from those interviewed is somewhat positive in light of the theory – yet it is 
hardly surprising if one considers the price to be paid by the marginalized in terms of 
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their environments as well as other social concerns. The case study is illustrative in this 
way of Goldberg’s assertion that “…race is more than simply the site of stratification, for 
the latter merely presupposes the establishment of levels of socio economic being.”530 
Rather in light of the evidence we can argue ‘race’ to be a significant catalyst in the 
construction of contemporary spatial forms – where space is atomised, areas are insulated 
through a non-acceptance and reconstruction of difference and subjugation. 
Analysis of the spatial configuration of the areas in the case study assists in an 
understanding of how spatial subjugation learned and habituated by systems of racial 
bias, are reproduced in polities with a supposed liberal demeanour. The operation of 
abstract rights to property, the freedom of association and rights to guard ones life and 
property – though indispensable for the operation of democracy; act to limit integration if 
their meaning is allowed to become perverted by an over-eager universality or 
abstractness. Abstract freedoms and universally constructed rights often fail the poor and 
marginalized by depriving them recourse to uniqueness and individual histories in the 
process of policy-making or decision-making in wider democratic society. Thus in the 
operation of abstract rights, opportunity is presented as equal despite the respective 
histories, experiences and burdens of agents. 
Finally the case study catalogues many of the subjective experiences of those 
marginalized within the periphractic spaces. Despite commitment to democratic 
integration; policymaking and the operation of private choice has evolved to allow the 
erection of increasingly insular, racially defined residential spaces. The identification of 
these practices with the erection of new ‘Berlin Walls’ amongst the marginalized as 
illustrated by the case study, highlight the divisive nature of their underlying ideology; of 
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race-based socio-political contestation in the politics of spatial configuration. Further, the 
implication of a continued acceptance of relocation of the marginalized as an option to 
contested space, points to a reconstruction of Apartheid Bantustanization, based on 
allusions to environmental sustainability – as an acceptable outcome to the failures of 
democratic integration. 
Evidence from the case study is highly illustrative of the fact that often urban integration 
proceeds from an uninformed standpoint. The dangers of such an approach are illustrated 
by the study and may be seen as proof of Harrison’s assertion that “there clearly are 
forms of fragmentation that add extra burdens to people’s lives, and that detract from the 
possibility of safe, liveable, sustainable urban environments.”531 
The emotional responses of residents of the margins may be seen as inherently grounded 
in their day-to-day lived experience of social and environmental exclusion, and as such 
provide a telling testimony of exclusion and oppression in the post-Apartheid era. 
Responses from these residents exhibit a sophisticated understanding of their local 
environments and spaces – providing an important account of life in informal settlements 
and the experience of ‘racial’ and class exclusion of residents in both political, spatial and 
socio-economic, and environmental terms. 
While it is acknowledged that spatial integration by necessity has evolved in cities the 
world over, protecting a significant degree of difference and separation of racial, class 
and cultural groups; the extent to which dramatic inequalities pervade these different 
groups in the South African context resulting in highly oppressive circumstances for the 
marginalized results in the status quo being un-sustainable and detrimental to the 
realisation of true integration. In short, while difference is widely held in liberal theory to 
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be desirable or a necessity – policies and practices in South African which have allowed 
for the preservation of ever-widening inequalities between groups within society – 
compounding the economic, social and environmental burdens of one clearly defined 
group in order to achieve the material and social prosperity of another – exists as a 
profound example of pervasive socio-economic, political and environmental injustice. 
From a social justice perspective then, these spatial dislocations and social inequalities do 
matter and should form the basis for concerted effort aimed at the promotion of justice 
for all citizens as expressed in the realisation of the rights to citizenship entrenched in the 
Constitution – as opposed to their contemporary abstract application to the marginalized. 
 
This highlights a crucial element in the discourse of ‘brown’ environmental theory and in 
particular the discourse of environmental justice. Whilst contemporary environmental 
activism not following environmental justice discourse could foreseeably praise the 
relocation of informal populations to areas such as Cosmo City, based on quality of 
environments or threats to their sustainability; many environmental justice activists 
would find it difficult to agree. The crucial factor in this discourse’s rejection of the 
relocation would relate not so much as an attempt to deny a wholesome environment to 
those marginalized, or to prevent the further degradation of occupied spaces; but rather 
opposition is directed at the construction of entire marginalized populations as LULU’s, 
or as the barely tolerated by-products of capitalist production (labour), whose negative 
qualities demand externalisation at any opportunity. 
Environmental Justice, to the extent that it is situated within the conceptualisation of 
social justice, allows for a broader consideration of the demands and wishes of 
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marginalized populations, specifically as they relate to brown issues such as employment 
and equal exposure to benefits of ones environment. In this way, the discourse avails the 
marginalized of mechanisms for the realisation of their autonomy, with the implication 
that relocation no longer exists as the only available policy option. 
Finally then, the extension of environmental justice aims to construct equity in procedural 
policy making processes involved in the treatment of informal settlements, and the 
structuring of urban settlement patterns, allows for many opportunities for integration and 
social justice to be realised. 
What is most evident from the case study is the need for development programs to move 
beyond the macroeconomic entrapment that allows for the perpetuation of social and 
spatial dislocation. 
Environmental Justice, to the extent that it is situated within the conceptualisation of 
social justice, allows for a broader consideration of the demands and wishes of 
marginalized populations, specifically as they relate to brown issues such as employment 
and equal exposure to benefits of ones environment. In this way, the discourse avails the 
marginalized of mechanisms for the realisation of their autonomy, with the implication 
that relocation no longer exists as the only available policy option. 
The recognition of the complexities of social forces underlying informal settlements is 
tantamount to the reversal of these tendencies and the building of sustainable outcomes; 
which are not only non-destructive of the livelihood strategies of the poor and 
marginalized, but further can act to support and extend these underlying networks of 
social capital to assist populations to cope with material inequalities in broader society. 
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What is crucial then in light of the evidence, is the need to reform the dominant neo-
liberal development path as embodied in the GEAR framework, to a development path 
more committed to meeting the needs of redistribution and livelihoods-sensitive 
development. 
Neoliberalism in the South African adaptation has proved to exacerbate differences 
inherited from Apartheid while simultaneously divorcing these from their historical 
political and socio-economic legacies. The result has been burgeoning poverty and the 
tendency for activists to argue the promotion of distinct graded classes of citizenship in 
South Africa – those able to manipulate the market-orientated discourse to achieve 
prosperity and the incumbent enjoyment of newfound liberal freedoms, and the 
overwhelming majority of the poor not able to enjoy any but the most abstract rights to 
citizenship. 
The end result of these policies has been the enabling of affluent ‘white’ communities to 
affect the relocation and dislocation of the ‘other’ and the insulation of their residential 
spaces against this enemy, while simultaneously the only rights to environments or space 
for the marginalized are to dust-bowl developments in isolated peripheries such as Cosmo 
City, or in formalised locations such as Diepsloot which appear as islands of the poor in 
affluent zones – complete with vacant surrounding buffer zones to prevent future 
encroachment. The demonstrated absence of the political will on behalf of the ANC-led 
government to affect a more equitable distribution of assets and a reformation of the 
market-led neo-liberal development approach, suggests that this model of spatial 
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Appendix A: List Of Interviews 
Interviews Ward councillors 
Siphiwe Dela – Ward councillor ANC ward 96 – 18.01.2004 – denoted by: SD. 
- 27.06.2005 
- 23.11.2005 (telephonic). 
- 09.01.2006 
 
Mmatlou Mulauzi – Ward councillor ANC ward 95 – 20.01.2004 – denoted by: MM. 
 
Kate Lorimer – Ward councillor DA ward 101 – 21.01.2004 – denoted by: KL. 
 
Dennis Hunt – Ward councillor DA ward 106 – 21.01.2004 – denoted by: DH. 
 
Isaac Maila – Ward Councillor ANC Ward 96 – 24.06.2006 (telephonic) 
 
Interviews Diepsloot residents  
Isaac Ngwenya - 07.01.2004  
 
Maria Mlambo – 20.01.2004 
 
Portia Dhlamini – 20.01.2004 
 
Interviews and informal discussions Zevenfontein  
Sonia Pitso 17.01.2004 and 19.01.2004 – denoted by: SP 
 
Selena Ndabani 17.01.2004 – denoted by: SN 
 
Mmapule Ndabani 17.01.2004 – denoted by: MN 
 
Felicity Sithole 17.01.2004 – denoted by: FS 
 
Elsie Mahape 18.01.2004 – denoted by: EM. 
 
Queenie Khumalo 18.01.2004 – denoted by: QK 
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Rosa Phaleng 15.03.2006 and  29.07.2006 (relocated to Cosmo City). 
 
Social worker in Zevenfontein 
Arena Brombacker 24.01.2004 – denoted by: AB 
 
Kate Lorimer (also DA councillor but runs trauma unit in Diepsloot.) 21.01.2004 
 
Interviews and Informal Discussions Cosmo City. 
Leslie Kekane 14.04.2006 and 21.06.2006 – Denoted by LK. 
 
Alina Mneswa 21.06.2006. - Denoted by AM 
 
Albert Mneswa 21.06.2006. 
 
Ida Ngwenya 25.06.2006 – Denoted by IN. 
 
Grace Dhlamini 25.06.2006. 
 
Julia Malete 14.05.2006 
 
Samuel Phaleng 01.02.2006 
 
Sarah Mojela 21.11.2005 
 
Ivy Sibanda 21.11.2005 
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Maps – Appendix 1 
 
 
























Map 6: Cosmo City Locality plan, showing existence of the settlement on the periphery – source: Joburg. 
Org.za Official Website of the City of Johannesburg, link: http://www.joburg.org.za/2004/dec/ 
